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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
This paper presents the MISS  model (Modelo Integrado da Segurança Social) and 
illustrates its use in two ways: firstly, through an analysis of the sustainability of the 
Portuguese public social security system in the light of the main reforms agreed in 
October 2006 between the government and social partners (the trade unions and 
employers federations); and secondly, through an assessment of the effects of these 
measures on the synthetic indicators of public finance sustainability used by the 
European Commision. 
 
MISS is an accounting/actuarial model developed to generate projections of the accounts 
of the contributive components of the two public social security subsystems in Portugal 
(i.e. the contributive parts of the Segurança Social subsystem and the Caixa Geral de 
Aposentações – CGA – subsystem). Emphasis has been put on detail in the design of the 
model, with the aim of emulating the extremely complex rules underlying the country’s 
pension provisions. Due to its actuarial nature, the MISS model suffers from certain 
limitations, above all the fact that in many aspects the behaviour of economic agents is 
treated as exogenous. This would not be the case if it were a general equilibrium model. 
However, given the available modelling techniques, the treatment of the two subsystems 
using an overlapping generations general equilibrium model would not allow for the 
level of generational heterogeneity that would have been required to achieve a minimum 
degree of realism. 
 
Since the aim of the model is to assess the financial sustainability of both subsystems, it 
is logical to restrict the analysis to their contributive components. It is reasonable for a 
benefit requiring a contributory history to be financed out of contributions and for other 
benefits to be financed out of taxes. The MISS model does not therefore take into 
account pensions and other payments of a non-contributive nature, such as the 
Rendimento Social de Inserção, granted to those on very low income irrespective of 
their contributive careers. Following the same logic, there is also no account made of 
pensions that are the direct responsibility of the State, such as those paid to military 
personnel and police officers injured on duty or to their families if they were killed 
(known as pensões de deficientes das Forças Armadas and pensões de preço de sangue, 
respectively). 
 
Two sets of projections were generated over a 75-year horizon (i.e., up to 2080). They 
differ in terms of the inclusion (exclusion) of the main reforms in social security agreed 
in October 2006 between the government and social partners. The baseline scenario 
without reforms depicts a situation of serious financial imbalance and reveals a situation 
that is clearly unsustainable. If no measures were taken, the consolidated primary deficit 
  iiof the two subsystems would go beyond 10% of GDP by the early 2040s (it stood at 
2.5% in 2005), even including in the revenue that part of VAT earmarked for social 
security as legally stipulated (around 1% of GDP). In the no-reform scenario, the 
implicit social security liabilities, evaluated as the present value at 2005 of the 
consolidated primary balances for the period 2005-2080, reach more than 500% of 
GDP.  
 
For the baseline scenario including the effects of reforms, the accounts show a 
significant improvement. The most conservative assessment of these effects depicts a 
primary deficit on the rise until mid-century, reaching almost 5% of GDP (less than half 
the amount for the scenario without reform), before gradually declining to around 2% of 
GDP by end-horizon. A more optimistic assessment puts the primary deficit on a 
downward path over the horizon, reaching equilibrium in the later years. The present 
value of the stream of future primary balances stands between -190% and -90% of GDP. 
In both assessments, the implicit liabilities for the CGA contributive subsystem account 
for around 90% of GDP. 
  
These conclusions depend on verifying a wide array of assumptions, both demographic 
and macroeconomic. A sensitivity analysis carried out on the projections shows that a 
bigger rise in fertility than supposed in the baseline scenarios results in an improvement 
in the financial situation of the Portuguese social security, albeit not very markedly. The 
effects of a smaller reduction in the mortality rate are somewhat more significant. If life 
expectancy were to rise only by half the figure set out in the baseline scenarios, a fall in 
liabilities of between 23 and 38 percentage points of GDP would be the outcome, 
depending on the scenario being considered. A different trend growth in productivity 
would also have a non-negligeable impact on the consolidated social security accounts. 
The baseline scenarios assume a 2% annual growth in productivity but this, given the 
behaviour of this variable over the last ten years, could well be optimistic. If risks on the 
downside were to materialise, the imbalance in the Portuguese social security system 
would become larger. For example, if the productivity annual growth were 1% a year, 
implicit liabilities would rise by between 15 and 39 percentage points. As a last point, a 
fall in net immigration flows, as compared with the assumption that the figure to 
horizon will be as in recent years, would also impact negatively on the country’s social 
security accounts. It should be noted, however, that the MISS model, which is not a 
general equilibrium model, cannot accurately project the social and macroeconomic 
effects of immigration, particularly on the unemployment rate. 
 
The analysis detailed in this paper also assesses the effects of the reforms in the 
European Commission’s sustainability gap indicators for Portugal. This reform cuts by 
around half the component pertaining to age-related public expenditure. If this reduction 
comes along with the continuation of the process of fiscal consolidation under way, this 
should allow for the country’s public finance sustainability assessment to be improved 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
MISS is a model developed at the Banco de Portugal to generate long-term projections 
of the accounts for the two public social security subsystems. These are the subsystem 
run by the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (Segurança Social) and the CGA 
(Caixa Geral de Aposentações) subsystem. The first is the predominant social security 
scheme, accounting for most private sector workers, while the latter (which was closed 
in 2005 to new registrations) covers most public employees contracted up to 2005, as 
well as some employees of public owned (or formerly public owned) enterprises. The 
model detailed in this paper was used for two purposes: firstly, to analyse the 
sustainability of the Portuguese public social security in the light of the main reform 
measures agreed in October 2006 between the government and social partners
1; and 
secondly, to assess the effects of these measures on the synthetic indicators of public 
finance sustainability used by the European Commission.  
 
In the literature, two types of models are typically considered for social security 
sustainability assessments: 
-  Models based on actuarial/accounting criteria; 
-  Dynamic general equilibrium models with overlapping generations.  
In models of the first type, the macroeconomic scenario to horizon is set by the analyst, 
and it does not react endogenously either to reform or to possible changes in the 
perception of economic agents as to the financial sustainability of social security. 
Dynamic general equilibrium models, on the other hand, try to take account of the 
decisions of economic agents relating to inter-temporal optimization. In particular, the 
second type of model, unlike the first, permits the modelling of changes in the labour 
supply and demand as well as in consumption, investment and savings decisions 
resulting from the policies under review.  Over the past twenty years, since publication 
of the seminal work by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), there has been notable progress 
in the dynamic computable general equilibrium models with overlapping generations, 
but they still have serious limitations in terms of how realistically they can emulate the 
functioning of social security systems. For example, aspects related to modelling 
demography or the rules for pension accrual and access to other benefits are still 
unsatisfactory. In contrast, actuarial/accounting models can be rather more detailed and 
realistic in the treatment of demographic and labour market features and of the rules by 
which the social security system works. For these reasons, there is a clear trade-off 
between the two types of models, both in terms of advantages and of drawbacks. 
                                                  
1 In terms of the general social security subsystem, this agreement is set down in the Social Security Framework Law 
(Law 4/2007 of 16 January) and in Decree Law 187/2007 of 10 May. The December 2006 update of the Portuguese 
Stability Programme (Ministry of Finance 2006) sets down the measures to be extended to the CGA subsystem 
(section I.3.2, clause A8). The corresponding legislation was approved in March 2007 and should be published soon. 
  1 
MISS belongs to the first type of model, which was chosen because of the need for 
flexibility in dealing with the extremely varied and complex rules governing pension 
provision in Portugal. The objective was to carry out an integrated analysis of the two 
public subsystems, which currently operate with different rules. Only with such an 
analysis would it be possible to take into account the financial consequences of the 2005 
decision not to allow any new registrations in the CGA and instead to register new 
public employees in the Segurança Social subsystem. Apart from this, there are various 
legal regimes in each of the subsystems, with relatively long transition periods, and a 
range of minimum pensions applicable in each of them. Moreover, there are two types 
of contributors in the Segurança Social subsystem, and although they are both basically 
subject to the same rules, they have features that are quite distinct: those who work for 
an employer (wage-earners, referred to in this paper as TCO, from the Portuguese 
trabalhadores por conta de outrem) and all the remainder (the self-employed, referred 
to in this paper as TI, trabalhadores independentes). 
 
The concern for detail in the modelling cannot hide the fact that MISS suffers from 
limitations typical of models of its kind. The most important caveat has been mentioned 
above – it does not allow for endogenous analysis of the changes in supply and demand 
and in the consumption and investment decisions of economic agents stemming from 
their adjustment to the reforms in social security that are being assessed. 
 
Another limitation is that the model was not set up to evaluate the effects of a possible 
transition from the present pay-as-you-go schemes to totally or partially funded 
schemes. The MISS model stemmed from the option to build an analytical tool to 
provide a detailed assessment of the effects of measures that change the parameters of 
the existing schemes. A capitalisation programme, if adopted (and, in particular, 
assuming that the capitalisation takes place outside the general government sector, as  
was the case in other countries where this has taken place), will have considerable 
implications for public finance indicators and lies beyond the scope of the present paper. 
 
It is important to highlight that the model only takes into consideration the contributive 
components of the two subsystems, i.e., no account is taken of payments not 
conditioned by past or present contributions by the beneficiaries or their families. In 
terms of the Segurança Social subsystem (the Subsistema Previdencial da Segurança 
Social, designated in this paper by its Portuguese initials SPSS), the model treats 
expenditure on pensions related to contributions, as well as unemployment benefits, 
subsidies for temporary absence from work (sickness, maternity, paternity and adoption 
benefits and allowable household assistance), along with family benefits
2. Therefore, 
total expenditure does not include pensions and other payments of a non-contributive 
nature, such as the Rendimento Social de Inserção (granted to those on very low income 
irrespective of their contributive careers). In the CGA case (the subsistema previdencial 
da Caixa Geral de Aposentações, designated in this paper by its Portuguese initials, 
SPCGA), the same logic has been followed and only expenditure on pensions and on 
family benefits are included (since the CGA is responsible for the payments of the latter 
to its pensioners). Excluded from the model are the pensions paid by the CGA that are 
the direct responsibility of the State, such as those paid to military personnel or police 
                                                  
2 Given the limitations in available information, projections of expenditure on family benefits in the SPSS also 
includes the non-contributive component, above all the expenditure on family allowance abono de família and 
funerals paid to beneficiaries who have no contributive career. This is, however, a very minor element. 
  2officers injured on duty or to their families if they were killed (known as pensões de 
deficientes das Forças Armadas and pensões de preço de sangue, respectively). 
 
The option to restrict the analysis to the contributive components of the two subsystems 
derives from the objective of MISS, which is to assess their financial sustainability. It is 
reasonable for a benefit requiring a contributory history to be financed out of the 
contributions of those who benefit or will in time benefit and for other benefits to be 
financed out of taxes. This principle chimes in with the spirit of the law-maker. Article 
54 of the Social Security Framework Law stipulates: “The contributive  subsystem 
should fundamentally be self-financing, based on a direct relationship between the legal 
duty to contribute and the right to receive.”
3. 
 
The model and the main assumptions are described in Chapter 2 and in the Annex. In 
Chapter 3, three scenarios projected up to 2080 are analysed, with a view to assessing 
the financial situation of the two subsystems. These are: “a baseline scenario without 
reforms”, “a baseline scenario with reforms – alternative I” and “a baseline scenario 
with reforms – alternative II”. The first scenario is different from the other two in that it 
does not include the effects of the measures agreed between the government and social 
partners in October 2006. The first scenario will be compared with the most recent 
official projections available, which also do not yet include the effects of the measures 
approved
4. The two scenarios with reforms include the four most representative 
measures of the social security reform: 
-  Earlier transition to the new formula for pension calculation set down in Decree 
Law 35/02, with a new transitional rule for SPSS beneficiaries, to be in force 
between 2007 and 2016; 
-  A new rule for updating pensions as a function of consumer inflation, the real 
growth of GDP, and the amount of the pension; 
-  A bigger financial penalty for early retirement, taking the figure up from 4.5% to 
6% for every year prior to the legal retirement age (contributors must in any case 
have a minimum contributive career of 30 years and be at least 55 years old); 
-  The introduction from 2008 onwards of a “sustainability factor” that will relate 
the calculation of new pensions to life expectancy at age 65. 
The introduction of a sustainability factor means multiplying the formula for calculating 
the statutory pension for old age by a penalty factor defined as the ratio between life 
expectancy at 65 in 2006 and life expectancy at 65 in the year before retirement. 
Contributors can opt for a combination of two extreme alternatives or “corner 
solutions”:  
-  They can put off retirement age until they completely offset the effect of the 
sustainability factor (alternative I); or 
-  They can retire at the statutory age and accept the financial penalty levied on the 
pension (alternative II).  
It is straightforward to parameterise the MISS model to cater for each of the extreme 
alternatives, but it is harder to combine them in the model, above all because it is 
difficult to forecast how people will effectively react. And the choice of the combination 
will have a major impact on the numbers of active contributors and pensioners, as well 
as on the accounts of both subsystems. For these reasons, it was decided to consider a 
baseline scenario for each of the two extreme alternatives mentioned. 
                                                  
3 Law 4/2007 of 16 January. In the previous version of this law (Law 32/2002 of 20 December), there was a passage 
with similar wording in article 30.  
4  Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (2006a).  
  3 
In Chapter 4, changes in various macroeconomic and demographic assumptions are 
introduced and the corresponding projections compared with those considered in the 
baseline scenarios. In this way the most critical assumptions for the projections can be 
identified. This sensitivity analysis is particularly important in actuarial/accounting 
models such as MISS: it helps to characterise the uncertainty of the results that stem 
from the inability of such models to generate endogenous responses from the 
demographic and macroeconomic variables to any changes in the system’s rules. 
  
Chapter 5 contributes to the discussion on the effects of the recent reform of the 
Portuguese social security system on the synthetic indicators of public finance 
sustainability used by the European Commission. These indicators enable the 
Commission to classify Member States in terms of sustainability risk, and have been 
used in the discussions under way in European institutions preparing the approval of a 
methodology that will allow medium-term objectives (MTO) to be fixed for the 
structural budget balance
5 of each Member State. 
 
The aim is for the MTO to include an additional margin over and above the safety 
margin needed for the general government deficit not to exceed 3% of GDP at an 
unfavourable economic juncture. This extra margin is related to the assessment of the 
public finance sustainability of each Member State. The greater the risk of public 
finances in any one Member State becoming unsustainable, the more demanding will be 
its MTO and, as a consequence, a greater effort of budgetary consolidation will be 
required. This ties in with the increasing concern in the Stability and Growth Pact for 
the public finance sustainability and its connection to demographic trends
6. 
  
In October 2006, the European Commission published its report entitled “The Long-
Term Sustainability of Public Finances in the European Union” (DGECFIN 2006a). The 
Commission’s services based their analysis on the structural indicators of sustainability, 
which had been coming into use since the assessments of the 2003 update of the 
stability and convergence programmes. For the first time, however, the indicators were 
calculated in a reasonably harmonised way for the Member States with the use of 
projections for age-related public expenditure. These projections were drawn up by the 
Ageing Working Group (AWG) within the EU’s Economic Policy Committee, which 
provides support to ECOFIN
 7. 
 
The Commission’s services propose a classification of the Member States in three 
groups pertaining to the sustainability of public finances: high risk, medium risk and 
low risk. This grading stems fundamentally from the figures obtained for the synthetic 
sustainability indicators, although it also takes an array of “qualitative factors” into 
consideration
8. Portugal was one of six countries graded as high risk. The others are 
                                                  
5 Budget balance adjusted for cyclical effects and temporary measures. 
6 The Stability and Growth Pact states the obligation of Member States to keep to the medium-term objective of 
reaching budgetary situations “close to balance or in surplus”. In the 2005 revision it was made explicit that “the 
medium-term budgetary objective should be differentiated for individual Member States, to take into account the 
diversity of economic and budgetary positions and developments as well as of fiscal risk to the sustainability of 
public finances, also in the face of prospective demographic changes”. This quotation is taken from paragraph 5 of 
the Preamble to Regulation CE 1055/2005 of the Council of 27 June, altering Regulation CE 1466/97. The same 
principle is stated in the Report approved by ECOFIN on 20 March 2005 and endorsed by the Council of Europe on 
22-23 March of the same year (see especially section 2.1 of the Report). 
7 These projections were published in the SGP and DGECFIN (2006). 
8 See Chapter IV of the Report. 
  4Greece, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Hungary. Portugal stands out as 
presenting the worst figures for the indicators among the EU Member States
9, based on 
the 2005 scenario considered by the Commission.  Two factors came into play in these 
results: the country’s large budget imbalance for 2005, in the framework of high 
sensitivity of the indicators to the initial budget position; and the projection of a steep 
rise in expenditure on pensions as a percentage of GDP (9.7 p.p. of GDP between 2004 
and 2050, according to projections put forward by the AWG). It should be noted that the 
calculations for Portugal did not take into account the reforms decided in 2006, nor their 
adaptation to the SPCGA in 2007, as part of the harmonisation of the two subsystems. 
 
The structural indicators computed by the Commission’s services require long-term 
projections for various types of age-related public expenditure, namely outlays on 
pensions, health-care, long-term care, education and unemployment. According to the 
AWG projections for Portugal, expenditure on pensions would seem to explain 
practically all the long-term age-related rise. As expenditure on health-care and 
education is beyond the scope of this paper, the choice fell therefore on an analysis of 
the reforms on pension expenditure and the consequent impact on the figures for the 
synthetic sustainability indicators. In Chapter 5, the assumptions underlying the AWG 
projections were adopted as far as possible, so as to avoid inconsistencies between the 
AWG assumptions for projecting the remaining items of expenditure and those used in 
MISS. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 sums up the main conclusions of the previous chapters. 
 
                                                  
9 There are no comparable figures for Greece, since projections for pension expenditure are not available.  













2. THE MODEL 
 
2.1. Structure of the model 
 
The structure of MISS is almost sequential. It can be broken down into 6 modules 
(detailed in schematic form in Figure 2.1.1): 
-  A demography module, which includes the dynamics of mortality, fertility, 
immigration and the resident population; 
-  A labour market module, which covers the dynamics of participation, 
employment and unemployment; 
-  A contributors and pensioners module, which projects the numbers of active 
contributors and pensioners from the various subsystems and types; 
-  A compensations, contributions and pensions module, which covers declared or 
stipulated compensations, new pensions and the pensions carried over from the 
past; 
-  A module for other benefits and allowances, which projects the numbers of 
beneficiaries and outgoings of unemployment benefits, of allowances for 
temporary absence from work and of family benefits; 
-  An SPSS and SPCGA accounts module, along with a summary of the 
consolidated accounts of the combined subsystems. 
 
Each variable is decomposed into gender (masculine and feminine) and age for each of 
these (with 111 groups, covering 0 to 110 years). For the variables relative to 
participation in the labour market and contribution to social security (labour force, 
employment, unemployment, active contributors, declared or stipulated compensation, 
contributions due, unemployment benefits and allowances for temporary absence from 
work), the ages were confined to the range from 15 up to and including 80. 
In the following sections there is a description of the modules in the model and an 
explanation of the assumptions used in the projections presented in Chapter 3. The main 
equations are detailed in the Annex. Figure 2.1.1 
The modules of the MISS model 
 
 
mortality Segurança Social compensations: TCO
fertility contributive TI
net immigration subsystem: contributions due: TCO
resident population TI





labour force expenditure on pensions: old age
unemployment disability
total employment: wage earners (TCO) survivor
others, ie. self-employed (TI) CGA compensations
non-active population contributive contributions due Accounts (contributive component):
subsystem: amount of new pensions: old age Segurança Social subsystem
disability CGA subsystem
survivor Consolidation of the 2 subsystems
expenditure on pensions: old age
Segurança Social no. active contributors: TCO disability
contributive  TI survivor
subsystem: length of service: TCO
TI
no. of pensioners: old age
disability
survivor no. of beneficiaries: unemployment
CGA no. active contributors temporary absence from work sickness
contributive length of service maternity, paternity and adoption
subsystem: no. of pensioners: old age children assistance 
disability family family allowance
survivor other
expenditure: unemployment
temporary absence from work sickness








Compensations, contributions and pensions:
 
 
7 2.2 Demography module 
At the heart of the MISS model are the equations relating to the projections for the 
resident population, by gender and age, for the end of each year to horizon. The initial 
figure is taken as the population at the end of the base years (2004 for the projections set 
out in the following chapters), with projections for fertility, mortality and net 
immigration. The procedure used is based on the factor analysis of the series available 
at the National Statistical Office and/or Eurostat for 1976-2004. The start of the period 
was chosen to leave 1974-75 out of the sample, avoiding the breaks in the series 
associated with the influx of returnees from the former colonies. 
It was possible to put together a very reasonable description of the evolution of the 
variables, broken down by age, using either a model with just one factor (as in the case 
of male mortality rates, female mortality rates and the net numbers of immigrants, 
masculine and feminine) or a model with two factors (as in the case of fertility rates
1). 















Figure 2.2.1 shows the evolution of the two factors describing the fertility rates 
observed over the sample period, along with projections for the 2005-2080 horizon. The 
first factor is almost uniformly correlated with the fertility rates for all ages and 
indicates the general trend of fertility. It accounts for 90.8% of the variance in the 
sample. The second factor is strongly correlated with the fertility of older women. It 
accounts for 7.6% of the variance in the sample. The baseline scenarios described in 
Chapter 3 assume the first factor to level at -1.5 (-1.3 in 2004) and the second factor to 
increase to +4 (+1.77 in 2004). 
                                                  
1 When only one factor is used to project the variables for each age group (as with mortality and 
immigration), the analytical method used is equivalent to the method proposed by Lee and Carter (1992). 
However, where extrapolation of fertility by age group is concerned, a model with only one factor is too 




 As far as male and female mortality are concerned, an upper bound of 84 years old was 
considered. This was because of limitations in the breakdown of available information 
on the resident population. One factor was identified for both men and women and this 
describes 93.2% of the variance in mortality rate for men and 95.8% for women. Figure 
2.2.2 shows the evolution of the factors for male and female mortality over the period 
(overlapping almost totally), as well as the paths over the projection horizon assumed in 
the baseline scenarios described in Chapter 3. Both these paths converge to -4 along the 
horizon (from -1.61 for men and -1.68 for women in 2004). This implies that the strong 
declining trend in mortality will continue over the coming decades, though gradually 
slowing. No attempt was made (unlike other demographic projections) to bring male 
mortality closer to the (lower) levels of female mortality. To date there does not seem to 
be any empirical evidence to support such an assumption. For ages above 84, given the 
projections for mortality at that age for each year of the horizon, it was taken that the 
mortality rate would increase exponentially with age, reaching a unitary value at 110 
years. 
 

















There are only a few statistics available for migration flows into and out of Portugal. 
The figures are, moreover, not always consistent with the population statistics and the 
natural balance. The decision was taken therefore, with regard to the period of the 
sample and for each age group, to use the net flow of immigration obtained as the 
difference between the variation in the stock of the resident population and the natural 
balance
2. These figures are, however, not really credible for ages under 5, and least of 
all for children under 12 months, nor for the over 80s
3. Given this, the factor analysis of 
net migration flows was limited to the ages of 5 to 80 (inclusive). Outside these age 
bounds, a nil figure was taken for the MISS projections. 
                                                  




3 The implicit flows indicate significant emigration of very young children and the elderly (especially 
female). Figure 2.2.3 shows how the factors deriving from male and female net immigration 
evolved, along with extrapolation to horizon. Only one meaningful factor could be 
obtained for each gender and their explained variance percentages are well below what 
was obtained for fertility and mortality: 51.2% and 55.7% for male and female net 
immigration, respectively. It was assumed that both factors would converge to 1.25 
along the horizon (1.15 and 1.23 in 2004). This implies the assumption, in terms of the 
baseline scenarios for the projections, that net annual immigration flows will hold 
relatively steady at the average of recent years. 
 
Figure 2.2.3 


















2.3 Labour market module 
This module projects, for each gender and age cohort, the participation rates in the 
labour market, the unemployment rates and the percentage of wage earners in total 
employment. The model uses these rates to compute the annual averages of labour 
force, inactive population, employment and unemployment, by gender and age group. 
As to definitions, it is worth highlighting that in the MISS model: 
-  participation and unemployment rates are to be understood in the widest sense, 
i.e., they take in all those who declare themselves as unemployed (and not just 
those who were actively looking for work during a short previous period); 
-  employment is decomposed into just two types, the wage earners who work for 
an employer (termed here by the Portuguese initials TCO – trabalhadores por 
conta de outrem) and all others, subsumed under the heading “self-employed”, 
taken in the widest sense (termed here as TI – trabalhadores independentes); 






                                                
The projections for this module are based on a series of regressions. For the years 1998 
to 2005
4 equations were estimated for the ratios between each of the variables 
(participation rate, unemployment rate and percentage of TCO in the total) and the 
related benchmarks. The regressors were the age and the percentages of individuals with 
secondary education and with university education. 
The benchmark for each variable was defined as the average figure for the variable in 
question for males with elementary education, aged 26 up to and including 45. For the 
baseline scenarios shown in Chapter 3, it was assumed that the benchmarks would be 
constant to 2080 for the participation rate and the percentage of TCO in total 
employment. The figures were 94.9% and 80.5% respectively. For the unemployment 
rate, an increase was postulated (from 8.6% to 9.1% and then 9.6%), stabilising in 2008 
and then falling until 2012 (from 9.1% to 8.6%, then to 8.1% and to 7.6%). The figure 
was then held steady. For the first two cases, the 1998 to 2005 period did not show any 
specific trend in the variables. In terms of the benchmark for the unemployment rate, it 
was assumed that the current figure is influenced by unfavourable cyclical factors, and 
this justifies the assumption that there will be a return to a natural or neutral figure from 
2010 onwards. 
Changes to the levels of schooling
5 up to 2080 were built on the basis of available 
information relating to 2005 and then on the following assumptions: 
-  The percentage of individuals with complete secondary education and university 
education is nil up to and including age 16 and 20 respectively
6; 
-  The percentage of individuals with complete secondary education and university 
education stabilises from ages 21 and 28 respectively and will remain constant 
as the age group gets older; 
-  For the intermediate ages, from 17 to 21 in the case of secondary education and 
21 to 28 for university education, a gradual increase in the percentages was 
factored in over time, with annual increases defined exogenously, to cater for the 
increased availability of education for the young. 
 
In the projections shown in Chapter 3, the annual increments considered for the 
intermediate ages were, in percentages: 
-  0.4 for males and 0.2 for females in college education; 
-  0.5 for males and 0.25 for females in secondary schooling. 
It was decided to include higher increments for males than females to avoid an ever 
greater education differential over the period to horizon. Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 show 
the resulting evolution of the structure of the resident population and the labour force by 
level of schooling. 
 
 
4 1998 is taken as the first year of the sample period for these regressions because it is the first year that 
the weights used to extrapolate the Labour Force Survey sample were updated in line with the 2001 
census. 
5 This level is defined as the maximum level of schooling achieved by the individual. 
6 In 2005, there was hardly anybody aged 21 or less with a university degree. With the new organisation 
of higher education stemming from the Bologna agreement, the model factors in a gradual increase in 
university degrees for 21-year-olds for the period up to 2010, until it reaches the percentage now 
pertaining to age 22. Over and against this, the percentage of 21-year-olds with secondary schooling was 
correspondingly reduced. Figure 2.3.1 
Educational attainment: 
structure of the resident population by highest level of education attained 
 
































structure of the labour force (aged 25 to 64) by highest level of education attained 






























For participation rate projections, the equations in the MISS model were multiplied by a 
parameter0 , to be defined by the model user. In the base year, 2005, the 
participation rate for ages above 50-55, depending on gender, present a decreasing 







Where ◊ = 0, the evolution of the participation rate (by gender and age) to horizon will 
depend solely on the paths assumed for the participation rate benchmark and for the 
proportions of the resident population with secondary and university education. In this 
situation, the fall in the participation rates for older individuals will be fundamentally 
maintained to horizon. The evolution will be different for scenarios where social 
security reforms are introduced, changing the likelihood of early retirement through old 
age or increasing the legal age for retirement. It is reasonable to accept that measures of 
this type increase the participation rate for more advanced age groups. 
The parameter ◊ aims to make the model more flexible, leading to a smoother fall in the 
participation rate after age 55. At the other extreme, where ◊ = 1, the participation rate 
for gender g and age a (with a between 55 and the legal retirement age) will be 
gradually corrected to horizon until it converges with the participation rate of the strata 
of same gender, age 55, although there may be a difference justified by a change in the 
levels of schooling. In other words, leaving out levels of schooling, the participation 
rate picture for the period between age 55 and the legal retirement age would be 
constant when ◊ = 1. Therefore, if reforms of the type already described are introduced, 
it is natural for the participation rate profile between age 55 and the legal retirement age 
to continue to decline, though by not as much as in 2005, meaning that the figure for ◊ 
should be fixed somewhere between 0 and 1. 
 
2.4 Module for contributors and pensioners 
2.4.1 Active contributors 
The dynamics of the number of active contributors are modelled separately for the 
following three sub-sets of individuals: 
-  Active SPCGA contributors ; 
-  Active SPSS contributors, who are wage earners (TCO); 
-  Active SPSS contributors, who are self-employed (TI) 
 
There are substantial differences in the way the SPCGA and the SPSS work, both in 
terms of contribution and pension entitlement rules, motivating the consideration of 
separate dynamics for active contributors in the two subsystems. In addition, the basic 
information available meant that the SPSS contributors could be divided into TCO and 
TI. It was decided to include separate equations for each of these, given the very 
significant differences that exist between them – the stipulated minimum compensation 
for TI (which is the most common contributive base for TI) is on average considerably 
lower than the declared compensation of TCO. Typically, the self-employed also 
contribute for a shorter period than the employed and both factors lead to significant 
differences in pension accrual. 
For the SPCGA, taking into account the initial figures for 2005, the number of active 
contributors is projected by adding the new contributors and subtracting the number of 
contributors who died, retired or severed from the subsystem for other reasons. The 
MISS model user can exogenously set severance rates (for all reasons but retirement and 
death) for SPCGA contributors by gender, age and year.  For the projections set out in 
this paper, a severance rate of 0.25% will be considered for both genders, all ages and 
each year to horizon. This figure is the average rate observed in 2005. It order to assess the financial effects of the 2005 decision to close the SPCGA to new 
registrations, a binary variableρ  was introduced. This takes the value of 1 or 0, 
depending on whether the aim is to build projections on the assumption that the SPCGA 
has been definitively closed to new registrations or to assume, in counterfactual terms, 
that the decision was not taken and new public employees are still being enrolled in the 
SPCGA. Closure implies that new public employees will be registered as TCO in the 
SPSS from 2006 onwards. For the next three or four decades, therefore, the SPSS will 
benefit from their contributions, without having to pay out pensions (given that the 
pensions of existing CGA contributors are reflected on the CGA accounts and not the 
SPSS). 
The number of new public employees, broken down by gender and age over the period 
to horizon, is obtained from assumptions relating to the total number of new public 
employees each year, the male/female breakdown and the age distribution. For the 
projections in Chapter 3, for each year to horizon, 20 thousand new registrations were 





































































For the SPSS, the equations for updating the number of employed and self-employed 
workers are simpler than for the SPCGA. The inconsistencies between the available 
sources of information (the National Statistical Office Labour Force Survey, the CGA 
and the Segurança Social databases) ruled out more detailed specifications. 
 
For the self-employed, the model simply projects the number of contributors in line 
with the number of TI employment, for each gender and age group. The model allows 
the user to exogenously set the evolution of the coverage rate (defined as the ratio 
between the number of contributors and employment of the same type). This could, for 
example, be used to translate a fall in the importance of the informal sector in the 
economy. The projections in Chapter 3, however, do not reflect any exogenous 
intervention on coverage rates. 
Where the dynamics of TCO in the SPSS are concerned, there are two additional 
complications, but the essence is the same as for the self-employed. The employment 
 
 
14relevant for calculation of the coverage rate is not TCO employment, but this figure 
less: 
-  the number of SPCGA active contributors (because these are already covered by 
a social security subsystem); 
-  in the case where ρ  = 1, the number of  public employee contributors to the 
SPSS who would have been enrolled in the CGA if this subsystem had not been 
closed to new registrations (because these have, by construction, a coverage rate 
of 100%). 
So, when: 
-    ρ  = 1, 
-  exogenous interventions on the coverage rates are taken out, 
-  public employees registered in the SPSS from 2006 are excluded, 
then the rate of change in the number of remaining SPSS contributors equals the rate of 
change of TCO employment also net of SPCGA contributors and of the public 
employees hired from 2006 onwards. 
 
2.4.2 Disabled and old age pensioners 
In the MISS model, the numbers of disability or old age pensioners at the end of each 
year is obtained by taking the corresponding number for the end of the previous year, 
subtracting those who have died and adding new registrations. 
To project the number of pensioners who die in a given year, the mortality rate is 
applied to the number of pensioners recorded at the end of the previous year. For those 
on a disability pension, the model allows for the user to apply a factor σ  ( ) to the 
average mortality rate for individuals of that age and gender. This factor takes into 
account that the mortality rates for those on a disability pension are greater than the 
mortality rates for the gender and age group where they belong. On the basis of 
information available for 2004 and 2005, the estimate 
1 ≥
σ  = 3.75 was obtained. 
Due to data constraints, there are no separate equations in the MISS model for the 
dynamics of disability pensioners in the SPSS coming from the TCO and TI groups (the 
same type of aggregation occurs at year-end data for old age and survivor pensioners). 
The breakdown is, however, ensured when calculating the number of new pensioners 
(as well as when calculating average new pensions). Therefore, the most relevant detail 
for a realistic projection of pension expenditure is in fact maintained. It must be borne 
in mind that there are significant differences between TCO and TI contributors in the 
SPSS in terms of compensation and the average length of contributions. 
It should also be highlighted here that an SPCGA disability pensioner receives a life-
long pension. This does not happen in the SPSS, where all those on a disability pension 
are classified as old age pensioners when they reach the legal retirement age (currently 
65). The MISS model allows the user to indicate, for each year, the legal retirement age 
in the subsystems. The equations where these legal ages come into play are 
automatically adjusted, simplifying the estimate of the effects caused by any change to 
these parameters of the model. 
The evolution of the number of new disability pensioners is projected on the basis of the 
likelihood of an active contributor retiring because of a disability. The probabilities 






disability pensioners in 2004 and 2005. They grow in a non-linear way with the age of 
the contributor. 
The numbers of new old age pensioners, by gender and age, are also projected by using 
functions which translate the “probability” of an active contributor retiring due to old 
age. In this case, however, it is not really a case of “probabilities,” because values above 
1 could be reached, typically for ages on or above the legal retirement age. This happens 
when contributors exercise their right to a pension even if they are not active when they 
do so. The equations detailing projections of the number of new old age pensioners 
differ from the disability pensioners equations in two other ways: 
-  The legal retirement age is an additional argument for the “probability” 
functions; 
-  “Mitigation factors” come into play. 
 
These mitigation factors will be equal to 1 unless the projection scenario takes into 
account policy measures that affect the “probabilities” of old age retirement. For 
example, the baseline scenarios with reforms analysed in Chapter 3 include a measure 
that implies a heavier financial penalty for early retirement, increasing the penalty from 
4.5% to 6% per year below the legal retirement age. To parameterize this measure in the 
MISS model two actions were needed to complement the change in the specification of 
the formula by which the pension is calculated: 
-  Firstly, as pointed out in Section 2.3, it was necessary to adjust ◊ so as to ensure 
a smoother fall in the participation rates between 55 and the legal retirement age 
(the parameter was set at ◊ = 0.25); 
-  Secondly, it was necessary to pin down the path for mitigating factors with 
values lower than 1, so as to express the expected fall in “probabilities” for old 
age retirement resulting from the higher penalty introduced for early retirement. 
 
For this second effect, it was assumed that 50% of potential new old age pensioners in 
this age group who were financially affected by the measure would put off their 
retirement. Where the SPCGA is concerned, there is less likelihood of new old age 
pensioners appearing with a statutory pension that is less than the minimum pension 
applicable (because these contributors will not be financially affected by the measure). 
A mitigating factor of 0.6 (=1-0.5x0.8) was assumed for the SPCGA for all years to 
horizon (on the assumption that the minimum pension is below statutory pension for 
80% of new old age pensioners). For the SPSS, where only 44.5% of new old age 
pensioners in 2005 received above the minimum pensions, the mitigating factor for 
2007 was fixed at 0.778 (=1- 0.5x0.445). For subsequent years, bearing in mind that 
there will be a gradual fall in the numbers of pensioners receiving the minimum 
pension, a decrease of 0.002 per year was assumed, implying a mitigating factor of 
0.632 in 2080, not far from what was considered for the SPCGA. 
 
 
2.4.3 Survivor pensioners 
The main differences between the dynamics of survivor pensioners in the two 
subsystems and the corresponding equations for old age and disability pensioners are 
related to the severance rates, as well as to the determination of the number of new 
pensioners. As regards the first point, in terms of existing legislation
7, there are a number of reasons 
for stopping a survivor’s pension, apart from the death of the beneficiary. Among these 
are: 
-  If the surviving spouse re-marries; 
-  When the descendant reaches adulthood or, being an adult, finishes his/her 
studies or drops out of school. 
 
Rates of depreciation in life are one of the model’s inputs, and their calibration is based 
on the distribution profile of pensioners by gender and age. No distinction is made 








































































In terms of the dynamics relating to the number of new survivor pensioners, the MISS 
model takes as the basic factor to determine these flows the number of mortalities 
among active contributors and old age and disability pensioners. The beneficiaries of 
survivor pensions can be grouped into two main categories: descendants and surviving 
spouses (or equivalent). The modelling of new survivor pensioners takes as a 
simplifying assumption that: 
-  Up to and including age 25, they are all descendants of contributors or of 
pensioners who have deceased; 
-  From age 26 onwards, they are all surviving spouses or equivalent. 
 
The proxies taken as an approximation to the number of deceased contributors and 
pensioners in each subsystem relevant to determine the number of new survival 
pensioners of gender g and age a were the following: 
-  For descendants of age a (at or below age 25) the number of mortalities of both 
genders with ages between a+25 to a+40 in that year; 
-  For spouses of age a (above age 25) the number of mortalities of the opposite 
gender with ages between a-5 and a+5. 




7For references and details, see www.seg.social.pt for the SPSS and www.cga.pt for the SPCGA.  
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The equations used to project new survivor pensioners (by gender and age) were 
estimated using these approximations. 
2.4.4 Condition for coherence, by gender and age, between the total number of 
pensioners and the inactive population 
 
The MISS model includes a condition for checking the coherence and for the possible 
truncation of the total number of (new) pensioners for each year. The model requires the 
ratio between the total number of pensioners – disability, old age and survivor – and the 
inactive population not to exceed, for both genders and all ages, a maximum between 1 
and the value of the corresponding ratio at base year 2005 (year-end figures). 
Given the differences between the demographic information available from INE and the 
administrative information from the IIES and CGA in 2005, the ratio in question is 
more than 1 for most ages above 65
8. Even if the existence of individuals in these age 
groups who receive more than one pension is taken into account
9, there is a “surplus” of 
over-65 pensioners which cannot be explained, when compared with the inactive 
population of the same age
10.  
If the model did not put any restriction on the number of pensioners, the 2005 
discrepancy would expand to horizon. The model therefore incorporates the restriction 
mentioned for the number of new pensioners. If the upper limit is breached in any given 
year, when the new pensioners are determined as described above, these numbers are 
truncated in proportion to the unrestricted figures so as to fulfil the condition. 
 
2.5 Compensations, contributions and pensions module 
2.5.1 Compensations declared/stipulated and contributions – SPSS 
The MISS model includes separate equations for average compensation of active TCO 
and TI contributors of SPSS. 
Average annual declared compensation by TCO contributors to the SPSS is calculated 
as a weighted average: 
-  Of the earnings of public employees registered in the SPSS in 2006; 
-  Of other employees’ compensation. 
The separation of these two components is justified because the average earnings of 
public employees registered in the SPSS is higher than the average earnings of the other 
TCO contributors. 
 
8 For males, the ratio in 2005 is more than 1 for most ages above 48, and for females for most ages above 
63. 
9 According to Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity data, there are around 200 thousand individuals 
who receive more than one pension. 
10 Over and above those who receive more than one pension, there are also pensioners in the two 
subsystems who are not resident in Portugal. These total around 30 thousand in the SPSS. However, there 
is a larger number of residents who receive a pension from other social security systems (from other 
countries and from pension funds for bank employees, insurance and some large companies), to which 
have to be added the inactive individuals who receive no pension from any scheme.  
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The projection of the “private sector” TCO average compensation
11 includes an annual 
up-date defined exogenously by the model user and it also takes into account the 
gender, age and gradual rise in schooling levels. The relationship between the latter 
variables and the private sector TCO compensation was estimated from 2002 “Quadros 
de Pessoal” registers, available from the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity. 
Education levels were projected with a similar procedure as the one described in section 
2.3 for the projections of schooling levels among the resident population, the labour 
force and total employment. 
The “pure” rate for updating TCO average compensation (that is without the effects of 
seniority and schooling) should be chosen for each year in line with the assumed rise in 
inflation and productivity in the economy and so as not to change in any significant way 
the share of labour in national income and the real unit cost of labour. From 2010 
onwards, in order to obtain the projections described in Chapter 3, productivity, the 
GDP deflator and the consumer price index were all assumed to rise at 2% per annum. 
As regards the “pure” update rate for wages in the private sector, it was set at 3.75%
12. 
In the MISS model, the dynamics for the average declared compensation of TI is 
different from the one considered for TCO. This stems above all from the fact that in 
most cases what is at issue is the figure for minimum compensation stipulated by the 
SPSS for contributory purposes. This threshold is still quite low, though it was altered 
in mid-2005 from 1 to 1.5 minimum salaries. There is also the fact that micro data are 
not available for TI, as they are for TCO, which would make it possible to assess the 
relationship between declared compensation and the schooling levels of TI contributors. 
This being the case, the equation projecting the average compensation of self-employed 
contributors is an attempt to take into consideration the three main factors underlying 
the dynamics of this variable: 
-  The “pure” up-dating of salaries associated with inflation and productivity, 
leaving out composition effects (to generate the projections described in Chapter 
3, the same rate was assumed for TI and TCO contributors); 
-  Possible changes to the minimum stipulated compensation for contributory 
purposes (this being defined in terms of the minimum wage); 
-  The up-dating of the national minimum wage. 
 
To project more accurately the effects of a change in the minimum stipulated 
compensation for TI, the MISS model takes into consideration the distribution of TI 
compensation. For 2005, the initial year, 7 brackets were defined in relation to the 
average compensation for all self-employed (under 25%; between 25% and 50%; 
between 50% and 75%; between 75% and 100%; between 100% and 150%; between 
150% and 200%; and above 200%). Seven “profiles” of compensation were 
correspondingly defined for TI contributors, such that it is assumed that each TI 
contributes according to a compensation defined as the mid point of the bracket to 
which he/she belongs
13. The change rate for the average compensation of the TI 
contributors is defined in the MISS model, for each gender and age group, as the 
weighted average of the change rates of the seven profiles of TI. It should be noted that 
 
11 Defined here as all TCO contributors except public employees registered in the SPSS from 2006. 
12 Identical to the rate used for updating the minimum wage. 
13 That is, 12.5%, 37.5%, 62.5%, 87.5%, 125%, 175%, and 300% of the average compensation for 
profiles 1 to 7 respectively.  
 
20
                                                
changes to the stipulated minimum contribution affect the declared compensation of TI 
workers in the lower profiles, but not for those in the higher profiles, who are affected 
only by the pure up-dating factor. 
The evolution of the stipulated minimum compensation to horizon is defined by the user 
of the model. This makes it easy to simulate the effects of any change. In the projections 
put forward in Chapter 3 it was assumed that the stipulated minimum compensation was 
1.5 minimum wages, except for 2005, where the figure was set at 1.25 (it was raised 
from 1 to 1.5 in mid-2005). 
Given the numbers of active SPSS contributors (TCO and TI) and their respective 
declared compensations, a preliminary approach to the total amount of contributions 
effectively paid to the SPSS consists in applying the standard rate of contribution to the 
total amount of declared compensations. The standard rate is currently 34.75%, with 
23.75% paid by the employer and 11% by the employee. 
In the case of public employees registered in the SPSS from 2006, the MISS model 
takes as a basis that the relevant overall rate of contribution is the basic rate set down in 
Decree Law 55/2006 of 15 March (23.08%). This rate does not cover the risks of 
unemployment and payments related to temporary absence from work (sickness, 
maternity and assistance to children). However, there is a group of public employees 
registered in the SPSS from 2006 that will be contributing at a rate above the basic rate, 
including coverage of certain risks excluded from the latter. Teachers’ contributions, for 
example, will include an additional amount associated with the coverage of risk relating 
to unemployment. Other public employees may come to be registered with coverage 
against the risk of sickness (instead of being registered for special health cover through 
what is known as the ADSE, as are all other public employees). It is impossible to 
predict the combinations that will involve additional coverage, so the MISS model takes 
the option that, by default, the contribution rate for all public employees registered in 
the SPSS will be the basic rate. This option has the additional advantage that it allows 
for a clearer comparison with the counterfactual situation where the CGA is not closed 
to new registrations, because the SPCGA is only responsible for payments of pensions 
and family benefits to its pensioners
14.  
The above mentioned preliminary amount of contributions is then corrected using a 
factor defined exogenously by the model user, taking into consideration the level of 
efficiency in collecting contributions at the standard rate. In the projections in Chapter 3 
it was assumed that this factor remains constant at around 92%, as observed in 2005 and 
estimated for 2006. There are two reasons why the degree of efficiency is lower than 
unity: 
-  A large number of subsidised special regimes were awarded to certain groups of 
workers, who therefore pay lower rates
15; 




14 Even so, the SPSS will be responsible for ensuring payment of family benefits to public employees 
registered in this subsystem from 2006. This situation would be different if they were registered in the 
CGA (which, as mentioned, only has responsibility for payment to pensioners). 
15 For details, see www.seg-social.pt.   
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It should be noted that this degree of efficiency does not take tax evasion into 
consideration. Indeed, as regards social security contributions, tax evasion happens 
when earnings are not declared or are understated. These circumstances have a direct 
bearing on the underestimation of numbers of individuals in active employment and/or 
of average declared earnings. 
 
2.5.2 Compensations and contributions – SPCGA 
For the SPSS, micro data were available for 2005 for all contributors
16. This was not the 
case with the SPCGA, where the data available related only to average earnings for 
contributors broken down by gender and age. As a result, this module of the MISS 
model – relating to earnings, contributions and new pensions – is more detailed for the 
SPSS than for the SPCGA. The latter subsystem does not take into account different 
profiles of earnings for each strata gender/age group. Based on the information available 
for 2005, the up-dating of the average compensation per strata is simply obtained by 
applying a variation rate defined by the model user to the earnings received the previous 
year for the same strata of gender and age (not the strata of the same gender and age less 
one year). Thus, as with the corresponding procedure for SPSS contributors, the up-
dating rate defined by the user does not incorporate the effects of seniority in salary 
progression. 
In the projections in Chapter 3, an updating rate of 3% is assumed for active SPCGA 
contributors. This is equivalent to a real gain of 1% per year (that is, half the assumed 
increase in productivity). The decision was taken not to index the compensation of 
public employees to the earnings of private sector workers. This way, the existing 
compensation gap in favour of the former is assumed to narrow gradually over time. 
In the SPSS, the 34.75% overall rate of contribution in the standard regime (“Regime 
Geral”) includes both the employees’ and the employers’ contributions. For the 
SPCGA, it was necessary to deal separately with these two components and the latter 
was in turn broken down into two components: 
-  The employers’ part duly paid to CGA by a number of entities (such as central 
government autonomous funds, local and regional government and some bodies 
outside the scope of general government but with employees registered with the 
CGA)
17; 
-  The State’s contribution as employer for the remaining public employees. 
 
The second of the above is not explicitly taken as a State outlay and appears in the State 
Budget as part of what is termed “the State subsidy to the CGA.” This is an amount 
transferred annually to the CGA to balance their accounts. 
In terms of employers’ contributions duly paid to the CGA, it is assumed that this 
corresponds to a proportion of the contributions paid by employees. The path of this 
proportion is defined exogenously, meaning that it is possible to simulate the effects of 
measures that may be introduced, increasing the rate of employer contributions that is 
projected over the horizon. 
 
16 Anonymous data. 




As far as the State is concerned, and the contributors on whose behalf there are no 
explicit employer contributions, the decision was taken to take a “reference figure for 
employer contribution” so as to separate for each year the State’s responsibility as 
employer and the financing of the CGA’s annual deficit. For this, the MISS model 
calculates the reference amount for employer contributions that would be due to the 
CGA if all bodies made employer contributions at a rate equivalent to what the private 
sector employer pays to the SPSS, after taking into consideration the different coverage 
of risks in the SPSS and the SPCGA
18. In 2005, this rate was around 13.1%
19. The 
MISS user can change this figure for any period along the horizon. It should be noted 
that the sum of this rate with the rate for the CGA contributor (10%) brings us very 
close to the basic overall rate (23.08%) set for public employees registered in the SPSS. 
2.5.3 Pensions for old age and disability – SPSS 
In the MISS model, the average amount of old age and disability pensions is determined 
for each strata of age and gender as a weighted average of the pensions carried over 
from the previous year and of the average figure for new pensions started during the 
year. Pensions carried forward are up-dated by an exogenous factor whereas new 
pensions are generated in accordance with relevant regulations and bearing in mind the 
varying profiles of beneficiaries’ contributions over the years. 
The SPSS rules for calculating pensions of new retirees for old age and disability are 
extremely complex, a fact stemming from the coexistence of more than one legal 
scheme. These schemes are set down in the Decree Law 329/93 of 25 September, 
Decree Law 35/02 of 19 February and Decree Law 187/07 of 10 May. The complexity 
is clearly visible in Figure 2.5.1, which was taken from the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Solidarity site in 2006 (on www.seg-social.pt). And this does not reflect yet the 
added complexity of the 2006 reform measures (Decree Law 187/07), when a new 
transitional scheme was inserted for the calculation of the statutory value of the pension, 
which is to be applied between 2007 and 2016, overriding the provisions for this period 
set down in Decree Law 35/02. 
In all the schemes, a “statutory” pension is calculated for each new pensioner. This 
depends on a number of factors: 
-  The period during which contributions are made (“contributory period” or 
career); 
-  The compensation which is taken as the basis for the pension (“reference 
compensation”), which depends on the salary declared for part or all of the 
period of contributions, depending on the applicable legal scheme; 
                                                  
18 As mentioned above, the SPCGA (unlike the SPSS) provides no cover for unemployment, nor subsidies 
related to temporary absence from work (sickness benefit, maternity, paternity, adoption and other family 
benefits). 
19 Decree Law 200/99 of 8 June states that coverage for possible unemployment corresponds to 5.22 
percentage points (p.p.), while coverage for a number of circumstances related to temporary absence 
(sickness, maternity, paternity, adoption and other family benefits) corresponds to 6.43 p.p. For this 
reason, when adjusting for the narrower coverage provided by the SPCGA, the social security standard 
contribution rate falls from 34.75% to 23.1%, of which 10% is paid by public employees. The 
“equivalent” employer’s rate is 13.1%, very close to the one in force since 2005 for public services with 




 -  The annual accrual rate for the pension, which depends on the contributory 
period and the reference compensation (except for those covered by Decree Law 
329/93); 
-  Any penalty for early retirement in the case of old age pensions; 
-  Also for old age pensioners, the so-called “sustainability factor,” to be applied 
from 2008 onwards. 
 
The actual amount of the new pension is the highest value when comparing the figures 
for the statutory pension and for the minimum pension due, the latter depending on the 
number of years of contributions. 
 
The MISS model attempts, as far as possible, to replicate these rules regarding how the 
pension amount is arrived at. In terms of the contributory period, one of the inputs 
required for the projection over the horizon is the percentage of contributors in the first 
year (broken down by age and gender) with a length of contributions in various brackets 
– 15 or more years, 21 or more, 31 or more and 40 or more. 
For 2005, it was possible to reach an approximation to these percentages, calculated on 
the basis of the information available relating to registration in the SPSS. The duration 
recorded can however seriously overestimate the length of the contributory period, 
given that: 
-  SPSS beneficiaries may be registered for many years before they start 
contributing; 
-  there are periods of unemployment or inactivity which are not taken into 
consideration when the record is analysed. 
 
In the light of this, the durations since first registration in the SPSS as observed in 2005 
were calibrated to reflect more accurately the actual contributory periods (for both TCO 
and TI workers). This was done in two ways: 
-  Through an age restriction, since a worker cannot contribute more than the 
difference between his age and 15 years; 
-  Through a coverage restriction, which ensures that a proportion of workers 
contributing over a period equal to the difference between his/her age and any 
reference age  ( aa ≤ )  is not larger than the proportion of workers of the same 
type (TCO or TI) of age a  who pay contributions to the SPSS (whatever the 
contributory period of the latter)
20. 
 
As a further point in relation to 2005, the average lengths of the contributory period for 
new pensioners of each type as calculated from the percentages obtained were also 
calibrated to replicate the figures for contributory periods observed in that year. 
The model projects the length of contributions for employees (TCO) and self-employed 
(TI) on the basis that: 




20 For example, it is taken that the levels of coverage for 2005, computed as the time span since 
registration in the SPSS, are x% for those aged 30 and with at least 5 years of contributions and y% for 
those aged 25, however long the contributory period of the latter. The restriction guarantees that x cannot 
be greater than y, because if it was, it could indicate that the level of coverage for those aged 25 in 2000 
would be greater than for those aged 25 in 2005. Indeed, x › y means implicitly that the coverage in 2000 




                                                
-  For ages below the legal retirement age, the percentage of contributors is non 
increasing with the career length (for example, the percentage of contributors of 
a certain type of gender g and age a with 21 or more years of contributions 
cannot be higher than the percentage corresponding to 15 or more years of 
contributions); 
-  For ages above the legal retirement age, the relationship is kept between the 
percentages of contributory duration for contributors of age a and of age a – 1 in 
the previous year 
21; 
-  As time passes, there is a gradual pass-through from the percentages of groups 
with small contributory duration to those with longer contributory duration. 
 
In terms of the reference compensation used for the purposes of calculating the statutory 
pension, and as detailed in Figure 2.5.1, two different procedures are used to determine 
the amount. The first is connected with the rule set down in Decree Law 329/93. Here, 
the reference compensation corresponds to the average of the 10 best out of the last 15 
years of declared or stipulated compensation (after revaluation using the CPI excluding 
housing). The MISS model takes the last ten years as the best of the last 15. The second 
procedure for calculating the reference wage for a new old age or disability pensioner is 
set down in Decree Law 35/02. This takes the whole period of contributions into 
consideration. In addition, from January 2002, the revaluation index for past wages 
comes from weighting the CPI excluding housing and the average evolution of earnings 
underlying contributions to the SPSS (with weights 75% and 25%, respectively). 
 
The MISS model takes different equations for the amounts of pensions related to the 
various legal regimes: 
-  Decree Law 329/93 is applied (being the most favourable) to active contributors 
who had completed 15 years of contributions at the end of 2001; 
-  Decree Law 35/02 “pure” is the least favourable and is therefore only applied to 
those registered in SPSS from January 2002; 
-  Decree Law 35/02 “mixed”, less favourable than the first but more than the 
second, consists of a weighted average made up of the amount of the new 
pension calculated according to previous systems and will be applied to all new 
pensioners registered in social security in or before 2001 but not yet reaching 15 
years of contributions in that year
22; 
-  The “mixed” regime agreed in 2006 between the government and social partners 
for the period 2007-2016
23. 
 
For the regime defined in Decree Law 329/93, the annual accrual rate of pension for old 
age and disability is 2%
24. In terms of the regimes defined in Decree Law 35/02, the 
accrual rate depends on the reference compensation (as shown in Figure 2.5.1). In this 
 
21 It should be noted that the percentage will fall (or at least hold steady) for ages above the legal 
retirement age. This is because those who have been contributing for a longer period tend to take a 
pension first, while those with a shorter period stay longer in active employment. 
22 This transitional regime takes a weighted average of the amounts calculated according to the rules of 
each of the two previous regimes, straight, with 2001 as the point of reference for weighting. 
23 The difference between this mixed transitional regime and the previous one is the reference year for 
calculating the weights: end-2006 instead of end-2001. 
24 By annual accrual rate of pension is meant the percentage applied to the reference wage for each year 
of contributions in the formula used to calculate the statutory pension. last case, it would be over-simplistic to use the average obtained for each strata 
(employed/self-employed, gender, age) so the MISS model attempts to approximate to 
the rule by applying different salary profiles relative to the reference compensation, 
following the logic detailed in section 2.5.1 in relation to the calculation of average 
earnings of self-employed. 
For ages below the legal retirement age, the statutory pension is multiplied by a factor 
that includes an attempt to cover the penalties for early retirement. The MISS model also 
takes into consideration the possibility that the statutory pension, from 2008 onwards, 
will be affected by the “sustainability factor.” This corresponds to the ratio between the 
2006 level of average life expectancy at age 65 and the same indicator in the year before 
retirement
25. 
Once the statutory pension is obtained for each of the 7 income profiles and by gender 
and age group, type of worker and legal regime, the figure is compared with the 
minimum pension for the specific profile (bearing in mind the average length of 
contributions for the strata), and the higher of the two figures is used. In this way, the 
MISS model attempts to take the contribution profile into consideration and come to a 
more realistic simulation of those situations where the set of minimum pensions is an 
active lower bound for the new pension. 
Once the amounts for new old age and disability pensions have been calculated for the 
four regimes that are legally stipulated (these amounts decomposed for each strata of 
gender and age and for each year along the horizon), the MISS model then proceeds 
with a weighting of these figures, using the relative importance of the regimes assumed 
for each year
26. The projections thus obtained are then calibrated to replicate in 2005 the 
figures for new average pensions observed in that year. 
 
2.5.4 Old age and disability pensions – SPCGA  
 
The dynamics of average old age and disability pensions for the SPCGA follow a logic 
similar to what was described for the SPSS at the start of the previous section. The only 
exception is the way new pensions are calculated. In the SPCGA, the statutory pension 
is calculated on the basis of the “Retirement Statute” (Estatuto de Aposentação) 
reviewed in 2005 (CGA 2006a)
27. This also includes a number of regimes and transition 
periods replicated in the MISS model, bearing in mind the main components: 
-  The contributory period; 
-  The reference compensation, which differs according to the date of registration 




                                                  
25 The MISS model allows for the activation or deactivation of the “sustainability factor” depending on 
whether the scenario under review refers to projections with or without this measure. 
26 Let 
329/93() t ℘ , 
35/02() t ℘ , 
2001()
mx t ℘ and  
2006()
mx t ℘ denote the weights of the rules for computing the 
statutory pensions, according to Decree Laws 329/93, 35/02 and 187/07. They must add up to 1 for each year. 
The 2006 reform agreed between the government and social partners implied cancelling 
329/93() t ℘ to 
horizon, and set 
2006() 1
mx t ℘ =  for 2007 2016 t ≤ ≤ ; (ii) 
2001() 1
mx t ℘ = from 2017, with a gradual fall in 
this last weight, substituting the gradual rise in the 
35/02() t ℘ weight (in the baseline scenarios presented 
in Chapter 3, this rise occurs gradually between 2033 and 2041, after which 
35/02() 1 t ℘ = ). 
27 See also CGA (2006b) where the rules of pension accrual for CGA contributors is set out.  
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-  The annual accrual rate of pension, which varies according to the year of 
registration in the CGA, the retirement year and the reference compensation; 
-  In the case of old age pensions, any possible future financial penalties for early 
retirement or the “sustainability factor” (applicable from 2008 onwards). 
 
The information available for the SPCGA, as opposed to the SPSS, included the average 
length of the contributory periods of active contributors by gender and age for the initial 
year of 2005. These average contributory periods are projected by the MISS model, 
assuming that they will not exceed an upper bound of 40 years of contributions and with 
the following considerations in mind: 
-  For ages above the retirement age, the length of the contributory period is up-
dated by adding one year to the time of service recorded in the previous year for 
contributors of the same gender and one year younger; 
-  For ages below the retirement age, the updating takes into consideration the fact 
that new pensioners of each strata generally have a contributory period longer 
than the average contributory period in the same strata. 
 
The typical picture, in fact, is that those contributors retiring at an age less or equal to 
the legal retirement age are those with longer contributory periods. Curiously, the 
information available for 2005 shows a similar phenomenon for contributory periods of 
new disability pensioners. In 2005, new CGA pensioners have on average contributed 
for a period 30% higher than the average contributory period in the same strata. 
For CGA contributors registered before 1993, the statutory pension is the result of a 
weighted average of two components, where the weights are defined by the number of 
contributing years up to and beyond 2005. The first component corresponds to the rule 
existing in 2005 for those registered before 1993 (basically, 90% of the last gross 
compensation), while the second component is related to the rules set down in Decree 
Law 35/02, but these are only applied to post-2005 contributions
28. For SPCGA 
contributors registered after 1993, the rule used for calculating the statutory pension is 
as set down in Decree Law 35/02. 
After the statutory pensions have been calculated according to the two legal schemes for 
each type of pension, each gender and age group and each year to horizon, the MISS 
model then chooses which legal scheme is applicable for each strata as a function of the 
year of start-up (on average) for the contributions of that strata. This figure is compared 
with the minimum pension which is applicable (taking into consideration the average 
contributory period for that strata), and the higher of the two figures is the one used. 
The projections obtained for the new pensions were then calibrated (as they were for the 
SPSS) to replicate in 2005 the observed figures. 
2.5.5 Survivor pensions 
The way survivor pensions are calculated is very complex. It depends on factors such as 
the nature of the beneficiaries (typically the spouse or child/children of the deceased, the 
number and age of the beneficiaries, along with the contributory period of the 
deceased). It is impossible to model adequately all the add-on factors that influence the 
amount of these pensions, so the MISS model uses the simplest solution available: it 
 
28 To simplify, the MISS model does not take into account the case of the contributor with enough years 
of service to warrant a complete pension in 2005, on the assumption that he/she opted for retirement in 
that year.  
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starts with the average survivor pensions paid out in 2005 and updates them using the 
change in the average old age pension for the subsystem in question. 
 
 
2.6 Module for remaining benefits and allowances 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the MISS model projects, in addition to pensions, other 
outlays related to previous or current contributions by the beneficiary or his/her family. 
In the Segurança Social subsystem there are three types of benefits or allowances that 
fulfil this definition: 
-  Unemployment benefits; 
-  Benefits to compensate for loss of income during absences from work with 
leave, covering sickness, maternity, paternity and adoption benefits and 
subsidies for assistance to children; 
-  Family benefits, including the family allowance for children, teenagers and 
young adults (abono de família), along with a number of other family-related 
benefits involving relatively small payments. 
 
For each of these types of outlays, there were micro-data available for 2005, making it 
possible to calculate by gender and age the numbers of beneficiaries (and the family 
members in the case of family allowances), as well as the average amount paid. 
 
In the CGA, apart from pensions, the only other payouts are the family benefits and 
only for pensioners, since contributors in active employment receive these payments 
directly from the services where they work. It should also be remembered, as mentioned 
in section 2.5.1, that the MISS model uses the basic rate set out in Decree Law 55/06 of 
15 March as the rate of contribution for all public employees registered in the SPSS 
from 2006 on. This does not cover unemployment and being temporarily off work but 
includes coverage for family benefits. 
2.6.1 Unemployment benefit 
For any given strata of gender and age, the MISS model takes into consideration three 
factors when projecting the change in the number of individuals receiving 
unemployment benefit: 
-  The change in the number of unemployed individuals with that gender and age; 
-  Any change in the SPSS coverage for that strata (i.e. in the ratio between the 
number of TCO active contributors and the number of TCO in the strata); 
-  Any alterations to legal eligibility for the unemployment benefit. 
 
An “eligibility index” is defined exogenously for the unemployment benefit so that the 
figure for 2005 was set to one and an increase (decrease) in the index to horizon means 
that there has been legislative change giving less (greater) restriction on access to this 
benefit. 
 
As regards the average annual amount processed per beneficiary, it is updated from 
2005 for all strata of gender and age, taking two factors into account: the change rate of 
the average declared or stipulated earnings for SPSS contributors in active employment 
(after excluding an amount as close as possible to the earnings paid to public employees  
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registered in the system from 2006); and the variation in a “unemployment benefit 
generosity index”, which is set exogenously by the model user. 
In the projections presented in Chapter 3, the indices for eligibility and generosity are 
kept constant and equal to 1 along the horizon. 
2.6.2 Sickness benefit 
The number of SPSS contributors on sickness leave is updated for each strata of gender 
and age by reference to the figure for the initial year (2005) in accordance with the 
evolution of the number of active contributors in the strata (employees and self-
employed), after excluding the approximate number of public employees registered in 
the SPSS as and from 2006. 
As for the average amount paid out for this benefit, the rule for updating, applied to 
each strata, considers only the variation in average earnings, as declared or stipulated. 
2.6.3 Maternity, paternity and adoption allowance 
These allowances, as their name suggests, are for contributors or their spouses (or the 
equivalent) on occasion of childbirth or child adoption. Given that the number of 
adoptions is relatively small when compared with the number of births, the updating 
rule included in the MISS model considers the number of beneficiaries involved for each 
strata of gender g and age a as follows: 
-  For females, the number of births per woman at age a; 
-  For males, the number of births per woman with age between a – 4 and a
29. 
 
To update the average subsidy for beneficiaries in each strata, a process similar to the 
one described for sickness benefit is used. 
 
2.6.4 Subsidy for children assistance 
The MISS model updates the number of contributors for each strata who benefit from 
this subsidy by taking as a point of reference the numbers for the resident population 
below age 10
30, and the numbers of active contributors belonging to the same strata. 
The rule for updating the average subsidy is exactly the same as the rule considered for 
other types of subsidy relating to temporary absence with leave from work. 
2.6.5 Family allowance abono de família - SPSS 
Due to limitations of the information available, the calculation of the number of abono 
de família beneficiaries and the expenditure on this allowance includes payments to 
contributors and non-contributors (welfare benefits). This is an exception to the MISS 
model rule of only considering the contributive social security scheme. However, for 
the base year, the non-contributive component is unlikely to account for more than 10% 
of the number of beneficiaries of this allowance, so the SPSS accounts are not 
significantly affected by its inclusion. 
 
29 It is assumed, ad-hoc, that the spouse (or equivalent) giving birth is of the same age as or somewhat 
younger than the beneficiary of the allowance. 
30 Those requiring assistance are most likely to be found below this age.  
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The MISS model extrapolates the total number of those entitled to family allowance
31 
for the two subsystems, based on the number in 2005 and the variation in the active 
resident population under 25 years old, the group which may be eligible for the subsidy. 
To reach the number of those entitled to the allowance through the Segurança Social 
subsystem, the MISS model subtracts from the total number those for whom the CGA 
has responsibility to grant this allowance (i.e. children, teenagers and young adults 
under the legal custody of beneficiaries who are CGA pensioners). 
The SPSS expenditure on abono de família per holder (in euros) is a simple projection 
based on the figure observed in the initial year and updated using a change rate of 
payments relating to family benefits, defined exogenously by the model user. 
For the projections in Chapter 3, the variation rate set for family benefits was identical 
to the one for pensions carried on from the previous year. 
2.6.6 Other family benefits – SPSS 
Abono de família represents the major part of SPSS expenditure on families (excluding 
outlays on non-contributory items such as the Rendimento Social de Inserção, a family 
support programme). Other outlays include funeral allowance, an allowance if a third-
party has to be employed for assistance, an extra payment granted to the handicapped, a 
subsidy for special education purposes, a monthly life-long allowance (subsídio mensal 
vitalício) and a “home allowance” (subsídio de lar)
32. Among all these household 
benefits, only the payment of funeral costs, like abono de família, is not fully 
contributive-based.  
Due to lack of more detailed information, the non-contributive component of the funeral 
allowance is also considered by the MISS model, although the amounts involved are 
very small and have a negligible effect on the SPSS accounts. 
The number of beneficiaries for these payments (excepting abono de família), broken 
down by gender and age group, was projected on the basis of the figure for 2005 and the 
projected variation rates of the number of active contributors and pensioners. It should 
be noted that this variation includes public employees registered in the SPSS as and 
from 2006. Article 2 of Decree Law 55/2006 of 15 March stipulates that the basic 
contribution rate of 23.08% covers the payment for all the above household benefits. 
The procedure for projecting the average amount under this heading is similar to the one 
used to project abono de família, and it is based on the variation rate fixed exogenously 
for the average payment relating to family benefits.  
2.6.7 Other family benefits – SPCGA 
Data on family benefits paid by the SPCGA by type of benefit, gender and age group 
were not available, so the MISS model treats all payments from the CGA to its 
beneficiaries as a whole. It should be mentioned, however, that the amount involved is 
 
31 The entitlement holder is the child, teenager or young adult entitled to the benefit. 
32 This is only for beneficiaries of the insurance sector employees’ social security fund.  
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quite small in all the criteria and does not justify a more detailed analysis
33. It is 
assumed that the CGA expenditure on family benefits evolves as per the number of 
pensioners in the subsystem and with the above-mentioned variation rate of average 
family benefits (defined exogenously). 
 
 
2.7 SPSS and SPCGA accounts module 
This is the last of the MISS modules and brings together the financial information 
calculated from the equations of the two previous modules (described in sections 2.5 
and 2.6). It aggregates this information for each of the subsystems, consolidates the 
accounts and calculates some relevant financial indicators. 
2.7.1 Non-consolidated accounts of the SPSS and the SPCGA 
The (non-consolidated) accounts of the SPSS and the SPCGA are obtained directly 
from the aggregation of revenue and expenditure items described above, with a few 
exceptions: 
i.  “Administration costs” 
 
The ratio between the total administration costs (also including those related 
to the management of welfare benefits) and the sum of a set of items relating 
to income and expenditure, considered the most relevant for generating the 
administration costs, was first computed for 2005. 
For the SPSS, there is an item for administrative costs in the published 
accounts and this was taken as the numerator for the ratio. The denominator 
includes revenue from contributions and quotas and expenditure on pensions 
along with a number of other payments (including the welfare benefits, such 
as acção social, abono de família and Rendimento Social de Inserção and 
outlays on professional training). 
For the SPCGA, administration costs were taken as the items relating to staff 
costs, purchases of goods and services and operational costs and losses. For 
this subsystem, the denominator includes receipts from contributions 
(quotas) and receipts earmarked from other bodies which are responsible for 
pension payments (except the so-called “State subsidy”) along with expenses 
on pensions and other benefits. 
In 2005, these ratios were 0.0141 and 0.0024, respectively, for the 
Segurança Social subsystem and for the CGA. For each year to horizon, the 
administrative costs were obtained by applying these ratios to the relevant 
revenue and expenditure items. The MISS model allows for changes in the 
administrative costs ratios along the horizon, but in the simulations presented 
in Chapter 3 they were kept constant at 2005 values. 
 
                                                  
33 In 2005, payments of family benefits made by the CGA to its pensioners only accounted for 0.6% of 
outlays on pensions and other items. Moreover, these outlays only represent 1.3% of total social security 
payments and 6.3% of family benefits.  
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ii.   “Receipts earmarked for pensions payments” – SPCGA
These are the amounts received by the CGA from other entities (among 
them the SPSS National Pensions Centre and former public companies 
whose employees were initially registered in the CGA) to reimburse the 
SPCGA for pension outlays for which it is not responsible. It would have 
been best to exclude these amounts from the SPCGA revenue, cancelling 
out the pensions paid out from this source. Unfortunately, the information 
available did not allow to do this with decomposition into gender and age 
groups. 
This being so, the decision was taken to consider expenditure on pensions, 
including the amounts paid on behalf of other bodies and to offset these with 
the payments made by these entities to the CGA. In this way, the balance of 
the SPCGA is not affected. The projections presented in Chapter 3 assume 
that the ratio of liabilities from other entities to expenditure on pensions is 
unchanged from 2005. 
iii.   “State responsibility for pension payments” - SPCGA 
  In the baseline year (2005), a sum was deducted from the CGA pension 
expenditure corresponding to the payment of pensions of a non-contributive 
nature which are the direct responsibility of the State. These are the pensions 
for disabled members of the armed forces and the survivor pensions related 
to those killed while on military or police service. 
iv.  “Use of reserves from former pension funds” – SPCGA 
 
Over recent years, the CGA has been absorbing liabilities for payments of 
pensions for employees or retirees of several public enterprises and former 
public enterprises. These extra liabilities were offset (only partially in some 
cases), by transfers of pension funds from these enterprises to the CGA. At 
year-end 2005, the CGA special reserve made up of these amounts totalled 
4028.2 million euros. When carrying out the projections of CGA accounts, 
these special reserves had to be filtered in gradually. For these purposes, the 
audit report published by the State Audit Board (Tribunal de Contas, 2005) 
was taken into consideration so as to come up with a simple procedure. The 
report covered the years 2006-2015, and it was assumed that these reserves 
transferred from CGD, NAV, ANA, INCM, RDP and DRAGAPOR would 
not be used during this period. Subsequently, it was assumed that there 
would be a linear usage until the funds were exhausted by 2050 (all except 
CGD) or 2065 (CGD). These dates correspond approximately to the point 
where pension liabilities cease, according to the State Audit Board’s report. 
There is a second group of special reserves made up of funds from the BNU, 
Macao, INDEP and the CTT. For these, the recent usage pattern was 
maintained, implying that they will be exhausted between 2014 and 2020. 
v.  VAT receipts earmarked to the SPSS and the SPCGA 
 
The logic underlying these accounts of the two subsystems is to include only 
revenue and expenditure items related to the contributive social security  
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components, but the MISS model also includes as revenue the amount 
transferred from the State Budget corresponding to the VAT receipts legally 
assigned to each of the subsystems. For 2005, the amount actually 
transferred was taken as input of the model. For 2006 and 2007, the source 
was the State Budget for 2007. From 2008 onwards, it was assumed that the 
transfer amount would grow in line with nominal GDP. The split of the VAT 
transfer between the SPSS and the SPCGA was kept proportional to the split 
budgeted for 2007, though with the restriction that no surplus should be 
projected in the SPCGA owing to the VAT transfer, in the last years along 
the horizon, when other receipts and outlays will tend to zero at the final 
stage of the system being closed down. During those last years of the 
projection period when this restriction is active, the amount not allocated to 
the SPCGA reverts to the SPSS. The sum of the funds assigned to the two 
subsystems, as a percentage of GDP, remain unchanged. 
2.7.2 Consolidated accounts of the two subsystems 
 A final point in the description of the main features of the MISS model relates to the 
consolidated accounts of the SPSS and the SPCGA. The consolidation process is very 
simple, and can be expressed as the sum of the financial flows in the two subsystems, 
after adjustments in two items: 
-  On the revenue side, the transfer from the SPSS National Pensions Centre to the 
SPCGA was withdrawn; 
-  To offset this, the corresponding amount was withdrawn from the sum of 
expenditures on old age, disability and survivor pensions in the two subsystems. 
This was to avoid duplication of expenditure (given that the outlay on pensions in the 
SPSS includes the amounts transferred to the CGA corresponding to that part of the 
pensions paid through it). 
 
For 2005 there is information available on pensions paid by the CGA which were the 
responsibility of the SPSS. It was therefore possible to break down by type of pension 
and to compute the proportions of these liabilities of the National Pension Centre for the 
payment of CGA pensions
34. In the projections presented in Chapter 3, these 
proportions are maintained unchanged along the horizon. 
 
 











3. BASELINE SCENARIOS WITH AND WITHOUT REFORM MEASURES 
 
 
Three projection scenarios over the horizon 2006-2080 are presented and analyzed in 
this chapter: “the baseline scenario without reforms,” “the baseline scenario with 
reforms – alternative I” and “the baseline scenario with reforms – alternative II.” The 
first scenario differs from the other two in that it does not include the effects of the main 
reform measures agreed between the government and social partners in October 2006. 
The other two scenarios include the most representative measures, being distinct in the 
sense that each refers to an extreme alternative of modelling the reaction of economic 
agents to one of the measures. 
 
The baseline scenario of official projections released in May 2006 did not yet include 
the effects of the measures agreed between the government and social partners. The 
only information available related to the anticipated effects of several measures on the 
overall balance of the Segurança Social subsystem
1. For this reason, the baseline 
scenario without reforms will be used for comparisons with official projections 
throughout this chapter. 
 
3.1 The main reforms 
 
The four most representative measures of the 2006 social security reform are: 
-  Earlier transition to the pension formula set down in Decree Law 35/02, which 
considers the whole contributive career and increases the accrual rate for lower 
wages; 
-  A new rule for updating pensions as a function of consumer inflation, the real 
growth of GDP and the pension amount; 
-  A bigger financial penalty for early retirement, i.e. retirement prior to the legal 
retirement age; 
-  The introduction of a “sustainability factor” that will relate the calculation of 
new pensions to the evolution of life expectancy at age 65. 
The first measure applies only to the SPSS and the other three apply to both the SPSS 
and the SPCGA. 
 
3.1.1 The regime set down in Decree Law 35/2002 brought forward to 2007 
 
Decree Law 35/2002 set out a formula for calculating the amount of new pensions 
which differs from the one set out in Decree Law 329/1993 in two fundamental points: 
                                                  
1 Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (2006a and 2006c). 
  34it takes the compensation over the whole contributive career (instead of the best ten out 
of the last fifteen years) and sets out different accrual rates, depending on the workers 
compensation (the lower the compensation, the higher the rate, varying between 2 and 
2.3 per cent). Decree Law 35/2002 set out a transitional period, during which the 
pension to be applied will be whichever is the higher, either the new regime one or as 
calculated as a weighted average of the pension from the last regime and from the new 
regime, where the weights correspond to the number of years of service before and after 
2001. Decree Law 35/2002 set down 2017 as the start of the transitional period but in 
2006 the decision was taken to bring forward the transition to the new formula to 2007. 
The intervening period, up to 2016, will be covered proportionately depending on the 
number of contributive years up to 2006 and after. 
 
3.1.2 The new rule for updating pensions and family benefits 
 
In the baseline scenarios with reforms, it was considered that pensions and family 
benefits would be updated from 2007 in accordance with consumer prices, plus 0.25 
percentage points. This means a change from recent years, where there have been 
increases significantly higher than inflation, above all as a result of the rise in minimum 
pensions
2. More specifically, the measure is to be applied as and from 2008 and brings 
future pension up-dates within a regulatory framework. This removes the discretionary 
element, and indexes the up-date to consumer inflation in the previous year. The 
indexation takes into account the real growth of GDP (annual average of the two 





GDP real variation rate  
less than 2% 
 
GDP real variation rate  
from 2% to 3% 
GDP real variation rate 





CPI change rate 
 
CPI change rate + 
 20% GDP real variation rate 
(minimum: CPI change rate + 
0.5 percentage points) 
 
CPI change rate + 20% GDP 
real variation rate 
 
Pensions 1.5 to 
6 IAS 
CPI change rate – 0.5 
 percentage points  CPI change rate 
CPI change rate + 12.5% 
GDP real variation rate 
 
Pensions  
6 to 12 IAS 
CPI change rate – 0.75 
percentage points  
CPI change rate – 0.25 
percentage points  CPI change rate 
 
It is assumed that economic growth will be around 2% per year. In such a case, the new 
rule for pension updating corresponds fundamentally to indexation to the consumer 
price index plus a relatively small differential, besides some pro-cyclical changes and 
some discrimination in favor of lower pensions. 
                                                  
2 The main reason for this was the convergence of minimum old age and disability pensions to the 
mandatory minimum wage as set down in the Social Security Framework Law of 2002 (Law 32/2002). 
3 The “IAS” is the social support index (Indexante de Apoios Sociais). For 2007, it was defined as the   
2006 mandatory minimum wage updated by the consumer inflation of that year (Law 53-B/2006). This 
Law provides that the rule for IAS updating in the future is to be identical with the rule for updating lower 
pensions (lower bracket). 
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3.1.3 Additional penalty for early retirement 
 
One of the measures approved – within the scope of the so-called “promotion of active 
ageing” – consists in introducing a disincentive to early retirement, with the penalty 
factor rising from 4.5% to 6% per year. Early retirement can still be taken, as long as the 
worker is at least age 55 and has a contributive career of at least 30 years. The baseline 
scenarios with reforms include the additional financial penalty to be applied to new 
pensions and consider a multiplicative factor to reduce the probability of those eligible 
actually retiring. The latter factor implies an increase in the participation rates for the 
age groups between 55 and 65 years old. 
 
3.1.4 Sustainability factor 
 
The so-called “sustainability factor” will be applied from 2008 onwards. It consists in 
multiplying the formula for calculating the statutory pension (obtained by applying the 
other existing regulations) by the ratio between average life expectancy at 65 in 2006 
and life expectancy in the year prior to retirement. Contributors can opt for a 
combination of two extreme alternatives or “corner solutions”
4:  
-  They can put off retirement age until they completely offset the effect of the 
sustainability factor (Alternative I); or 
-  They can retire at the statutory age and accept the financial penalty levied on the 
pension (Alternative II).  
It is relatively easy to parameterise the MISS model to cater for each of the extreme 
alternatives
5, but it is more complicated to combine them in the model, above all 
because it is difficult to forecast how people will react. For this reason the decision was 
taken to present two alternatives scenarios with reform measures, corresponding to the 
two extreme alternatives for modelling the sustainability factor. 
 
 
3.2 Demography projections 
 
Table 3.2.1 summarizes the projections of the main demographic variables. These are 
the same for the three scenarios being analyzed. In the light of these projections, the 
population will continue to rise until mid-century, although the annual variation will be 
less and less significant. Beyond that there is likely to be a slight reduction in 
population figures. The population will age markedly over the whole period, with a 





                                                  
4 A third possibility is also available. This involves additional voluntary contributions to public or private 
capitalization schemes. In its essence, this alternative is already available through pension savings funds 
(known as PPRs). 
5 It should be noted that alternative I means indexing the legal retirement age to average life expectancy at 
65. One of the limiting factors in MISS is that the legal retirement age is an integer number, so in 
alternative I changes in that age are only considered when average life expectancy at 65 rises by one year 
(as an average for males and females). The demography projections presented below assume that 
indexation of average life expectancy at 65 is equivalent to increases in the legal retirement age in 2013, 
2020, 2029 and 2043. 
  36  37
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Resident population (annual average in thousands) 10561 10891 11806 12224 12041
      annual variation rate 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1
Dependency ratios
      pop. 65 years or more / pop. 15 years to 64 years  0.25 0.27 0.40 0.56 0.52
      pop. under 15 years  / pop. 15 years to 64 years 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.26
      pop. under 15 or more than 64 years / pop. 15 to 64 years  0.49 0.51 0.62 0.82 0.78
Net immigration (thousands) 48 48 49 50 50
Total fertility rate (15 years to 49 years) (1) 1.45 1.48 1.55 1.58 1.59
       15 years to 29 years (1) 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.72
       30 years to 49 years (1) 0.70 0.74 0.83 0.86 0.87
Mortality rate x 1000 (total) 7.2 7.1 8.0 10.0 10.5
       under 15 years  0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
       15 years to 29 years 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
       30 years to 49 years 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7
      1.8
       7.0
       75.5
Life ex
      m
           81.8
           21.4
      fe
           89.1
           25.9
Note: (
Table 3.2.1 
Demographic projections – baseline scenarios with or without reforms 
 
  50 years to 64 years 3.7 3.3 2.3 1.9
 65 years to 80 years  18.4 16.1 9.8 8.0
 81 years or more 95.1 85.0 74.5 70.1
pectancy (in years)
ale
 at birth 75.4 76.7 79.8 81.1
 at 65 years  16.5 17.4 19.8 20.9
male
 at birth 82.2 83.6 86.9 88.4
 at 65 years  20.3 21.2 24.0 25.3
1) Sum of fertility rates for the ages indicated.  
                                                
 
 
The population pyramids in Figure 3.2.1 show this ageing very clearly. Other interesting 
indicators are the dependency ratios (Table 3.2.1). The ratio between the number of 
people of 65 or more years of age and the number of people between 15 and 64 more 
than doubles between 2005 and 2080, while the ratio of children under 15 to the number 
of individuals between 15 and 64 years old remains stable. At the same time, life 
expectancy at birth and at age 65 is likely to rise significantly with increases of around 5 
years up to 2050 and one more year to end-horizon. The rise in life expectancy is a 
direct reflection of the assumptions taken for mortality rates, which continue to show a 
sharp fall up to mid-century, as observed in these indicators during the last century for 




6 However, the average mortality rate for the population as a whole increases consistently along the 
horizon, from 7.2 per thousand in 2005 to 10.5 per thousand in 2080. This result would appear to go 
against the conclusion that there is a fall in the mortality rate, but it is simply the result of the composition 
effect associated with the progressive ageing of the population. In spite of the significant fall in the 
mortality rate for each age group, the rise in the overall mortality rate is due to the considerably higher 
rates for the older age groups and the increase in the proportion of the elderly in the population structure. 
The same phenomenon also explains the rise in the mortality rate in the oldest strata in the last two 
decades to horizon (see Table 3.2.1).   38 
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Population pyramids – baseline scenarios with or without reforms 
 The pace at which the population is ageing would be even more pronounced if two 
assumptions had not been made: a recovery in the fertility rate when compared with 
recent decades and a stabilization of the net immigration flows seen in recent years. 
 
As mentioned in the last chapter, it is assumed that fertility among younger women 
(under 30) will continue to fall to horizon, though at a slower rate than recorded in 
recent decades, but the fall will be more than offset by a rise in the fertility rate among 
women aged 30 or more. 
 
In terms of migration flows, it was also considered reasonable (and maybe even 
conservative, in the context of growing globalization in the world economy), to accept 
that there would be the same net migratory flows to horizon (with around 50 thousand 
net inflow per year). 
 
Table 3.2.2 
Comparison of results - demography 
2004 2010 2030 2050 difference 2004 2010 2030 2050 difference
2050-2004 2050-2004/5
Resident population (10
6, end-year) 10.5 10.7 10.7 10.1 -0.5 10.5 10.9 11.8 12.2 1.7
0 years to 14 years  1.7 1.7 1.4 1.3 -0.3 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 0.1
15 years to 64 years 7.1 7.1 6.6 5.5 -1.6 7.1 7.2 7.3 6.7 -0.4
65 years or more 1.8 1.9 2.6 3.2 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.9 3.8 2.0
Dependency ratios (%)
pop. 0 years to 14 years  / pop. 15 years to 64 years  23.3 23.5 21.5 23.8 0.5 23.2 23.6 22.2 26.0 2.8
pop. 65 years to 110 years  / pop. 15 years to 64 years  25.2 26.5 39.2 58.5 33.3 25.2 27.1 39.6 56.3 31.0
Total fertility rate (2) 1.45 1.52 1.60 1.60 0.15 1.44 1.48 1.55 1.58 0.14
Life expectancy (years)
at birth
        male 74.2 75.5 79.0 81.2 7.0 - 76.7 79.8 81.1 5.7
        female 81.0 82.2 85.2 86.7 5.7 - 83.6 86.9 88.4 6.2
at 65 years 
        male 15.6 16.4 18.6 19.9 4.3 - 17.4 19.8 20.9 4.3
        female 19.0 19.8 21.9 23.1 4.1 - 21.2 24.0 25.3 5.1
Net immigration (annual flow, 10
3) 42 18 15 15 -27 47 50 49 50 3
Notes: (1) Identical to AWG projections.
           (2) Sum of fertility rates from 15 years to 49 years.




When comparing the MISS model and official projections
7, it should be highlighted 
that, according to the latter, the resident population shows a downward trend as and 
from the 2020s. It is clear from Table 3.2.2 that this difference is related to a smaller fall 
in the population of active age (ages 15 to 64) and also to a bigger increase in the 
elderly population in the MISS projections. The explanation for these differences relates 
above all to the assumptions on migratory flows. The fertility and life expectancy 
indicators follow similar paths
8, but official projections, unlike those obtained with the 
                                                  
7 The official projections include demography projections identical to those published for Portugal by the 
European Commission in early 2006. These were the results of the study undertaken by the AWG (EPC 
and DGECFIN 2006). 
8 The figures for life expectancy for 2004/2005 calculated in the MISS model are around 1 year higher 
than in the official scenario. This stems from the different assumptions for the distribution of the resident 
over-85s. Demographic statistics put the over-85s in one group, but this had to be decomposed into 




3.3 Labour market projections 
 
Table 3.3.1 is based on demographic projections and illustrates the baseline scenario 
without reforms for some of the main variables related to the labour market. The overall 
participation rate for ages between 15 and 64 rises slightly to horizon in this scenario. 
This is explained by the maturation of the female participation rate and by the 
assumption of a gradual rise in schooling (sections 2.2 and 2.3), in the context of a 
positive correlation between schooling and participation in the labour market. These 
factors more than offset the double effect of negative composition related to the 




Labour market projections – baseline scenario without reforms 
 
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Participation rate
    15 years to 80 years 63.5 63.5 59.5 57.5 59.1
        male 70.3 70.3 65.7 62.1 63.4
        female 57.0 57.1 53.4 53.1 55.0
    15 years to 64 years 73.8 74.2 72.7 74.3 74.5
        male 79.8 80.1 78.4 78.8 79.1
        female 68.0 68.3 67.0 69.9 70.1
Employment (annual average in thousands)
    15 years to 80 years 4851 4980 5103 4873 4906
    15 years to 64 years  4668 4790 4832 4561 4630
Productivity (annual variation rate) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Annual average compensation (as % of minimum wage)
         SPSS - Declared or stipulated 176.5 186.6 217.2 234.8 250.5
         SPCGA 380.5 386.5 391.8 347.9 -




The first of these negative composition effects justifies the fall in the participation rate 
when the age bracket is increased to 15-80. In this case, the negative composition effect 
dominates the projection, given that participation rates are lower for older age groups 
and these groups become proportionately bigger. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
distinct groups up to 105 (the upper limit was chosen because it corresponds to the top age found in the 
INE Labour Force Survey and in the SPSS and SPCGA databases for pensioners). Distribution by ages, 
as used in MISS inputs, was estimated from information supplied by INE and from data on pensioners 
provided by the two social security subsystems. Everything points to a greater proportion of older people, 
unlike the age distribution implicit in the official figures for life expectancy. 
  40As highlighted in the previous chapter, productivity (defined as the gross domestic 
product per worker, at constant prices) was fixed exogenously for the period after 2010 
on a trend growth of 2% per year. In the first years of the period, more specifically up to 
2009, lower figures were assumed, albeit on an increasing path, reflecting the 
assumption that Portuguese economic growth will gradually recover in the coming 
years. 
 
The assumptions on wages and other earnings, when taken in conjunction with the 
effects of longer schooling and seniority, imply that the average compensation declared 
to the SPSS will grow in line with productivity. For SPCGA contributors, the 
projections point to a more modest growth of average compensation. This results from 
the assumption that real wages of public employees will not grow as fast as in the 
private sector. A negative drift of around 1 percentage point per year was postulated 
when compared to private sector employees, based on the assumption that there would 
be a gradual convergence and that the advantage of the public sector would be gradually 
whittled away (although part will persist because of the much higher level of schooling 
in general government than in the private sector
9). 
 
The combination of the projected path for productivity and for real wages results in a 
very slight fall to horizon in the real unit cost of labour. 
 
Table 3.3.2 
Comparison of results: scenarios without reforms – labour market 
2010 2030 2050 difference 2010 2030 2050 difference
2050-2006 2050-2006
Participation rates (15 years to 64 years) 75.6 76.1 76.1 2.5 74.2 72.7 74.3 0.4
Employment (annual variation rate) 1.3 -0.1 -0.5 - 1.0 -0.1 -0.2 -
Productivity (annual variation rate) 1.5 2.1 2.5 - 2.0 2.0 2.0 -




Table 3.3.2 shows the main labour market indicators for which it is possible to compare 
the baseline scenario without reforms with official projections (which do not 
incorporate the measures agreed in 2006). Two differences stand out, the first being the 
path assumed for productivity, where official figures are based on a more gradual 
recovery in productivity, but to a trend growth higher than the one considered in the 
projections obtained from using the MISS model. The second difference has to do with 
the fact that official projections point to an increase in the participation rate (ages 15 to 
64) greater than the rise projected in baseline scenario without reforms obtained from 
the MISS model. This difference is more marked if the different projections for the 
population are also factored in, above all the sharp fall in active old people in official 
                                                  
9 The large initial wage gap visible in Table 3.3.1 is also bigger because contributors to the SPSS 
subsystem include the self-employed. For most of these, the compensation declared to the social security 
is the minimum compensation stipulated as reference to the minimum contribution, which is very low (1.5 
mandatory minimum wages, since mid 2005). 
  41figures. Indeed, increasing ageing, ceteris paribus, should imply a fall in the 
participation rate due to a composition effect
10. 
 
Table 3.3.3 shows projections of the labour market variables for the two alternatives of 
the baseline scenario with reforms. If compared with Table 3.3.1, the most salient 
difference is the behaviour of participation rates, which are higher than in the scenario 
without reforms, in particular for alternative I (which is postulated on retirement being 
put off until the sustainability factor is completely offset). 
 
Table 3.3.3 
Labour market projections – baseline scenario with reforms 
 
2 0 0 52 0 1 02 0 3 02 0 5 02 0 8 02 0 0 52 0 1 02 0 3 02 0 5 02 0 8 0
Participation rate
    15 years to 80 years 63.5 63.9 61.9 60.8 62.7 63.5 63.7 60.2 58.3 60.0
        male 70.3 70.7 68.3 65.9 67.4 70.3 70.5 66.5 63.1 64.5
        female 57.0 57.4 55.6 56.0 58.3 57.0 57.3 54.1 53.8 55.8
    15 years to 64 years 73.8 74.6 74.4 76.4 76.7 73.8 74.4 73.6 75.3 75.6
        male 79.8 80.6 80.3 81.2 81.6 79.8 80.3 79.4 80.0 80.3
        female 68.0 68.7 68.6 71.7 72.1 68.0 68.5 67.8 70.8 71.1
Employment (annual average in thousands)
    1 5  y e a r s  t o  8 0  y e a r s 4 8 5 15 0 0 95 3 1 45 1 6 65 2 1 54 8 5 14 9 9 55 1 6 54 9 4 34 9 8 3
    1 5  y e a r s  t o  6 4  y e a r s   4 6 6 84 8 1 64 9 4 34 6 8 44 7 6 54 6 6 84 8 0 34 8 8 84 6 2 24 6 9 8
Productivity (annual variation rate) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Annual average compensation (as % of minimum wage)
         SPSS - Declared or stipulated 176.5 186.5 216.8 235.5 251.1 176.5 186.6 217.0 234.9 250.6
         SPCGA 380.5 387.4 393.1 347.9 - 380.5 387.3 392.3 347.9 -
Real unit labour cost (2005=1) 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.96




Both the additional penalty for early retirement and the introduction of the sustainability 
factor will lead to a fall in the probability of old age retirement among workers over 55 
years old. As a result, there will be a rise in the participation rate for these age groups. 
In 2005, the participation rates for ages over 55 (i.e., those ages less than 10 years 
below the legal retirement age) take a downward profile when age increases. To take the 
effects of these two measures of reform into account, the parameterization of the model 
implied an attenuated decreasing profile of participation rates over age 55, which in turn 
caused a rise in the overall participation rate when comparing the baseline scenarios 
with and without reforms. 
 
 
3.4 Projection of the numbers of contributors and beneficiaries and of average 
pensions 
 
Table 3.4.1 shows an array of synthetic indicators for the baseline scenario without 
reforms, relating to the dynamics of the numbers of contributors and pensioners and of 
average pensions, the latter as a percentage of the mandatory minimum wage. What 
stands out is the big rise projected for dependency ratios in the social security system. 
There is a reasonable increase in the number of active SPSS contributors to horizon (in 
                                                  
10 The participation rates are higher for the so-called prime ages, between 25 and 50. As the labour force 
ages, this age group loses some of its importance in relation to the 51-64 group, which has considerably 
lower participation rates. 
  42net terms almost 1 million individuals between 2005 and 2080). But when looking at the 
SPSS and the SPCGA together, the relationship between the number of pensioners (of 
different types) and the number of active contributors rises by almost 70% from the 
early years of the century to a figure above 110% from mid-century. This ratio goes 
beyond unity at the start of the 2040s. At this point, following the logic of a pay-as-you-
go system, the contributions made by each worker would have to cover more than one 
pensioner (as well as the payment of other contribution-based benefits such as 
unemployment benefits). The increase stems exclusively from the component linked to 
old age pensioners, given that the indicators referring to the remaining components 
(disability and survivor pensioners) hold steady or even decrease. 
 
Table 3.4.1 
Contributors and beneficiaries – baseline scenario without measures 
 
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Dependency ratios (SPSS+SPCGA)
     total pensioners / active contributors 69.0 70.0 85.1 113.6 113.3
     old age pensioners / active contributors 44.1 46.5 60.0 87.4 90.5
     disability pensioners / active contributors 7.9 6.7 7.7 7.6 6.4
     survivor pensioners / active contributors 17.1 16.7 17.3 18.6 16.4
Numbers of contributors (annual average in thousands)
     SPSS subsystem 3696 3947 4439 4498 4613
        TCO 3330 3593 4095 4200 4336
        TI 366 354 344 298 277
     SPCGA subsystem 741 650 244 6 0
Number  of pensioners (annual average in thousands)
     Old age 1955 2138 2812 3935 4174
         SPSS 1650 1812 2450 3687 4170
         SPCGA 305 326 362 247 4
     Disability 349 309 362 343 294
         SPSS 278 246 284 303 294
         SPCGA 71 62 77 40 0
     Survivor 759 770 810 839 756
         SPSS 634 635 676 748 751
         SPCGA 125 135 135 91 5
Average pension (as a percentage of minimum wage)
     Old age 118.8 124.2 144.0 137.8 140.2
         SPSS 85.0 92.4 117.8 129.1 140.2
         SPCGA 301.6 301.3 321.2 267.7 -
     Disability 96.8 108.2 143.5 121.7 106.3
         SPSS 73.5 80.0 94.6 104.6 106.2
         SPCGA 188.6 219.3 324.0 251.3 -
     Survivor 52.1 54.6 68.1 75.8 84.4
         SPSS 45.0 47.4 62.4 75.5 84.7




In the technical report containing the official projections for the Segurança Social 
subsystem, there are no indicators comparable to those in Table 3.4.1. The only 
information that allows for some comparison is what was published in December 2005 
in the fiche on Portugal prepared by the Portuguese representatives in the Ageing 
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11. Table 3.4.2 
summarizes the information available on the number of pensioners in the Segurança 
Social subsystem (scenario without reforms) and puts it side by side with the projections 
from the baseline scenario without reforms obtained from the MISS model. The AWG 
information may be to some extent out of date, but it was prepared on the basis of the 
model used to obtain the official projections of May 2006 (the ModPensPor model) and 
probably with very similar assumptions. It should also be noted that the AWG 
projections relating to the numbers of pensioners include those with a non-contributive 
welfare pension (the so-called pensões sociais), omitted from the MISS model
12. With 
this caveat, the figures in Table 3.4.2 show that the MISS model projects a bigger 




Comparison of results: scenarios without reforms 
number of pensioners in the Segurança Social subsystem 
 
2005 2010 2030 2050 difference 2005 2010 2030 2050 difference
2050-2005 2050-2005
Segurança Social pensioners (10
6) (1) 2.64 2.79 3.81 4.56 1.92 2.56 2.69 3.41 4.74 2.18
Old age 1.69 1.80 2.62 3.27 1.59 1.65 1.81 2.45 3.69 2.04
Disability 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.26 -0.04 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.03
Survivor 0.65 0.68 0.85 1.02 0.37 0.63 0.64 0.68 0.75 0.11
Note: (1) AWG includes pensioners from the contributive and non-contributive regimes; MISS only includes pensioners from the contributive regime.




Table 3.4.3 includes the same indicators as Table 3.4.1, but for the alternatives I and II 
of the baseline scenarios with reforms. A comparison of the two tables shows that there 
are important differences in alternative I relating to the projections of most variables, 
while alternative II shows smaller changes, apart from the relative average pensions. 
 
In the scenario without reforms, the ratio of old age pensioners practically doubles and 
goes beyond 90% at end-horizon. In alternative II, where workers do not change their 
retirement age and accept the financial penalty associated with the sustainability factor, 
the ratio for old age pensioners moves in a less pronounced way (due to the higher 
penalty imposed on early retirement), but still practically doubles to horizon. By 
contrast, in alternative I (putting off the retirement age until the financial penalty is 
completely offset) the same ratio only moves up slightly, from 44.1% in 2005 to 51.1% 
in 2080. It must, of course, be borne in mind that putting off retirement age logically 
causes an increase in the number of disability pensioners, but the overall effect is still 
notable: in alternative I, the ratio for pensioners as a whole increases by 4.8 percentage 
points to horizon, compared with 44.3 percentage points if there are no reforms and 39.4 
percentage points for alternative II. The significance of these differences is even greater 
because it occurs in a context where there are more active contributors, given the rise in 
participation rates for older age groups, a point already highlighted. 
 
                                                  
11 Appended to EPC and DGECFIN (2006) and available on  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/epc/epc_sustainability_ageing_en.htm 
12 There were around 80 thousand non-contributive welfare pensions in 2005. 
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Contributors and beneficiaries – baseline scenario with measures 
 
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080 2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Dependency ratios (SPSS+SPCGA)
     total pensioners / active contributors 69.0 68.9 70.8 76.8 73.8 69.0 69.1 81.0 109.1 108.4
     old age pensioners / active contributors 44.1 45.5 44.6 49.3 51.1 44.1 45.7 56.1 83.4 86.0
     disability pensioners / active contributors 7.9 6.7 9.7 11.4 9.4 7.9 6.7 7.9 7.7 6.4
     survivor pensioners / active contributors 17.1 16.7 16.5 16.0 13.3 17.1 16.7 17.0 18.0 16.0
Numbers of contributors (annual average in thousands)
     SPSS subsystem 3696 3953 4516 4643 4784 3696 3946 4468 4547 4670
        TCO 3330 3596 4152 4324 4486 3330 3590 4116 4240 4384
        TI 366 358 364 319 298 366 356 352 307 286
     SPCGA subsystem 741 661 283 13 0 741 660 258 7 0
Number  of pensioners (annual average in thousands)
     Old age 1955 2099 2140 2297 2444 1955 2104 2652 3797 4016
         SPSS 1650 1784 1830 2066 2440 1650 1789 2313 3558 4013
         SPCGA 305 315 310 231 4 305 316 339 238 4
     Disability 349 309 465 531 450 349 309 371 351 299
         SPSS 278 247 374 478 450 278 246 287 308 299
         SPCGA 71 62 91 54 0 71 63 84 44 0
     Survivor 759 769 793 745 638 759 770 802 819 746
         SPSS 634 635 658 650 632 634 635 666 727 741
         SPCGA 125 134 136 96 6 125 135 136 92 5
Average pension (as a percentage of minimum wage)
     Old age 118.8 120.3 119.2 109.2 101.1 118.8 120.4 110.1 91.2 82.7
         SPSS 85.0 88.8 90.3 94.8 101.1 85.0 88.9 84.9 82.5 82.7
         SPCGA 301.6 298.9 289.7 237.7 - 301.6 298.8 282.1 222.0 -
     Disability 96.8 106.6 128.2 102.2 84.7 96.8 106.7 132.9 104.0 84.7
         SPSS 73.5 77.3 79.9 86.9 84.7 73.5 77.3 80.4 86.3 84.7
         SPCGA 188.6 222.2 327.0 238.5 - 188.6 222.5 312.5 228.1 -
     Survivor 52.1 53.3 52.8 53.8 55.8 52.1 53.3 52.0 49.9 48.7
         SPSS 45.0 45.9 45.7 51.4 56.0 45.0 45.9 45.4 48.1 48.8
         SPCGA 88.1 87.8 87.1 70.3 - 88.1 87.9 84.5 64.2 -




Another notable difference between the projections in Tables 3.4.3 and 3.4.1 refers to 
the way average pensions overall evolve as a percentage of the minimum wage. To 
illustrate the difference in the most relevant group (old age pensions) the social security 
system matures to the point where, if there are no reforms, the average pension in the 
SPSS will rise between 2005 and 2080 from 85% of the minimum wage to close 140%. 
In alternative I, this increase is smaller and the average old age pension rises to 101% of 
the minimum wage at the end of horizon. In alternative II there is even a slight decrease 
in the average pension as a percentage of the minimum wage (from 85% in 2005 to 
82.7% in 2080). In the SPCGA, the indicators fall in all three cases, but more steeply 
when taking into consideration the reforms, the figures being 33.9, 63.9 and 79.6 
percentage points, respectively in the scenarios without reforms and with reforms, 
alternatives I and II
14. 
 
These distinct paths for the average pension as a percentage of the minimum wage can 
be justified above all by the reference to pension updates made for each scenario. With 
no reforms, updating is indexed to the change in wages (without accounting for the 
effects of increasing seniority and longer schooling) and this is a “natural” rule for pay- 
                                                  
14 With the CGA closed to new registrations, the number of SPCGA pensioners will be relatively small 
after 2050 and the average figure will be insignificant. Because of this, no figures are given for 2080. 
  45-as-you-go systems
15. With both alternatives of the baseline scenarios with reforms, the 
indexation for pension update is taken as consumer inflation plus 0.25 percentage 
points. As mentioned in section 3.1.2, this was the simplification adopted in the 
scenarios with reforms to approximate the new complex updating rule for pensions. 
 
 
3.5 Projections of the financial synopsis of SPSS and SPCGA  
 
3.5.1 The contributive Segurança Social subsystem 
 
Tables 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 provide projections of the SPSS accounts for all three baseline 
scenarios. If the logic to be followed was to consider only contribution-based revenue 
items, calculation of the balance should in fact include on the revenue side only the 
revenue related to the contributions of workers and employers. However, Portuguese 
legislation assigns part of the country’s VAT receipts for social security financing, so 




SPSS account – baseline scenario without reforms 
 
As a percentage of GDP
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Actual contributions (employees and employers) 7.5 8.0 9.4 10.0 10.2
VAT assigned 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0
Primary expenditure 9.1 9.9 13.8 20.3 22.0
     Pensions 6.7 7.4 11.3 17.7 19.4
            Old age 5.0 5.7 9.1 14.9 16.7
            Disability 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9
            Survivor 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.8 1.8
     Other benefits and allowances 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0
     Administrative costs 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
SPSS primary balance -1.2 -1.2 -3.7 -9.5 -10.9
Present value (2005) of primary balances (1) -399.0




17 is one of the basic indicators that can help gauge the financial 
sustainability of the social security contributive regimes. If no reforms were made (see 
Table 3.5.1) the primary balance would have been negative to horizon and getting 
progressively worse, reaching beyond 10% of GDP from mid-century. This path 
changes substantially with alternatives I and II of the scenarios with reforms (Table 
3.5.2). Alternative I leads to better results, with an improvement in the primary balance 
during the first thirty years, reaching a surplus of 0.6% of GDP in 2030, followed by a 
                                                  
15 For the SPCGA, the update of compensations is assumed to be smaller than for the private sector and 
the minimum wage. This is the reason why the ratio between average pension and minimum wage falls 
gradually to horizon, even in the scenario without reforms. 
16 The way the MISS model projects the VAT assigned to social security is explained at the end of 
subsection 2.7.1. 
17 Excluding financial income and costs. 
  46slight decrease, with the primary balance staying practically even. The results for 
alternative II show a smaller improvement when compared with the picture if there are 
no reforms, but still remain substantial. The primary balance reaches near equilibrium 




SPSS account – baseline scenario with reforms 
 
As a percentage of GDP
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080 2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Actual contributions (employees and employers) 7.5 7.9 9.1 9.8 9.9 7.5 7.9 9.3 10.0 10.1
VAT assigned 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0
Primary expenditure 9.1 9.5 9.2 10.3 10.9 9.1 9.6 10.2 13.4 13.4
     Pensions 6.7 7.0 6.8 8.0 8.6 6.7 7.1 7.8 11.0 11.1
            Old age 5.0 5.4 5.0 5.8 6.6 5.0 5.4 6.1 9.1 9.3
            Disability 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
            Survivor 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0
     Other benefits and allowances 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9
     Administrative costs 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
SPSS primary balance -1.2 -0.9 0.6 0.2 0.1 -1.2 -0.9 -0.2 -2.7 -2.3
Present value (2005) of primary balances (1) 0.7 -97.3
Note: (1) Discount rate taken as the implicit public debt interest rate.




The cumulative value of the primary balances for 2005-2080 in terms of present value 
(referred to 2005)
18 as a percentage of the 2005 GDP can be taken as a synthetic 
indicator of financial sustainability. The present value (truncated at 2080) corroborates 
earlier conclusions: serious financial imbalance in the SPSS before reforms and a major 
improvement if measures are put in place, although the imbalance is still significant in 
alternative II, where it reaches almost 100% of GDP. 
 
Table 3.5.3 allows for a comparison between official projections (before any reforms) 
up to 2050 and the baseline scenario without reforms obtained from using the MISS 
model for the same horizon. The latter shows a bigger growth in revenue from 
contributions, related to the different demographic path projected: higher numbers of 
resident population, labour force and contributors to the system. The larger revenue is, 
however, more than offset by an exponential growth in expenditure on old age pensions, 
which is much less apparent in the official scenario. Part of the difference in the 
behaviour of expenditure on old age pensions stems from a stronger dynamic in the 
numbers of this group of pensioners in the scenario put forward in MISS. But the 
fundamental explanation would seem to be in the indexation rule of pensions adopted 
for each scenario. In the scenario without reforms generated by MISS the rule was an 
indexation of the SPSS pensions to the updating of wages in the private sector 
(excluding the effects of increasing seniority and longer schooling). The way pensions 




                                                  
18 The discount rate taken was the (nominal) implicit public debt interest rate, which was set at 4.5% from 
2010. 
19 The fiche on Portugal appended to the AWG (EPC and DGECFIN 2006) refers to pension updating in 
real terms of 0.1% per year. 
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Comparison of results: scenarios without reforms - SPSS account 
 
2005 2010 2030 2050 difference 2005 2010 2030 2050 difference
2050-2005 2050-2005
Contributions and dues 7.4 7.6 8.1 8.4 1.0 7.5 8.0 9.4 10.0 2.5
Expenditure on pensions (1) 5.3 6.0 8.4 9.6 4.3 6.7 7.4 11.3 17.7 10.9
Old age 3.8 4.4 6.7 7.8 4.0 5.0 5.7 9.1 14.9 9.9
Disability 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 -0.2 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.3
Survivor 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.4 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.8 0.8
Expenditure on other benefits and allowances 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 -0.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.0
Balance (1),(2) 0.1 -0.2 -2.4 -3.5 -3.6 -1.2 -1.2 -3.7 -9.5 -8.3
Unit: percentage of GDP for each scenario.
Notes: (1) Official projections only include pensions from the Segurança Social general regime while pensions in the MISS model also include other regimes, only non-contributive 
                 being excluded.
           (2) In MISS, the primary balance is calculated with assigned VAT included. In official projections, the balance is called the effective balance of the contributive system. 
                This is the best concept for comparison with the MISS primary balance, although it includes expenditure on active employment policies.





Primary balances in all three scenarios – i.e. with and without reforms – develop in a 
non-linear pattern. This is due to demographic factors, to the maturing of the system, to 
the dynamics of reform effects and, in addition, to registrations of public employees 
after 2006 (following the closure of CGA to new entrants). In the first half of the 
horizon, the effect of these new registrations in the SPSS is reflected above all in a rise 
in revenue, to the extent that expenditure on pensions for this group will still be 
negligible. Later on, the positive effect on the balance is reversed, as expenditure on 
pensions for this group will catch up. In the box at the end of this chapter, there is a 
discussion of the consequences on SPSS accounts of closing CGA to new registrations 
as and from 2006. 
 
3.5.2 The CGA contributive subsystem 
 
Because of the special way the SPCGA is financed, a concept of imputed contribution is 
presented in Tables 3.5.4 and 3.5.5. Only some entities pay employer contributions to 
the SPCGA (fundamentally those in general government with financial autonomy). 
Given the fact that actual employer contributions are not paid for the remaining public 
employees, the State transfers what is commonly known as the “State subsidy” to the 
CGA, the amount depending on what is needed to keep the system financially in 
balance (besides the transfer of the VAT assigned to CGA). The MISS model does not 
take this State subsidy into consideration. If it did, it would not be possible to clarify the 
CGA’s financial situation or consolidate the accounts of the two subsystems. Instead, it 
factors in the same rate of contribution for each public employee as the employer rate in 
the private sector adjusted for the different coverage of risks in the two subsystems. 
That part of the employer contribution considered as SPCGA revenue that is not in fact 
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SPCGA account – baseline scenario without reforms 
 
As a percentage of GDP
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Contributions (employees and employers) (actual and imputed) 2.4 2.1 0.7 0.0 0.0
Income from entities in charge of pensions and other payments 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.0
Use of other reserves (former pension funds) 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
VAT assigned 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0
Primary expenditure 4.2 4.3 4.9 2.7 0.0
     Pensions 4.2 4.3 4.9 2.7 0.0
            Old age 3.4 3.5 3.8 2.2 0.0
            Disability 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.0
            Survivor 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0
     Other benefits and allowances 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     Administrative costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SPCGA primary balance (1) -1.2 -1.4 -3.3 -2.1 0.0
Present value (2005) of primary balances (1),(2) -113.8
Memorandum item: balance of special reserves (former pension funds) 2.7 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.0
Notes: (1) Including employer contributions imputed to the State.





SPCGA account – baseline scenario with reforms 
 
As a percentage of GDP
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080 2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Contributions (employees and employers) (actual and imputed) 2.4 2.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.1 0.8 0.0 0.0
Income from entities in charge of pensions and other payments 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.0
Use of other reserves (former pension funds) 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
VAT assigned 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0
Primary expenditure 4.2 4.2 4.0 2.3 0.0 4.2 4.2 4.2 2.2 0.0
     Pensions 4.2 4.1 3.9 2.2 0.0 4.2 4.1 4.1 2.2 0.0
            Old age 3.4 3.3 2.8 1.7 0.0 3.4 3.3 3.1 1.7 0.0
            Disability 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.0
            Survivor 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0
     Other benefits and allowances 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     Administrative costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SPCGA primary balance (1) -1.2 -1.2 -2.4 -1.7 0.0 -1.2 -1.3 -2.6 -1.6 0.0
Present value (2005) of primary balances (1),(2) -89.1 -90.3
Memorandum item: balance of special reserves (former pension funds) 2.7 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 2.7 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.0
Notes: (1) Including employer contributions imputed to the State.
           (2) Discount rate taken as the implicit public debt interest rate.




The aim was to reach equivalence between the imputed State contribution rate and the 
contribution rate paid by private sector employers to the SPSS. After adjustments for 
different coverage of risks, that rate was found to be 13.1% of the employee’s 
compensation, which is very close to the 13% rate paid by general government entities 
  49with financial autonomy for their employees registered in the SPCGA
20. This “imputed 
employer contribution” of the State amounted to around 2.5% of GDP in 2005 and was 
included as part of the overall contribution revenue of the SPCGA for the purposes of 
Tables 3.5.4 and 3.5.5. 
 
With this revenue included, the primary balance of the SPCGA reached -1.2% of GDP 
in 2005. All three baseline scenarios then point to a worsening of the primary balances 
until the 2030s, after which the deficits gradually tail off and become insignificant at 
end-horizon. 
 
The initial worsening stems from the fact that the SPCGA no longer receives 
contributions from new registrations. In the baseline scenario without reforms, the 
maximum deficit, above 3% of GDP, is reached in the 2030s. And even in the two 
alternatives with reforms
21 the primary deficit is likely to be more than 2% of GDP for a 
large part of the second quartile of the century. 
 
Using the cumulative present value of the 2005-2080 primary balances of the SPCGA, 
one comes to around 114% of GDP for the baseline scenario without reforms and 89% 
of GDP for the two alternatives of the baseline scenario with reforms, both considerably 
high figures. The conclusion, therefore, is that there is a deep financial imbalance in the 
SPCGA and that the measures agreed do not substantially change the situation, as they 
do for the SPSS. This finding is understandable in the light of a number of unfavourable 
factors that have accumulated over the past and also because revenue will gradually dry 
up owing to the closure of the subsystem to new registrations. 
 
3.4.3 Consolidated accounts of the two subsystems 
 
The indicators set out in Tables 3.5.6 and 3.5.7 were obtained after consolidation of the 
SPSS and SPCGA accounts, as described at the end of Chapter 2. These Tables make it 
possible to have an integrated view of the accounts of the contributive regimes of both 
subsystems. 
 
The projections for the baseline scenarios after inclusion of the reforms follow a path 
that is not so stark but even so shows significant imbalance, which is fundamentally 
because of the SPCGA accounts, as shown in the previous subsections. Contrary to the 
scenario without reforms, the primary deficits do not get sharply worse in the initial 
phase of projections. In alternative I, there is even a gradual decrease of deficits to a 
virtually balanced situation in 2080. In alternative II, the projection shows a worsening 
of the primary deficit until mid-century, then a gradual fall, with a deficit in 2080 
similar to 2005 deficit. In these scenarios with reforms, the implicit liabilities as 
measured by the present value of primary balances for 2005-2080 is estimated at 88.4% 




                                                  
20 This is also almost identical to the 13.08% the State pays as employer contributions for public service 
employees registered in the SPSS after 2006. These still have coverage of risks similar to the ones 
registered in the CGA. 
21 It should be remembered that the last three of the four measures detailed in section 3.1 apply both to 
SPSS and SPCGA contributors. 
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SPSS+SPCGA consolidated accounts – baseline scenario without reforms  
 
As a percentage of GDP
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Actual and imputed contributions 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.2
Income from entities in charge of pensions and other payments 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0
Use of other reserves (former pension funds) 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
VAT assigned 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Primary expenditure 13.1 14.1 18.6 22.9 22.0
     Pensions 10.8 11.6 16.0 20.3 19.4
            Old age 8.2 9.1 12.8 17.0 16.7
            Disability 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.2 0.9
            Survivor 1.4 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.8
     Other benefits and allowances 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0
     Administrative costs 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
SPSS+SPCGA subsystems primary balance(1) -2.4 -2.6 -7.0 -11.6 -10.9
Present value (2005) of primary balances (1),(2) -512.8
Memorandum item: balance of special reserves (former pension funds) 2.7 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.0
Notes: (1) Including employer contributions imputed to the State.
           (2) Discount rate taken as the implicit public debt interest rate.  
 
Table 3.5.7 
SPSS+SPCGA consolidated accounts – baseline scenario with reforms 
 
As a percentage of GDP
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080 2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Actual and imputed contributions 9.9 10.0 9.9 9.8 9.9 9.9 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.1
Income from entities in charge of pensions and other payments 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0
Use of other reserves (former pension funds) 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
VAT assigned 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Primary expenditure 13.1 13.5 13.0 12.5 10.9 13.1 13.6 14.2 15.5 13.4
     Pensions 10.8 11.0 10.6 10.2 8.6 10.8 11.1 11.8 13.1 11.1
            Old age 8.2 8.6 7.7 7.4 6.6 8.2 8.7 9.1 10.7 9.4
            Disability 1.1 1.0 1.6 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.1 0.7
            Survivor 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.0
     Other benefits and allowances 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9
     Administrative costs 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
SPSS+SPCGA subsystems primary balance(1) -2.4 -2.1 -1.7 -1.5 0.1 -2.4 -2.2 -2.8 -4.3 -2.3
Present value (2005) of primary balances (1),(2) -88.4 -187.6
Memorandum item: balance of special reserves (former pension funds) 2.7 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 2.7 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.0
Notes: (1) Including employer contributions imputed to the State.
           (2) Discount rate taken as the implicit public debt interest rate.




Consequences of the closure of the CGA on the SPSS accounts 
 
One of the MISS model’s features which is not found in other models simulating the 
financial situation of the Portuguese social security is that it was conceived in such a 
way as to provide a straightforward method for assessing the consequences of the 
decision to close the CGA to new registrations as and from 2006. This simulation meant 
introducing two relatively simple changes in the parameterization of the MISS model: i) 
changing the value of ρ  from 1 to 0; ii) taking the revenue received by the CGA from 
other entities in charge of pension payments and then fixing them at the levels projected 
when the CGA was closed.  
  51In terms of this latter point, it was assumed that, even in a counter factual situation of 
non-closure, there would be no enrollment of employees (on a contributive basis) with 
liability for future pension payments in the hands of outside entities. In the past, such 
situations were normally associated with employees in public-owned, or formerly 
public-owned enterprises, who were traditionally registered in the CGA up to a certain 
date. In other words, it was assumed that, irrespective of whether the CGA was closed 
at the end of 2005, these situations would not lead to new registrations in the CGA. 
 
Table 3.C.1 
Consequences of non-closure of CGA to new registrations on the SPSS accounts: 
differences from the respective baseline scenario with reforms 
In percentage points of GDP
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080 2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Actual contributions by employees and employers 0.0 -0.2 -0.9 -1.3 -1.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.9 -1.3 -1.0
VAT assigned 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Primary expenditure 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.9 -2.4 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -1.2 -2.1
     Pensions 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.9 -2.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -1.2 -2.1
            Old age 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -1.9 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.9 -1.7
            Disability 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1
            Survivor 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
     Other benefits and allowances 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     Administrative costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
SPSS primary balance 0.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.4 1.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.1 1.2
Present value (2005) of primary balances (1) -2.8 -1.7
Note: (1) Discount rate taken as the implicit public debt interest rate.
Alternative II Alternative I
 
Taking the two alternatives of the baseline scenario with reforms as terms of 
comparison, Table 3.C.1 shows the estimated difference in the SPSS accounts in the 
hypothetical situation of the CGA continuing to receive registrations from new public 
employees as and from 2006. It can be seen that this would imply a fall in SPSS revenue 
from contributions (reaching a maximum of 1.3% of GDP by mid-century) stemming 
from the fact that there were no new public employees coming in. Over and against this, 
expenditure on pensions would be lower. However, as mentioned in the main text, 
reductions in revenue and expenditure would not occur at the same time: revenue would 
fall first and expenditure only later because, in the first decades, the new public 
employees would be contributing and there would be no major expenditure on their 
pensions, given that they would be in the early stages of their contributive careers. 
 
In terms of the primary balance of the SPSS, non-closure of the CGA would imply a 
worsening until mid-century. It would reach a maximum of around 0.75 percentage 
points of GDP around 2030. After 2050, there would be a significant reduction of 
expenditure due to the SPSS not having to pay pensions to public employees and the 
primary balance of the subsystem would improve. This could reach between 1 and 1.5 
percentage points of GDP in the last decade to horizon. 
 
There is not a great difference in the present value of primary balances in the period up 
to 2080, in spite of the very specific intertemporal distribution of the effects. This is 
understandable because the alternatives (baseline scenario with reforms) used for 
comparison do not show any great imbalance, and also because any new registrations 
in the CGA would basically come under the rules pertaining to public employees 
registered in the SPSS. 
 













4. SENSITIVITY TO CHANGES IN DEMOGRAPHIC AND 
MACROECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS 
 
This chapter looks at the sensitivity of projections to changes in some of the main 
demographic and macroeconomic assumptions, specifically: 
-  Fertility rates; 
-  Mortality rates; 
-  Net immigration flows; 
-  Trend growth of productivity. 
The analysis was carried out though a comparison with the two alternative baseline 
scenarios with reforms, changing only one of the dimensions in each exercise. 
In the following sections, the effects obtained with the MISS model will, wherever 
possible, be compared with similar sensitivity analyses published in other papers and 
reports, such as those by the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (2006c) and EPC 
and DGECFIN (2006). 
 
 
4.1. A higher fertility rate 
 
The baseline scenarios described in the previous chapter assume a small recovery in the 
fertility rate along the horizon. The first sensitivity analysis carried out was an 
assessment of the effect of a higher fertility rate on the projections of the baseline 
scenarios. In terms of model parameterization, it should be recalled that the projection 
of fertility rates (see Chapter 2) is based on the extrapolation of two factors: the first 
indicates the overall trend in fertility rates, while the second indicates the evolution of 
fertility in women over 30, compared with younger women. For the purposes of this 
sensitivity analysis, the limit towards which the first factor converges in 2080 was 
raised (from -1.5 to -0.5), while the recovery path of the second factor was left 
unchanged. This meant gradually pushing up the total fertility rate from 1.45% in 2005 
to nearly 1.9% from mid-century (instead of nearly 1.6%). 
As can be seen in Table 4.1.1, the different assumption regarding the fertility rate has 
moderate long-term repercussions on the size of the population and in its structure by 
age groups. However, it leads to only a slight improvement in the primary balances of 
the SPSS and the SPCGA. In terms of the cumulative present value of the primary 
balances 2005-2080, the effect is favourable, though not markedly. 
 Table 4.1.1 
Sensitivity to a rise in fertility: 
differences from the respective baseline scenario with reforms 
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080 2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Total fertility rate - 0.09 0.24 0.30 0.33 - 0.09 0.24 0.30 0.33
Population (10
6) - 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.9 - 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.9
Ratio of over 65s to 15-64 years - 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 - 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04
Expenditure on pensions - consolidated total (% GDP)  - 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.8 - 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.7
      Social Security - 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.8 - 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.7
      CGA - 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Primary balance SPSS+SPCGA (% GDP) - 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.9 - 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8
      Social Security - 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 - 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8
      CGA
(1 ) - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Present value of primary balances (% GDP) 
(2) 17.7 11.2
      Social Security 17.5 10.8
      CGA
(1 ) 0.2 0.4
Notes: (1) Includes the imputed State contribution (CGA).
             (2) Calculation made on the basis of the discount rate implicit in public debt and truncated for the period 2005-2080.




4.2 A higher mortality rate 
 
The evolution of mortality rates projected in the baseline scenarios leads to gradual rises 
in average life expectancy at birth to horizon, reaching nearly 6 years more at 2080. As 
might be expected, this result depends critically on the assumptions for the mortality 
rate. To assess the sensitivity to changes in these rates, the factors used in MISS for the 
extrapolation of mortality were pushed up (from -4 to -3). In terms of the baseline 
scenarios, this implied reducing by almost a half the increase of the average life 
expectancy at end-horizon (Table 4.2.1). 
 
Table 4.2.1 
Sensitivity to a rise in mortality: 
Differences from the respective baseline scenario with reforms 
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080 2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Mortality rate (x1000) - 0.5 1.1 1.2 0.5 - 0.5 1.1 1.2 0.5
Population (10
6) - 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 - 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5
Ratio of over 65s to 15-64 years - 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 - 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07
Life expectancy at birth
       Male - -0.6 -2.1 -2.7 -3.1 - -0.6 -2.1 -2.7 -3.1
       Female - -0.7 -2.3 -3.2 -3.6 - -0.7 -2.3 -3.2 -3.6
Expenditure on pensions - consolidated total (% GDP)  - 0.0 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 - 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
     Social security - 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 - 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5
      CGA - 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 - 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0
Primary balance SPSS+SPCGA (% GDP) - 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.8 - 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5
     Social security - 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 - 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5
      CGA
(1 ) - 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 - 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0
Present value of primary balances (% GDP) 
(2) 37.7 22.6
     Social security 28.2 15.1
      CGA
(1 ) 9.5 7.5
Notes: (1) Includes the imputed State contribution (CGA).
             (2) Calculation made on the basis of the discount rate implicit in public debt and truncated for the period 2005-2080.
Alternative II Alternative I
 
 
The response of expenditure on pensions to the rise in mortality is in the region of 0.3 to 
0.5 percentage points of GDP for the 2020s and between 0.5 and 0.8 percentage points 
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reduction occurs throughout the period, the present value of primary balances rises 
between 22.6 and 37.7 percentage points of GDP (2005 figures), evidence of the fact 
that the evolution of life expectancy is the cause of some pressure on the financial 
situation of the Portuguese social security. 
Looking at a sensitivity analysis carried out by the AWG on the same issue of mortality, 
the findings are to a large extent consistent, although the AWG only analysed the SPSS. 
Their assessment of a 15% increase in mortality rates by 2050 implies an additional 
pensions expenditure of 0.6 percentage points of GDP also for 2050. This compares 
with 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points as projected by MISS for the same period (as a result 
of a 12% increase in the overall mortality rate). 
 
 
4.3 Less immigration 
 
In the baseline scenarios, it was assumed that net immigration flows would remain 
relatively stable, in contrast with AWG and official assumptions, which point to a drop 
to around a third of current figures. To assess the sensitivity of projections to these 
different assumptions, the limits towards which the two factors used for the 
extrapolation of net immigration flows were brought down as compared with the 
baseline scenarios (from 1.25 to 0). 
The results (Table 4.3.1) show a significant change in the long-term financial situation 
of social security. The fall in population stems not only from the lower flow of 
immigrants, but also from the lower birth rate that it implies. Another long-term effect 
is the increase in the older population dependency ratio. 
 
Table 4.3.1 
Sensitivity to less immigration: 
differences from the respective baseline scenario with reforms 
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080 2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Net immigration (10
3) - -8 -23 -28 -31 - -8 -23 -28 -31
Population (10
6) - 0.0 -0.4 -1.2 -2.8 - 0.0 -0.4 -1.2 -2.8
Ratio of over 65s to 15-64 years - 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.12 - 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.12
Number of old age pensioners (annual average, 10
3) - 0 1 -12 -241 - 0 3 -33 -457
Expenditure on pensions - consolidated total (% GDP)  - 0.0 0.5 1.4 1.9 - 0.0 0.6 1.9 2.4
     Social security - 0.0 0.4 1.1 1.9 - 0.0 0.4 1.6 2.4
      CGA - 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 - 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0
Primary balance SPSS+SPCGA (% GDP) - 0.0 -0.5 -1.4 -2.0 - 0.0 -0.6 -1.9 -2.5
     Social security - 0.0 -0.4 -1.1 -2.0 - 0.0 -0.5 -1.6 -2.5
      CGA
(1 ) - 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 - 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0
Present value of primary balances (% GDP) 
(2) -47.5 -42.8
     Social security -46.1 -40.8
      CGA
(1 ) -1.4 -2.0
Notes: (1) Includes the imputed State contribution (CGA).
             (2) Calculation made on the basis of the discount rate implicit in public debt and truncated for the period 2005-2080.
Alternative II Alternative I
 
 
In terms of the social security accounts, it is again the expenditure on pensions as a 
percentage of GDP that records the biggest rise, fundamentally as a result of lower 
economic growth brought on by the fall in employment. In the longer term, that is from 
the 2040s, there is a decrease in the number of pensioners, but the effect of lower output 
growth continues to dominate, leading to a fall in the consolidated primary balance 
 
 
55(SPSS+SPCGA) of 2.0 and 2.5 percentage points of GDP at end-horizon, respectively 
in alternatives I and II of the scenarios with reforms. The present value of primary 
balances falls by 47.5 and 42.8 percentage points of GDP. 
In the official projections, the sensitivity analysis presupposed a 10,000 increase in 
immigration flows (net annual amounts) and the improvement in the Social Security 
account
1 was 0.3 percentage points of GDP in 2050. In the MISS simulation, the impact 
of a reduction of around 20 thousand individuals per year until 2050 in the primary 
balance of the Segurança Social system is 1.1 to 1.6 percentage points of GDP. This 
means that, even factoring in the differences in the concepts, the MISS model is more 
sensitive to assumptions on immigration. 
 
4.4 Lower productivity growth 
In the baseline scenario, productivity growth was set at 2% per year from 2010 and for 
the sensitivity exercise this rate was cut by half (1% per year from 2008). As a result, 
the GDP growth trend also fell by around 1 percentage point. This implied revising the 
approximation to the indexation rule of pensions and other payments considered in both 
alternatives of the scenario with reforms: consumer inflation less 0.25 percentage points 
in the sensitivity scenarios rather than consumer inflation plus 0.25 percentage points as 
in the baseline scenarios. 
 
Table 4.4.1 
Sensitivity to lower productivity growth: 
Differences from the respective baseline scenario with reforms 
2005 2010 2030 2050 2080 2005 2010 2030 2050 2080
Productivity (t.v.a.) - -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 - -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Contributions from employees and employers  - consolidated total (% GDP) - 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 - 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
      Social Security - 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 - 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
      CGA
1 - 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Expenditure on pensions - consolidated total (% GDP)  - 0.1 1.3 2.3 2.4 - 0.1 1.5 2.8 3.0
     Social security - 0.0 0.8 1.7 2.3 - 0.0 0.9 2.2 3.0
      CGA - 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.0 - 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.0
Primary balance SPSS+SPCGA (% GDP) - 0.0 -1.1 -2.0 -1.9 - 0.0 -1.2 -2.5 -2.6
     Social security - 0.0 -0.7 -1.4 -1.9 - 0.0 -0.8 -2.0 -2.6
      CGA
(1 ) - 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 0.0 - 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 0.0
Present value (2005) for cumulative primary balances (% GDP) 
(2) -38.9 -15.1
     Social security -44.8 -20.1
      CGA
(1 ) 5.9 5.1
Notes: (1) Includes the imputed State contribution (CGA).
               (2) Calculation made on the basis of the discount rate implicit in public debt and truncated for the period 2005-2080.
Alternative I Alternative II
 
 
In the MISS model, a lower pace in productivity growth is reflected firstly in a lower 
growth rate of compensation (including the minimum wage and other related 
payments). In tandem, the revenue from contributions for the two subsystems fell but 
the slower growth of the economy meant a slight rise in the importance of this item in 
terms of GDP (Table 4.4.1). On the expenditure side, there is a lower rate of pensions 
growth (-0.5 percentage points per year compared with the baseline alternatives) but 
there is a considerable increase in expenditure on pensions as a percentage of GDP (due 




1 This concept is not comparable to what is used in the MISS model.  
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to a denominator effect) and this leads to a fall in the consolidated SPSS+SPCGA 
primary balance. This amounts to around 2 percentage points of GDP by the end of the 
horizon for alternative I and around 2.5 percentage points for alternative II. The 
corresponding present values of the primary balances go down by almost 40 percentage 
points of GDP in alternative I and around 15 percentage points in alternative II
2. 
Therefore, if the somewhat optimistic assumption of 2% per year productivity growth 
does not materialize, this can lead to a worsening of the social security financial 
situation relative to the baseline scenarios, even under the new rule for pension 
updating. 
 
Over a longer horizon than projected, there is likely to be less effect from the changes to 
productivity growth on the social security accounts. If the horizon was extended, say, to 
120 years, it is very likely that the effects generated for the last period would show a 
less significant sensitivity to the trend productivity growth
3. The effects estimated for 
the next decades, above all up to 2050, can be understood as a result of the natural 
inertia in any social security system. In fact, the change in the way productivity grows 
has a relatively rapid impact on wages and contributions to social security, while the 
impact on new pensions will only be felt in the long term. The longer the contributive 
career considered to determine the reference wage, the slower the impact of wage 
moderation on the value of new pensions. It should be added that the knock-on effect on 
pensions expenditure in the wake of a slowdown in productivity growth is more difficult 
in countries like Portugal where a relatively generous range of minimum pensions helps 
to isolate the evolution of expenditure on pensions from contributive careers. 
If we compare the effect of this change on the evolution of contributions and pensions, 
using a similar analysis to the AWG, there is some similarity in the responses, though 
they are less marked with the MISS model. According to the AWG, a reduction of 0.25 
percentage points in productivity growth will imply, for 2050, an increase in 
contributions revenue of 0.14 percentage points of GDP and an increase in expenditure 
on pensions of 0.93 percentage points of GDP. If these effects are multiplied by 4, to 
provide a comparison with the figures in Table 4.4.1, there would be, in general terms, a 
1.1 percentage points fall in the trend growth of productivity, implying rises of 0.6 
percentage points of GDP in SPSS revenue and 3.7 percentage points of GDP in SPSS 
expenditure. These figures compare with increases of 0.4, 2.3 and 2.8 percentage points 




2 By subsectors, the SPSS balance worsens but the CGA balance improves. The latter change is in 
apparent contradiction with the deterioration of SPCGA annual primary balances, but it stems from two 
points: on one hand, there is a lower rate of pension update (ceteris paribus) and this pushes up the 
present value of the primary balances as a percentage of GDP; and on the other hand, lower productivity 
growth implies lower primary balances as a percentage of GDP in each year to horizon. 
3 There will be no full neutrality since payments to public employees, in the assumptions used for the 
baseline scenarios, are only partially indexed to productivity growth (i.e. a 1 percentage point increase in 
overall productivity translates into a 0.5 percentage points growth in the compensation of public 
employees). Moreover, in the baseline scenarios with reforms (taken as reference case), the updating of 











5. THE EFFECT OF REFORMS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
SUSTAINABILITY GAP INDICATORS FOR PORTUGAL 
 
 
A number of estimates are presented in this chapter relating to the impact of the 
Portugal’s social security reforms on the synthetic sustainability indicators used by the 
European Commission to assess long-term public finance sustainability. 
 
The Commission calculates these indicators taking into consideration the AWG long-
term projections of those items of public expenditure that are most age-sensitive. 
According to the AWG projections, in the case of Portugal, pensions expenditure 
explains practically all the long-term rise in overall age-related expenditure. The present 
analysis was restricted, for this reason, to the effects of the reforms on pensions 
expenditure and its impact on the sustainability indicators. The response to the reform 
measures of other kinds of age-related expenditure, such as education or health was 
therefore ignored. 
 
It would not make sense to assess the reform package by using projections for 
expenditure on pensions based on different assumptions than those the AWG used for 
generating projections of the remaining types of expenditure included in the calculation 
of the indicators. For this reason the assumptions underlying the 2006 AWG projections 
have been used in this chapter as much as possible. They differ in some ways from the 
assumptions underlying projections presented in previous chapters. The most significant 
differences will be highlighted and discussed.  
 
 
5.1 The S1 and S2 indicators 
 
The European Commission services calculate two main synthetic sustainability 
indicators known as the sustainability gaps S1 and S2
1,2. Their purpose is to measure 
the size of the permanent budgetary adjustment (translated as a variation of the primary 
public revenue and/or expenditure ratios on GDP) as required:   
                                                  
1 The logic is similar to the tax-gap indicator proposed by Blanchard et al (1990). 
2 There is a third indicator, deriving from S2 and called Required Primary Balance (RPB). This is simply 
the sum of S2 and the average value of the primary structural balance (that is, corrected for the cycle and 
temporary measures) in the five years after end-horizon of the last stability/convergence programme 
update. Whereas the S1 and S2 indicators show the departure from sustainability (conditional on the 
available projections), the RPB indicates the objective for the primary structural balance at the end of the 
current stability/convergence programme required to achieve sustainability (S2=0) without any further 
policy changes. Given the low value added of the RPB indicator compared with S2, the decision was 
taken to limit the analysis of this chapter to S1 and S2.  
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i.  In the case of S1, for the public debt ratio to reach 60% of GDP at the end of an 
extended horizon (2050 in the European Commission calculations); 
ii.  In the case of S2, for the present value of public debt to tend to zero when the 
horizon widens to infinity (so as to respect the intertemporal budgetary 
restriction over an infinite horizon). 
 
The public finances of any economy are subject to an intertemporal constraint, meaning 
that at any moment the present value of all future public revenue must cover public debt 
at that moment and also the present value of future public expenditure. In a framework 
of unchanged policies (in particular, unchanged tax rates), a situation of non-
sustainability of public finances is considered to exist when there is an excessive 
accumulation of public debt in the long term (translated into an explosive path for the 
ratio of public debt to GDP). Conditional to a set of long-term projections, if the 
sustainability gaps S1 and S2 are significantly positive and large, then this can be taken 
as evidence that the current budgetary policy is not consistent with the intertemporal 
budgetary constraint, and cannot accommodate the projected evolution of public 
expenditure most sensitive to the ageing of the population. 
 
The sustainability gaps for S1 and S2 can be decomposed in the following way
3: 
 
S1 = IBP1 + LTC1  + D R        
S2 = IBP2 + LTC2        
where:  
-  IBPi (i=1,2) – (Initial Budgetary Position) – This is the change required in the initial 
budgetary position, defined as the difference between the initial value of the primary 
structural balance (as a % of GDP) and the constant value of that balance (also as a 
% of GDP), so as to guarantee that, in the case of S1, the ratio of public debt at end- 
horizon (2050) is identical to the initial value of that ratio and, in the case of S2, the 
present value of public debt at current prices tends to zero (over an infinite 
horizon)
4; 
-  LTCi (i=1,2) – (Long-Term Change in the budgetary position) – The effect on the 
indicator of the projected increase in age-related public expenditure; 
-  DR – (Debt Requirement) – The additional variation in the public debt ratio needed 
to reach 60% of GDP in 2050. 
This breakdown of S1 and S2 shows that it is possible to identify whether the main 
factors underlying the high value of an indicator stem from an insufficient initial 
primary balance and/or from an unfavourable projection of age-related public 
expenditure.    
 
For the baseline scenario of the sustainability gaps in 2005, and over and beyond the 
projection of expenditure most sensitive to the ageing of population produced by the 
AWG (EPC and DGECFIN 2006), the Commission accepts a number of assumptions to 
simplify the calculation. The most salient of these are: 
-  The implicit real rate of interest on public debt is taken as 3% per year, for all 
Member States for the period 2010-2050; 
-  The annual variation in the GDP deflator is taken as 2% for all Member States 
for the period 2010-2050; 
                                                  
3 See Annex 1 of DGECFIN (2006a) for a derivation of the S1 and S2 algebraic expressions.   
4 It should be noted that this does not imply that the ratio of debt to GDP (not its present value) should 
also tend to zero.  
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-  Total revenue and primary expenditure not directly influenced by the ageing of 
the population is taken as constant at 2005 figures as a ratio of GDP, after 
correction for cyclical effects and one-off and other temporary measures;  
-  (Only for S2) the primary balance is taken as constant after 2050 (as a % of 
GDP), since the AWG projections for age-related expenditure are only available 
up to that year. 
As for the initial public debt ratios, the Commission subtracted from the “Maastricht 
debt” the estimated stock of financial assets held by public pension funds. In the case of 
Portugal, the financial assets to be deducted from public debt were taken as those held 
by the Segurança Social subsystem and the CGA reserves (reaching 2.1% of GDP). The 
European Commission also assumed that the average rate of real GDP variation for 
Portugal would be 1.5% per year for the period 2010 to 2050. 
 
Table 5.1.1 gives the values of S1 and S2 for the 2005 baseline scenario, as reported by 
the European Commission in the DGECFIN (2006a). Portugal has the highest figures of 
all Member States, with only Hungary on a par for S1.
5 The figures are 3 times greater 
than the average for the EU12 and 4 times greater than the average for the EU25.
6 This 
is due to both the initial budgetary position (IBP) and the long-term change in age-
related expenditure (LTC). This combination of two unfavourable elements is shared by 
only two Member States – Hungary and Portugal. 
 
Table 5.1.1 
Sustainability gaps calculated by the European Commission services 
2005 baseline scenario 
Change (2050-2010) of which: change in Risk
 in age-related pensions expenditure assessment
expenditure (p.p.)   IBP DR LTC IBP LTC
Belgium 6.6 5.1 0.4 -3.5 0.2 3.7 1.8 -3.5 5.3 average
Germany 4.0 2.6 3.5 1.5 0.2 1.7 4.4 1.6 2.8 average
Greece 
(a) 1.4 n.d. 3.2 2.08 0.8 0.4 3.0 2.2 0.9 high
Spain 8.9 6.8 0.2 -2.7 -0.6 3.5 3.2 -2.7 5.9 average
France 3.2 1.9 3.2 1.3 0.1 1.8 4.0 1.4 2.6 average
Ireland 7.8 5.9 -0.8 -3.1 -1.2 3.5 2.9 -3.1 6.0 average
Italy 2.3 0.7 3.4 1.3 0.8 1.3 3.1 1.3 1.8 average
Luxemburg 8.4 7.6 4.6 1.2 -1.8 5.2 9.5 1.2 8.3 average
Netherlands 5.2 3.6 -0.2 -3.1 -0.4 3.3 1.3 -3.1 4.4 low
Austria 1.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.9 -0.1 1.0 0.3 -0.8 1.1 low
Portugal 9.7 8.9 7.9 3.6 0.3 4.1 10.5 3.8 6.7 high
Finland 5.0 2.5 -3.3 -5.0 -1.6 3.3 -0.9 -5.1 4.2 low
EU12 
(b) 4.4 2.8 2.3 0.1 0.1 2.1 3.5 0.2 3.3 -
Czech Republic 7.7 5.8 2.5 0.5 -0.6 2.6 5.5 0.7 4.8 high
Denmark 4.5 2.7 -4.2 -6.1 -1.0 3.0 -2.2 -6.1 3.9 low
Estonia -1.8 -2.6 -4.4 -1.7 -1.2 -1.5 -3.4 -1.8 -1.7 low
Cyprus 11.7 11.8 4.0 -0.3 0.0 4.3 8.5 0.2 8.3 high
Latvia 1.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -1.0 0.9 0.8 -0.4 1.2 low
Lithuania 2.1 2.0 0.3 0.4 -0.8 0.7 1.8 0.5 1.3 low
Hungary 7.1 6.0 7.9 4.5 0.3 3.1 9.8 4.8 5.1 high
Malta -0.6 -1.8 0.4 -0.5 0.3 0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 average
Poland -3.2 -3.3 -0.4 2.2 -0.1 -2.5 -0.2 2.6 -2.8 low
Slovenia 9.9 7.2 3.9 0.1 -0.6 4.4 7.3 0.2 7.1 high
Slovakia 3.7 2.3 1.3 0.7 -0.5 1.1 3.0 0.9 2.1 average
Sweden 2.4 1.1 -2.7 -3.1 -1.0 1.5 -1.1 -3.1 2.0 low
United Kingdom 4.2 2.0 3.4 1.6 -0.2 1.9 4.9 1.8 3.2 average
EU25 
(b)
4.1 2.6 2.1 0.2 0.0 1.9 3.4 0.3 3.0 -
Source: DG ECFIN (2006), Table II.1 (p.28) and Chapter VI (pp.91-167).
Notes:
  (a) Not comparable since there are no projections available for expenditure on pensions.





The large IBP figure for Portugal stems directly from the high negative primary 
structural balance in 2005, the initial year for this baseline scenario, when it stood at -
                                                  
5  The figures for Greece are not comparable with the remaining Member States since projections for 
pensions expenditure are not available. 
6 Excluding Greece in both cases. 
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2.5% of GDP. In this scenario, as mentioned above, total revenue and primary 
expenditure excluding age-related items remain constant as a percentage of GDP along 
the horizon at 2005 levels (after correction for cyclical effects and temporary measures). 
In other words, in the 2005 baseline scenario, no consideration is given to the projection 
of budgetary consolidation set down in the country’s stability programme.  
 
The European Commission services also report calculations of the sustainability gaps in 
an alternative scenario called “MTO scenario”. The difference between this and the 
2005 baseline scenario is that the path towards the medium-term objective (MTO) is 
factored in for all Member States. This brings convergence of the structural balance in 
2010 to the MTO as defined by each government when it updated its stability 
programme in December 2005
7  (the AWG projections on age-related public 
expenditure were used for both scenarios, baseline and MTO). In the case of Portugal, 
the second scenario makes all the difference, because the MTO for the overall structural 
balance is -0.5% of GDP, which corresponds to a primary structural surplus of 2.5% of 





S1 S2 S1 S2
Belgium 1.3 2.7 0.9 0.9
Germany 0.1 1.2 -3.4 -3.2
Greece 
(a) -1.9 -1.8 -5.1 -4.8
Spain 2.2 5.2 2.0 2.0
France 0.0 0.9 -3.2 -3.1
Ireland 1.7 5.3 2.5 2.4
Italy -1.0 -1.1 -4.4 -4.2
Luxemburg 3.9 8.9 -0.7 -0.6
Netherlands 2.2 3.6 2.4 2.3
Austria -0.7 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8
Portugal 2.5 5.2 -5.4 -5.3
Finland -0.7 1.6 2.6 2.5
EU12 
(b) 0.3 1.6 -2.0 -1.9
Czech Republic 2.2 5.1 -0.3 -0.4
Denmark 0.7 2.4 4.9 4.6
Estonia -2.6 -1.7 1.8 1.7
Cyprus 2.3 6.9 -1.7 -1.6
Latvia 0.6 1.9 1.2 1.1
Lithuania 0.3 1.8 0.0 0.0
Hungary 1.7 4.0 -6.2 -5.8
Malta -2.5 -3.0 -2.9 -2.7
Poland -4.0 -3.7 -3.6 -3.5
Slovenia 3.8 7.2 -0.1 -0.1
Slovakia 0.1 1.8 -1.2 -1.2
Sweden -1.9 -0.3 0.8 0.8
United Kingdom 1.0 2.7 -2.4 -2.2
EU25 
(b)
0.2 1.6 -1.9 -1.8
Source: DG ECFIN (2006), Table III.6 (p.50) and Table II.1 (p.28)
Notes:
  (a) Not comparable since there are no projections available for expenditure on pensions.







                                                  
7 A compilation of the MTOs defined by the national governments involved can be found in Fig 7.1 of the 
DGECFIN report (2006b). 
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The S1 and S2 figures for the MTO scenario are detailed in Table 5.1.2. Given that the 
LTC is unchanged (and given that the DR for S1 is also similar), the sustainability gap 
differences from the baseline scenario are due above all to a change in the IBP. In 
absolute terms, what is particularly noticeable is the improvement in both gaps, coming 
in at over 5 percentage points of GDP. However, in relative terms Portugal’s position is 
still quite unfavourable, given that most Member States with large budget imbalances 
are also aiming at major budgetary consolidations. 
 
Therefore, according to European Commission figures, the risk of long-term public 
finance unsustainability remained high for Portugal, even if the process of consolidation 
were successful, because of the contribution of the increase in age-related public 
expenditure (LTC). It can be seen from Table 5.1.1 that the LTC element in S1 and S2 
is high for Portugal – nearly twice the EU12 or EU25 averages, as a result of an increase 
of 9.7 percentage points of GDP from 2010 to 2050 in age-related public expenditure as 
projected by the AWG, with 8.9 percentage points relating to the increase in 
expenditure on pensions. These figures compare with an EU12 average of 4.4 and 2.8 
percentage points, respectively. 
 
It is important, however, to highlight the fact that these figures for Portugal do not take 
the 2006 social security reforms into account.  
 
 
5.2 The effects of social security reforms on S1 and S2 
 
The European Commission’s long-term projections of expenditure on pensions for 
Portugal were prepared during 2005 by the Portuguese representatives in the AWG. 
They were based on a series of assumptions agreed by the Group, and the projection 
models were the same as those used to produce the official Portuguese projections. The 
logic underlying these models is described very succinctly in the fiche on Portugal 
appended to the AWG report (EPC and DGECFIN 2006). Without access to those 
models, it is impossible to accurately replicate the projections and test the effects of the 
reforms. It is, however, possible to use the MISS  model to generate alternative 
projections on pensions, based on a set of demographic and macroeconomic 
assumptions similar to those used by the AWG. 
 
There are fundamentally four main differences between the AWG assumptions and 
those underlying the baseline scenario without reforms described in Chapter 3: 
-  Smaller net immigration flows (in the AWG projections there are positive flows 
but they are around one-third of those considered in Chapter 3); 
-  Updating of pensions and other benefits and allowances by inflation plus 0.1 
percentage points instead of the indexation to salary updates; 
-  Higher real interest rate implicit in public debt (3% instead of 2.5%);  
-  Lower mortality tables for the CGA contributors than for the population as a 
whole, where MISS assumes that mortality rates are the same for both 
subsystems and only considers an amplifying factor for the mortality of 
disability pensioners. 
 
In Table 5.2.1 the AWG projections for expenditure are compared with their equivalents 
obtained with the MISS model, after adjusting the assumptions as indicated, except for 
the information that refers to the CGA mortality tables, since this seems to be unrealistic 
in terms of the projection horizon. As far as the SPSS is concerned, the initial difference 
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in the figures relates above all to non-contributive pensions, which are not covered by 
the MISS model.   
 
Table 5.2.1 
Pensions expenditure projections – scenario without reforms 
 
As a percentage of GDP
Difference
2005 2010 2030 2050 2050-2005
(1) AWG
 Total of the  two subsystems 11.5 11.9 16.0 20.8 9.3
      Segurança Social 7.5 8.0 11.2 16.6 9.1
      CGA 3.9 3.6 4.5 3.9 0.0
      Residual difference 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
(2) MISS (excluding non-contributive pensions) with AWG assumptions
 Total of the  two subsystems 10.8 11.4 14.7 19.2 8.5
      Segurança Social 6.7 7.3 9.7 16.0 9.2
      CGA 4.2 4.3 5.3 3.4 -0.8
      Difference (consolidation effect) -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
Difference (1) - (2)
 Total of the  two subsystems 0.7 0.5 1.3 1.6 0.8
      Segurança Social 0.8 0.7 1.5 0.6 -0.1
      CGA -0.3 -0.7 -0.8 0.5 0.8
Sources: Fiche on Portugal appended to the AWG report, Revised Long-Term Projections for the Public Pension Schemes, December 2005 and MISS model.  
 
 
In terms of the SPSS, it is worth noting that the increase in pensions expenditure 
between 2005 and 2050 is practically the same in the AWG and the MISS model 
projections (9.1 and 9.2 percentage points, respectively). The differences in the SPCGA 
are, however, more significant. As regards 2005, the reason for the difference probably 
lies in the fact that the AWG information was more provisional. Their projections were 
available at the end of 2005, whereas the MISS model uses information provided to the 
Banco de Portugal by the CGA in mid-2006. Apart from the difference in initial figures, 
the AWG projections show the same figure (as a percentage of GDP) for the initial year 
and for end-horizon, while the projections generated by the MISS model show a 0.8 
percentage points fall. With the CGA subsystem closed to new registrations from 2006 
onwards, it is reasonable to expect considerably less expenditure on pensions in 2050, 
45 years after the last registrations. The reason why the AWG projections are more 
resilient is possibly because lower mortality rates were used for public employees than 
for the population in general. 
 
Apart from the differences, it is clear that the MISS model allows for the projection of 
an increase in public expenditure on pensions similar to the figure produced by the 
AWG and used by the European Commission. It seems reasonable, therefore, to use the 
MISS model to assess the effects of the reforms on this expenditure and then analyse its 
impact on the sustainability gaps. 
 
The reforms considered in the alternative scenarios are those analysed in Chapter 3: 
i)  The new rule to update pensions as a function of consumer inflation, the real 
GDP growth and the size of the pension; 
ii)  The additional financial penalty on the statutory pension for those taking 
early retirement; 
  63 
iii)  Early adoption of the new formula for calculating the statutory pension, 
taking the whole contributive career into consideration and increasing the 
accrual rate for lower compensations; 
iv)  Inclusion of the “sustainability factor” in the formula used to calculate the 
statutory pension. 
 
As mentioned in section 3.1, the new rule for up-dating pensions is rather complex and 
takes into account whether real GDP growth is less than 2%, above 3% or within these 
figures. In Chapter 3, an average GDP growth of 2% per year was projected,
8 and an 
approximation to the rule consisted in assuming an update equal to inflation plus 0.25 
percentage points. When the AWG assumptions are emulated, it would be excessive to 
use this average update, because the trend growth in the economy is lower. A new 
approximation to the rule was taken as an indexation of pensions to the inflation rate 
less 0.1 percentage points. 
 
As considered in Chapter 3, the option was to project the two extreme alternatives of the 
sustainability factor in tandem, in terms of the reactions of those concerned: alternative I 
was based on workers preferring to put off their retirement until they were able to offset 
the financial penalty; and alternative II was based on workers not changing their 
retirement age and accepting the financial penalty in full.    
 
According to the projections presented in Table 5.2.2, the four measures reduce the rise 
in pensions expenditure up to the 2050 horizon by between 4.1 and 7.4 percentage 
points of GDP. The figures provide a comparison between the no-reform and the post-
reform situations, with the AWG assumptions being used in both cases. Therefore, the 
estimate of 4 percentage points of GDP put forward in the Commission’s assessment of 
the December 2006 update of the Portuguese stability programme corresponds to the 
lower limit of the interval (which is defined by the effect of the sustainability factor in 
alternative II of the scenario).  
 
Table 5.2.2 
Pensions expenditure projections – including the effect of reforms 
 
As a percentage of GDP
Difference
2005 2010 2030 2050 2050-2005
MISS projections (excluding non-contributive pensions) based on AWG assumptions
   Total of the two subsystems in alternative I
 (a) 10.8 10.9 10.9 11.8 1.0
      Segurança Social 6 . 77 . 07 . 09 . 2 2 . 5
      CGA 4.2 4.1 4.1 2.6 -1.5
   Total of the two subsystems in alternative II 
(b) 10.8 11.0 12.1 15.2 4.4
      Segurança Social 6.7 7.0 8.0 12.7 5.9
      CGA 4.2 4.1 4.3 2.6 -1.6
Effect of the reforms
   Total of the two subsystems in alternative I
 (a) 0.0 -0.5 -3.8 -7.4 -7.4
      Segurança Social 0.0 -0.3 -2.7 -6.7 -6.7
      CGA 0.0 -0.2 -1.2 -0.7 -0.7
   Total of the two subsystems in alternative II 
(b) 0.0 -0.4 -2.6 -4.1 -4.1
      Segurança Social 0.0 -0.3 -1.7 -3.3 -3.3
      CGA 0.0 -0.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.8
Notes: (a) Assuming that everyone opts to put off retirement and cancel out the sustainability factor penalty.
           (b) Assuming that everyone retires at legal retirement age, preferring to accept the financial penalty of the factor.  
 
                                                  
8  With the exception of the sensitivity analysis to lower productivity growth. 
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In spite of the reduction, there is still a considerable increase in pensions expenditure up 
to 2050, even though this is around half what the increase would have been without 
reforms. In the MTO scenario, which factors in the on-going budgetary consolidation 
process until the MTO is reached by 2010, the sustainability gaps S1 and S2 are now 
close to the average value for the euro area (Table 5.2.3). 
 
Table 5.2.3 
Effect of the reforms on the sustainability gaps for Portugal  
 
As a percentage of GDP
Total IBP DR LTC Total IBP LTC
2005 baseline scenario 2005  
(1) European Commission figures (no reforms) 7.9 3.6 0.3 4.1 10.5 3.8 6.7
(2) Effect of the reforms (MISS estimates)
     (2.I) Alternative I 
(a) -3.2 -- - 3 . 2 -4.9 -- 4 . 9
     (2.II)  Alternative II
 (b) -2.0 -- - 2 . 0 -2.7 -- 2 . 7
(3) Figures after inclusion of the reforms
      (3.I) = (1)+(2.I)  Alternative I 
(a) 4.7 3.6 0.3 0.9 5.5 3.8 1.8
      (3.II) = (1)+(2.II) Alternative II 
(b) 6.0 3.6 0.3 2.1 7.7 3.8 4.0
Memorandum item:  EU12 average excluding Greece 2.3 0.1 0.1 2.1 3.5 0.2 3.3
MTO scenario  
(1) European Commission figures (no reforms) 2.5 -1.7 0.0 4.1 5.2 -1.5 6.7
(2) Effect of the reforms (MISS estimates)
     (2.I) Alternative I 
(a) -3.2 -- - 3 . 2 -4.9 -- 4 . 9
     (2.II)  Alternative II
 (b) -2.0 -- - 2 . 0 -2.7 -- 2 . 7
(3) Figures after inclusion of the reforms
      (3.I) = (1)+(2.I)  Alternative I 
(a) -0.8 -1.7 0.0 0.9 0.3 -1.5 1.8
      (3.II) = (1)+(2.II) Alternative II 
(b) 0.5 -1.7 0.0 2.1 2.5 -1.5 4.0
Memorandum item:  EU12 average excluding Greece 0.3 -1.8 0.0 2.1 1.6 -1.7 3.3
Sources: European Commission (Sustainability report 2006) and MISS.
Notes: (a) Assuming that everyone opts to put off retirement and cancel out the sustainability factor penalty.





In relative terms and for the MTO scenario, comparing the revised S1 and S2 gaps 
(taking into account the reform measures) with the figures for other euro area countries 
(see Table 5.1.2) Portugal has more favourable values than Belgium, Spain, Ireland, 
Luxemburg and the Netherlands (and Slovenia, which adopted the euro in 2007). It is 
important, however, to underline that for Portugal to move into an average risk group, it 
will have to proceed with the ambitious but necessary budgetary consolidation process 
set out in the country’s stability programme. 
 













The idea underlying the MISS model was to create an instrument allowing for an 
integrated analysis of the long-term financial situation of the two contributive 
subsystems of Portuguese public social security. A detailed design was needed so as to 
emulate the extremely complex rules governing pension determination. The aim was to 
be able to make a reasonably realistic assessment of any future changes to these rules. 
Due to its actuarial nature, the MISS model suffers from certain limitations, above all 
the fact that in many aspects the behaviour of economic agents is treated as exogenous. 
This would not be the case if it were a general equilibrium model. However, given the 
available modelling techniques, the treatment of the two subsystems using an 
overlapping generations general equilibrium model would not allow for the level of 
generational heterogeneity that would have been required to achieve a minimum degree 
of realism. 
 
A first set of projections generated by the model did not include the social security 
reform measures agreed in October 2006 between the government and social partners. 
This baseline scenario without reforms depicts a situation of serious financial imbalance 
and reveals a situation that is clearly unsustainable. If no measures were taken, the 
consolidated primary deficit of the two subsystems would go beyond 10% of GDP by 
the early 2040s (it stood at 2.5% in 2005), even including in the revenue that part of 
VAT earmarked for social security as legally stipulated (around 1% of GDP). In the no-
reform scenario, the implicit social security liabilities, evaluated as the present value at 
2005 of the consolidated primary balances for the period 2005-2080, reach more than 
500% of GDP.  
 
A second set of projections generated by the MISS model takes into account the four 
most representative measures of the social security reform: 
-  Earlier transition to the new formula for pension calculation set down in Decree 
Law 35/02, with a new transitional rule for calculating SPSS beneficiaries, to be 
in force between 2007 and 2016; 
-  A new rule for updating pensions as a function of consumer inflation, the real 
growth of GDP, and the amount of the pension; 
-  A bigger financial penalty for early retirement, taking the figure up from 4.5% to 
6% for every year prior to the legal retirement age (contributors must in any case 
have a minimum contributive career of 30 years and be at least 55 years old); 
-  The introduction from 2008 onwards of a “sustainability factor” that will relate 
the calculation of new pensions to life expectancy at age 65. 
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the statutory pension for old age by a penalty factor defined as the ratio between life 
expectancy at 65 in 2006 and life expectancy at 65 in the year before retirement. 
Contributors can opt for a combination of two extreme alternatives or “corner 
solutions”:  
-  They can put off retirement age until they completely offset the effect of the 
sustainability factor (alternative I); or 
-  They can retire at the legal retirement age and accept the financial penalty levied 
on the pension (alternative II).  
It is straightforward to parameterise the MISS model to cater for each of the extreme 
alternatives, but it is harder to combine them in the model, above all because it is 
difficult to forecast how people will effectively react. For these reasons, it was decided 
to consider a baseline scenario for each of the two extreme alternatives mentioned. 
 
When comparing the two alternatives with the no-reform situation, the accounts show 
considerable improvement. In the case of alternative II, which provides the most 
conservative assessment of the reform effects, the consolidated primary deficit rises 
until mid-century, reaching almost 5% of GDP (less than half the amount for the 
scenario without reform), before gradually declining to around 2% of GDP by end-
horizon. In alternative I, the consolidated primary deficit evolves along a downward 
path over the horizon, reaching equilibrium in the later years. The present value of the 
stream of future primary balances stands at -190% and -90% of GDP, respectively in 
alternatives II and I. In both assessments, the implicit liabilities for the SPCGA account 
for around 90% of GDP. 
 
These conclusions depend on verifying a wide array of assumptions, both demographic 
and macroeconomic. A sensitivity analysis carried out on the projections shows that a 
bigger rise in fertility than supposed in the baseline scenarios results in an improvement 
in the financial situation of Portuguese social security, albeit not very markedly. The 
effects of a smaller reduction in the mortality rate are somewhat more significant. If life 
expectancy were to rise only by half the figure set out in the baseline scenarios, a fall in 
liabilities of between 23 and 38 percentage points of GDP would be the outcome, 
depending on the scenario being considered. A different trend growth in productivity 
would also have a non-negligeable impact on the consolidated social security accounts. 
The baseline scenarios assume a 2% annual growth in productivity but this, in the light 
of the behaviour of this variable over the last ten years, could well be optimistic. If risks 
on the downside were to materialise, the imbalance in the Portuguese social security 
system would become larger. For example, if the annual growth were 1% a year, 
implicit liabilities would rise by between 15 and 39 percentage points. In turn, a fall in 
net immigration flows, as compared with the assumption that the figure to horizon will 
be as in recent years, would also impact negatively on the country’s social security 
accounts. It should be noted, however, that the MISS model by its nature cannot 
accurately project the social and macroeconomic effects of immigration, particularly on 
the unemployment rate. 
 
The analysis detailed in this paper also assesses the effects of the reforms in the 
European Commission’s sustainability gap indicators for Portugal. This reform cuts by 
around half the component pertaining to age-related public expenditure. If this reduction 
comes along with continuation of the process of fiscal consolidation under way, it 
  67should allow for the country’s public finance sustainability assessment to be improved 
from high to average risk. 
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ANNEX: THE MAIN EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL 
 
 
A.1 Basic notation  
 
In the equations  presented in this Annex, each variable is designated by a letter, 
associated in principle with two subscripts and one or two superscripts. The subscripts 
refer to the gender  and age (a). For gender, 1 is masculine and 2 is feminine. 
The age subscript (a) takes values between 0 and 110 years, except for the variables 
associated with the labour market, where age a is restricted to the range from 15 to 80. 
As far as the superscripts are concerned,  the most common use is to designate 
decomposition of a given universe or typology. Superscripts, for example, can assume 
the variants  . The superscript SS designates the SPSS as a whole, 
encompassing employees (TCO) and self-employed workers (TI). The   symbol is 
used to represent the aggregate value for a set of values in either script.  
(1 , 2 g = )
,, , i SS TCO TI CGA =
⊕
 
The year t to which a variable refers will always be given in brackets after the letter 
designating the variable in question. In the projections discussed in these notes, t varies 
between the base year, that is 2004 or 2005 (depending on the variables), and 2080, the 
last year of a 75-year horizon. So, for example,  , ()
CGA
ga x t refers to the value of a given 
variable  x in year t for those in the SPCGA of gender g, with age a. In turn, 
, ()
CGA x t ⊕⊕ represents the aggregate of the values of variable x for the two genders and for 
all the relevant ages, i.e.: 
-  If the variable assumes values for the whole interval 0-110 years,  
 














  (A.1.1)  
 
-  If the variable only assumes values for ages 15 up to and including 80 (the 
ages of participation in the labour market),  
 














⎟    (A.1.1 ')  
 
Another convention in the notation consists of representing flow-variables by small case 
Latin letters, stock-variables by upper case Latin letters and ratios or probabilities (rates 
of fertility or mortality, for example) by Greek letters or other symbols.  
 
  71For stock-variables, an upper case letter with a circumflex means stock at year-end, 
while an upper case letter with a horizontal accent means annual average stock. For 
example, for a given stock-variable X, the notations  , ˆ ()
TCO
ga X t  and  , ()
TCO
ga Xt  are, 
respectively, the year-end value at year t and the average of variable X in year t relative 
to TCO of gender g and age a.  
 
It would be useful here to clarify the precise meaning of the age  subscript.  For a flow – 
-variable and a stock-variable at year-end, the  , ()
i
ga x t  and  , ˆ ()
i
ga X t notations refer to 
values for individuals in subsystem i of age a completed during the year t (which is 
equivalent to considering individuals who would be age a at the end of the year in 
question). However, for an annual average stock-variable,  , ()
i
ga Xt  refers to the average 
value for individuals in subsystem i aged a during part of year t, with each individual 
weighted in the calculation of that average according to the part of the year he/she was 
age a. 
 
For many of the stock-variables, data are available for the end of the base year and the 
projections for each of the years during horizon are based on dynamic equations defined 
for year-end variables. After the values for year-end are projected, the corresponding 
annual average stocks are obtained from the following equation, which gives the 
approximate weighted average mentioned above:  
 
                 () ,, , 1 ,, 1
1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () () () ( 1 ) ( 1 )
4
ii i ii
ga ga ga ga ga Xt XtX tXt X t +− =+ + − + −  (A.1.2)  
 
For some stock-variables, such as those referring to the labour market, there is no 
reliable information for year-end, only for annual averages. In these cases, the 
projections are carried out using the annual averages and the year-end values, when 
necessary, are obtained from the equations:  
 





() ( 1 5 )
ˆ 3 ()








Xt X t Xt a −−
⎧ = ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ++ − < ≤ ⎩
 (A.1.3)  
 
These equations give a simple approximation to solving equation (A.1.2) in order 
to , ˆ ()
i
ga X t .
1
                                                 
1 In fact, considering (A.1.2), one obtains: 
 
,1 ,1 ,2 ,
,, , , 1
ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 11 1 1 ˆˆ () ( 1 ) () ()
22 2 2 2 2
ii ii
ga ga ga ga ii i i
ga ga ga ga
Xt Xt Xt X t
XtXt Xt X t
+− +
+
+ +− + +
++ = + + +
−  
 
Using the proxies 
 
,, 1 , 1
1 ˆˆ ˆ () ( 1 ) ( 1 )
2
ii i
ga ga ga Xt X t X t +− ⎡⎤ ++ − ⎣⎦       and      ,1 ,2 ,
1 ˆˆˆ () ( 1 ) ( 1 )
2
iii
ga ga ga Xt Xt X t ++ ⎡ ⎤ ++ − ⎣ ⎦  , 
 
solving in order to  ,1 ˆ ()
i
ga X t +  and taking one year off the age, the equation (A.A.3) is obtained for   
.  For  , the equation must be adapted because (A.A.2) would lead to a non-null annual 
average for 14 year-olds: 
15 80 a <≤ 15 a =
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Finally, the notation of many variables relating to contributors and pensioners in the 
SPSS and SPCGA subsystems also include the binary variable ρ  as an additional 
argument, and this assumes:  
-  the value of 1 when representing the situation resulting from closure of the 
CGA to new registrations from the start of 2006 (decision taken in 2005); 
-  the value of 0 when analysing the counterfactual situation, in which there is 
no closure and the CGA continues to take new registrations. 
For example:  
 
                                            , ˆ (| 1 )
CGA
ga X t    and    , ˆ (| 0 )
CGA
ga X t     (A.1.4)  
 
denote the value of the stock-variable X at the end of year t, for individuals of gender g 
and age a, for the situation where the CGA is closed and for the (counterfactual) 
situation where it is not, respectively.  
 
The binary variable ρ  was introduced into the model to allow for modelling the effects 
on the accounts of the two subsystems deriving from CGA closure to new registrations 
from the start of 2006.  
 
A.2 Demography module 
 
Let   be the stock (in thousands) of individuals of gender g and age a resident in 










()( 1 ) 1 () ( 2 ) ()1 () () ( 0 )
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tg t g n t t mt a
Pt
tP t m t a




= +− = − + = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎪ = ⎨
−− + ⎪ ⎩ >
 (A.2.1)  
 
where:  
-  () t ψ  is the proportion of individuals of masculine gender among newborn in 
year t; 
-  () ι ⋅  is the indicator function, which assumes value 1 if the condition between 
brackets is true and value 0 otherwise; 
                                                                                                                                               
 
() ,14 ,14 ,15 ,14 ,13 ,15
11 ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ () () () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ()
44
ii i ii i
gg g gg g Xt XtXtXt Xt Xt =+ + − + − =      (*) 
 
Hypothetically, for variables restricted to the 15 to 80 age bracket, all year-end stocks for 14 year-olds or 
less are null. This being so, the annual average  ,14()
i
g Xt  has to be zero, contrary to what was obtained in 
(*) from (A.1.2). However, for the purposes of approximation for age 15, (*) is preferable to  ,14() 0
i
g Xt =  in 
the expression 
 
,15 ,14 ,15 ,14 ,15 ,15
1 ˆˆ ˆ () () ( 1 ) () () ( 1 )
4
iii i ii






Solving in order to  X t , one obtains  ,15 ,15
4 ˆ () ()
3
ii
gg Xt Xt = . 








nt tP t ϕ
=
= ∑  is the number of live births occurring during year t (in 
thousands); 
-  () a t ϕ  is the fertility rate of women of age a in year t, defined as the ratio 
between the number of live births in year t for women of age a and the 
resident female population (annual average) of age a in year t; 
-  , () ga t μ  is the mortality rate in year t for individuals of gender g that 
completed or would complete of age a during year t (that is, that were aged 
 at the end of the year  1 a− 1 t − ); 
-   is the net flow of immigrants (that is, the number of immigrants 
minus the number of emigrants) in thousands, of gender g and age a.  
, () ga mt
 
The data on the resident population are only available age by age until age 84. The 
number of individuals of age 85 or above is presented in aggregate form for each 
gender, and for this reason it was necessary to break down the two aggregates for the 
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≤    (A.2.2) 
 
where  ϖ  is a parameter that was chosen so that  , for   and for 
, were identical to the corresponding aggregate provided by INE and Eurostat. 
The values obtained presented age profiles similar to these observed for the number of 









= ∑ 1 g =
2 g =
 
The available values for fertility rates cover women of ages 15 to 48 year by year and 
then those aged 49 or more as a single group. In the MISS model, and by simplification, 
it was assumed that this last class corresponds totally to the fertility of women aged 49.  
 
The projections of fertility rates, mortality rates (masculine and feminine) and net 
immigration flows (masculine and feminine), for each age, were based on the historical 
linear relationship with the relevant factors and the projection of these factors over the 
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I f t ,  ()()
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II f t ,  ,( )()
mort
gI f t  and  ,( )()
imig
gI f t  represent, respectively, the projection 
of   the fertility first factor, the fertility second factor, the mortality first 
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Among the demographic indicators made available in MISS, there are the "life 
expectancy at birth" and the "life expectancy at 65". The corresponding values are 
calculated from the following expression:  
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   (A.2.6) 
 
where   or  0 A= 65 A= . It should be noticed that the term between straight brackets 
translates the probability of an individual of gender g who reaches the reference age A, 
to complete age a * ( A > ) before dying.  
 
A.3 Labour market module  
 
The evolution of schooling levels up to 2080 reflects the following premises:  
 
-  if  ,     (A.3.1)   16 a ≤
,sec ,sec ,sec
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-  if  ,     (A.3.2)  20 a ≤
,sup ,sup ,sup
,,, () () () 0
res act emp
ga ga ga tt t εεε ==
 
-  if    22 a ≥
  ,       
 (A.3.3) 
,sec ,sec ,sec ,sec ,sec ,sec
,1 , ,1 , ,1 , () ( 1 ) , () ( 1 ) , () ( 1 )
res res act act emp emp
ga ga ga ga ga ga tt tt t t εε εε ε ε +++ =− =− =
 
-  if  ,   28 a ≥
             
,sup ,sup ,sup ,sup ,sup ,sup
,1 , ,1 , ,1 , ( ) (1 ) , ( ) (1 ) , ( ) (1
res res act act emp emp
ga ga ga ga ga ga tt tt t t εε εε ε ε +++ =− =− =
 (A.3.4) 
 
 -if  17 ,  21 a ≤≤
 
2 In the cases of immigration and mortality, different factors were calculated and projected for the two 
genders, masculine ( 1 g = ) and feminine ( 2 g = ). 
  75,sec ,sec ,sec ,sec ,sec ,sec
,1 , , ,1 , , () ( 1 ) () , () ( 1 ) ()
res res res act act act
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- final 
()




-  ga k ga k ga k ga k  and   are 
sent the increased 
access to schooling on the part of the young. 
 
The projection equation for activity rates used in MISS is as follows:  
 
+
,se ,s mp mp c
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ga t ε  are the percentages of the resident population of 
 
 and a pectively with college/university degree (hereafter 
higher schooling) and secondary schooling (completed to 12th year 
year in the
3  Portuguese system - or equivalent) ; 
-  , ga  and  , ga  are the percentages of the active population of 
gender g nd age a respectively with higher and secondary schooling; 
,sup ,sec
 a
-  , () ga t  and 
c
, () ga t  are the percentages of total employment of gender g 
and age a respectively with higher and secondary schooling; 
,sec res t , 
,sup res t , 
,sec act t , 
,sup act t , 
,sup ,se









exogenously defined annual increments, designed to repre
( )
,sec ,sup
,, , , ˆ () ( 1 ) () , , () , ()
res res
ga ga a c t a c t ga ga tt t g at t ττ β φ ε ε ⎡ =− + ⎣   +
( )
,sec ,sup
,, ˆ ( 1) , , ( 1), ( 1)
res res
act act g a g a tg a t t βφε ε ⎤ −− − − + ⎦  
( ) ,, 5 5 ( )) (2005) (2005) 1 exp 0.05( 2005)
SS
ga g aat t τ τ ⎡⎤ + ≤ − − − − (55 ι ◊ < ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦   
                                                                                                                   (A.3.6)  
where:  
-  , () ga t τ  is the rate of annual average participation for individuals of gender g 
- 
and age a in year t; 
() t act β  is the benchmark for the participation rates; 






 age or to the financial penalties for early retirement through old 
age, relative to the situation in 2005, and this assumes a positive value (but 
                                                
the respective benchmark as the dependent variable; 
()
SS at   is the legal retirement age applicable to the SPSS in year t (which is 
never less than the legal retirement age in the SPCGA); 
01 ≤◊≤  is a parameter that assumes value 0 if there is no change to the legal 
retirement




3 This level of schooling is defined as the maximum attained by the individual. 
  76The projection equations for the unemployment rates and the percentages of TCO 
employment are similar to the projection equation for the participation rates, with the 
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,, , , ˆ () ( 1 ) () , , () , ()
emp emp
ga ga e m p e m p ga ga tt t g at t κκ β φ ε ε =− +   +
                                       ( )
,sec ,sup ˆ ( 1) , , ( 1), ( 1)
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, () ga t - δ  is the rate of annual average unemployment rate for individuals of 
 g and  n year t; 
, () ga t κ  is the annual average percentage of TCO in total em
gender age a i
-  ployment for 
indivi f gend
- 
duals o er g and age a in year t; 
() des t β  and  () emp t β  are, respectively, benchmarks for the unemployment 
rates and the share of TCO employment in total employment; 
ˆ () φ ⋅  and  ˆ () φ ⋅  are the regression equations that have as a dependent  - 
le, re ective e rati
des emp
variab sp ly, th o between the unemployment rate and its 
benchmark and the ratio between the percentage of TCO employment and 
the corresponding benchmark.  
 
When the rates  , () ga t τ ,  , () ga t δ  and  , () ga t κ  are pr n for each strata (g, a) the 
annual averages of labour force, inactive population, unem ent, total employment, 





,, , () () ()
act res
ga ga ga Pt t Pt τ =    (A.3.9) 
,, , () () ()
inact res act
ga ga ga Pt P t P t =−   (A.3.10) 
,, , () () ()
act
ga ga ga D tt P δ =   t   (A.3.11) 
,,, () () ()
TOT act
ga ga ga EtP t D t =−   (A.3.12) 
,, , ga ga ga () () ()
TCO TOT Et t Et κ =    (A.3.13) 
,, , ga ga ga () () ()





ga Pt  is the labour force, in annual average, for the strata (g, a) in year t;  - 
, ()
inact
ga P -  t  is the inactive population, in annual average, for the strata (g, a) in 
year t; 
-  , () ga D t  is the unemployment, in annual average, for the strata (g, a) in year t; 




  77-  , ga
(g, a) in year t;
()
TCO Et  is the number of employees (TCO), in annual average, for the strata 
, ()
TI Et  is the number of individuals with other f ga orms of 
.4 Module of contributors and pensioners: number of contributors  
 





employment (TI), in annual average, for the strata (g, a) in year t. 
 
A
 to the 
CGA:  
 
() ,, 1 , , , , ˆˆ (| ) ( 1 | )1 () () (| ) (| ) ( 1 ) ()
CGA CGA CGA CGA
ga ga ga a ga ga Ct C t t tvt it c t ρρ μ ξ ρ ρ ρ − =− − −− − + −   g
r and beyond the binary variable ρ  (closure or not of the CGA to new 
registra ns) and tio  the mortality rates  , () ga t μ previously defined:  
, ˆ (| )
CGA
ga Ct -  ρ  is the number of active contributors to the CGA of gender g and 
age a at the end of the year t, conditional on ρ ; 
, () ga t -  ξ  is the severance rate of SPCG  c A ontributors (for other motives but 
retiremen
- 
t and death) of gender g and of age a during year t; 
, (| )
CGA
ga vt ρ  is the number of new old age pe   nsioners in the SPCGA in year t, 
of gender g and age a, conditional on ρ ; 
, (| )
CGA
ga it -  ρ  is the number of new disability pensioners in the SPCGA in year 
t, of gender g and age a, conditional on ρ ; 
-  , () ga ct  i ors (essentially new public employees) 
of gender g and of age a that would have
s the number of new contribut
 be registered in the CGA in year t 
if this subsystem had not been closed to new registrations, that is, if  0 ρ = .  
The number of new public employees of each gender and age along the horizon,  , 
ed in the MISS model in accordance with the following equation:  
It was taken that  ,, ˆˆ (2005|1) (2005|0)
CGA CGA
ga ga CC = , given that the decision to close the 
GA to new registrations was not in force in 2005.   C
 
, () ga ct
is obtain
 





-   the total number of new public employees admitted in year t, in 
thousands; 
() pt i
-  () t ϑ  is the percentage of these employees that are male; 
-  , () ga t ω  is the percentage, in year t, of new public employees of gender g 
with age a. 
ote that, by construction, for each year t:  
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The transition equations for the number of TCO and TI contributors of the SPSS are:  
 
( ) ( ) ,, ,, , , , ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ (| ) ( 1 | ) (| ) () (| ) ( 1 ) ( 1 |
A
a t )
TCO TCO TCO TCO CGA TCO CG
ga ga ga ga ga ga g Ct Ct t Et Ct Et C ρρ λ ρ ρ ρ ⎡ ⎤ =− + − − − − + − ⎣ ⎦
() () ( ) ,, , , , ga ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ( | ) ( |0) ( | ) ( 1|0) ( 1| )
TCO CGA CGA CGA CGA
ga ga ga ga tC t C t C t C t λ ρρ ρ ⎡⎤ −− − − − − − ⎣⎦  
(A.4.4) 
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, (1 ) ga
ˆ (1 )








⎧ ⎫ − ⎪ ⎪ =+ ⎨ ⎬
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   (A.4.7) 
 
where:  
-  ρ  and  ˆ ()
TI Ct  are, respectively, the number of active TCO  , ga
nd the contributors a  number of active TI contributors in the SPSS, of gender 
g and age a at the end of year t (in the case of the first variable, conditional 
on ρ ); 
-  , ga d  , ˆTI
ga E re the stocks of TCO and TI employment, respectively, 





TCO Et  an t  a
- 
()
λ ρ and  , ()
TI
ga t λ  are the "coverage rates" of the SPSS, respectively for 
TCO and TI workers (in the first case, conditional on ρ ), of gende  
age a e end of year t, defined as ratios between the number 
contributors and the relevant employment of each type, evaluate
r g and
of active 
d in the 
η
 is imposed, 
sulting from the inconsistencies in the information of the Labour Force Survey. 
ves lower numbers of TCO employees 
an the sum of TCO contributors registered in the SPSS and the SPCGA.  
 
Equations (A.4.4) and (A.4.5) can be written as:  
 
 at th
previous year and possibly modified by the "coverage variations"  , () ga t  
and  , ()
TI
ga t η  supplied by the user of the model at his/her discretion.  
 
In equations (A.4.6) and (A.4.7), a maximum value 1 for coverage rates
TCO
re
Indeed, in 2005, for older age groups, the latter gi
th
( ) ( )
()
,, , , ˆ ( 1 |)
TCO
ga Ctρ − − , ,
,, , , , , ,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( |) ( | 0 ) ( |) ( 1 | 0 ) ( 1 |)
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ( )( | ) ( | 0 )( | ) ( 1 )( 1 | ) ( 1 | 0 )
TCO CGA CGA CGA CGA
ga ga ga ga ga
TCO CGA CGA CGA TCO CGA CGA
ga ga ga ga ga ga ga
Ct Ct Ct Ct Ct
Et Ct Ct Ct Et Ct Ct
ρρ ρ
ρρ ρ
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −− − − − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
−−− − − − − − − ()
=
⎡⎤
⎣⎦ , ˆ (1 | )
CGA
ga Ctρ ⎡ ⎤ −− ⎣ ⎦
, (| )
TCO














   (A.4.5’) 
 
When  , () 0
TI
ga t η =  equation (A.4.5') imposes simply that the number of TI 
contributors ( , ˆ ()
TI
ga Ct ) changes in line with the TI employment variation rate (i.e. the 
variation rate of  , ˆ ()
TI
ga Et ). It is possible for the model user to set non zero values  , ()
TI
a t η , 
in order to control over the evolution of the coverage rate along the horizon (for 
 represent situations where the informal sector of the
ˆˆ () ( 1 )
TI TI CtCt −−
 the
example, to  economy becomes less 
ections presented in Chapter 3,  t η =  and 
uation (A.4.4') is less straightforward but its logic 
is simi , 






important). However, in the proj , ga
, () 0
TCO
ga t η =  were assumed for every year t, gender g and age a.  
 
In comparison to equation (A.4.5'), eq
() 0
TI
lar the difference being that the reference employment taken for calculation of 
ge rate is not TCO employment. Instead, the option was made to take T
nt and subtract   this:  
that part of TCO employment that corresponds to SPCGA contributors 
(because these TCO are already covered by a social security subsystem); 
in the case of  1 ρ = , the number of TCO contributors of the SPSS that would 
have been registered in the SPCGA if this new subsystem had not been 
 to n because these have, by  closed ew registrations ( construction, a coverage 
rate of 100%).  
 
ote that, when , the difference ( ) ,, ˆˆ (| 0 ) (| )
CGA CGA
ga ga Ct Ct ρ − N 1 ρ =  is an approximation to 
hen the public employees registered in the subsystem from 2006 are excluded from 
ors and also excluding the public employees registered from 2006 onwards.  
ber of pensioners in the contributors and pensioners 
odule 
For the year-end number of disability pensioners in the SPCGA and SPSS subsystems, 
the dynamic equations are as follows: 
                                                
the number of public employees registered in the SPSS from 2006 and who remained 
active in year t
4. 
 
The equations (A.4.4) or (A.4.4') make it possible to take into account any endogenous 
changes to the coverage rate implied by the decision to close the SPCGA. In other 
words, if  , () 0
TCO
ga t η = , the variation rate in the number of TCO contributors in the SPSS, 
w
the calculation, is identical to the variation rate of TCO employment net of CGA 
contribut
 
A.5 Equations for the num
m
 
A.5.1 Disability pensioners  
 
 
4 The approximation error stems from the fact that the retirement probabilities defined by the model user 
may not be identical for the two sub-systems. If this were to happen (as in the projections in Chapter 3 and 
following), the number of public servants registered in the SPSS from 2006 on and still active in year t 
would not exactly match to the difference between the number of active contributors in the SPCGA in the 
counterfactual situation of non-closure and the real situation of closure to new registrations as and from 
2006. 
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( ) ,, 1 , , ˆˆ (| ) ( 1 | )1 () (| )
CGA CGA CGA
ga ga ga ga It It tit ρ ρσ μ − =−− +ρ    (A.5.1) 
 
() ( ) , ˆ (
SS
ga , 1 ˆ | ) ( 1 | )1 () (| ) () ()
SS TCO TI SS
ga I tI , ,, ga ga ga t t i ti t a a t ρρ σ μ ρ − =−− + + <     (A.5.2) 
where:  
 
, ˆ (| )
CGA
ga It ρ -   is the number of disability pensioners in the SPCGA at the end of 
year t of gender g and age a, conditional o   n ρ ; 
, ˆ (| )
SS
ga It ρ -   is the number of disability pensioners in the SPSS at the end of 
year t of gende g and age, conditional on r  ρ ; 
, (| )
CGA
ga it -  ρ ,  , (| )
TCO
ga it ρ  and  , ()
TI
ga it  are the numbers (in the two first cases 
conditional onρ ) of new disability pensioners during year t, respectively of 
GA, TCO and TI of the SPSS, of gender g and of age a completed in 
the year; 
the SPC
t -  , ) ga( σμ  is the mortality rate in year t for disability pensioners of gender g 
and age a completed in the year. 
The parameter σ  ( 1 ≥ ), which multiplies the mortality rates, can be chosen by the 
odel  user, m   to  make the mortality rates for disability pensioners larger than the 
ic strata   a) where
 
 new disability pensioners
mortality rates for the total number of individuals of the specif (g,  they 
are found.  
The evolution of the number of   , (| )
CGA
ga it ρ ,  , (| )
TCO
ga it ρ  and 
t  is projected on the basis of the probabilities of an active contributor retiring 
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( 1 ) ˆ () ( 2 )
ga inv SS TI
gg a
it
aC t π −
ˆ () ( 1 )
()
inv SS TI












g a π d 
, ()
inv SS
g a π  are functions that represent the probability of an active 
ontributor, re
 an
spectiv SPCGA and in the SPSS, of gender g and age  at the 
g through disability during year t (the year when age a is 
he logic of the equations for the stocks of old age pensioners at the end of the year is 
similar to the one described for pensioners retiring through disability:  
ely in the  1 a− c
end of the year  1 t − , retirin
ompleted).   c
 
A.5.2 Old age pensioners  
 
T
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( ) ,, 1 , , ˆˆ (| ) ( 1 | )1 () (| )
CGA CGA CGA
ga ga ga ga Vt Vt tvt ρ ρμ − =−− +ρ    (A.5.6) 
 
() ,, 1 , , , ˆˆ (| ) ( 1 | )1 () (| ) ()
SS SS TCO TI
ga ga ga ga ga Vt V t t v t vt ρρ μ ρ − =−− + + +  
() ( ) ,1 , ˆ () ( 1 | )1 ()
SS SS





, ˆ (| )
CGA
ga Vt ρ  is the number of old age pension rs e  in the SPCGA at the end of 
year t of gender g and age a, conditional on ρ ; 
, ˆ (| )
SS
ga Vt -  ρ  is the number of old age pen on si ers in the SPSS at the end of year 
g and ondi t of gender   age a, c tional on ρ ; 
, ()
CGA
ga vt ,  , ()
TCO
ga vt  and  , ()
TI
ga vt  are the numbers of new old age pensioners 
during year t, the first for the SPCGA, the second and third for the SPSS, 
TCO and TI respectively (in the two first cases, conditional on 
- 
ρ ), of gender 
g and completing age a during the year (this excludes former disability 




The numbers of new old age pensioners are projected in the MISS model in a similar 
way to the numbers of disability pensioners, on the basis of functions that represent the 
bability" of an active contributor of gender g and age  1 a−  at the end of the year 
−  to retire through old age in year t when he/she comp a:  
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   (A.5.10) 
where:




-  ble to the SPCGA in year t; 
, (, () )
velh CGA CGA
g aa t π   and 
, (, ( ) )
velh SS SS
g aa t π   are functions that represent the 
"probability" of an active contrib , from the SPCGA and the SPSS, 




−  at the end of the year  1 t − , to retire 
through  duri
- 
ugh old age, defined by the user of the model, as described in 
section 2.4.2.  
  old age ng year t (the year in which he/she completes age a); 
()
CGA t υ  and  ( )
SS t υ  are "mitigating factors" of the "probabilities" of 
retirement thro
 
  82A.5.3 Survivor pensioners  






,0 ,0 ˆ (| ) (| )
CGA CGA
gg St st ρ ρ =    (A.5.11) 
 
,0 ,0 ˆ (| ) (| )
SS SS
gg St st ρ =    (A.5.12) 
 
ρ
() ,, 1 , , , ˆˆ (| ) ( 1 | )1 () () (| )
CGA CGA CGA
ga ga ga ga ga St S t t tst ρ ρμ χ − =−− −+ρ     ( ) 0 a >    (A.5.13) 
 
() ,, 1 , , , ˆˆ (| ) ( 1 | )1 () () (| )
SS SS SS





, ˆ (| )
CGA
ga St ρ  and  , ˆ (| )
SS
ga St ρ  are the stocks of survivor pensioners at the end of 
year t, in the  C SP GA and the SPSS respectively, of gender g and age a, 
conditional onρ ; 
-  , (| )
CGA
ga st ρ  and  , (| )
SS
ga st ρ  are the numbers of new survivor pensioners during 
year t, in the  C SP GA and the SPSS respectively, of gender g and age a, 
conditional onρ ; 
, () ga t -  χ  is the depreciation rate of the stock of survivor pensioners, of  gender 
g and age a, for reasons other than the death of the beneficiary (“depreciation 
in life”).  
 
The rates of depreciation in life  , () ga t χ  are one input of the MISS  model, and its 
measurement is based on the profile of the distribution of pensioners by gender and age. 
No distinction was made between the rates of depreciation in life rates considered for 
e two subsystems.   th
 
Let  , (| )
CGA
ga bt ρ  and  , (| )
SS
ga bt ρ  be the numbers of contributors and pensioners in the 
SPCGA and the SPSS, respectively, deceased in year t and relevant to determine the 
number of new survivor pensioners of gender g and age a in the specific subsystem 
on (c ditional on ρ ). The following approximations were considered:  
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that is, if  g g  1 = ,   and vice 
versa).  
 
To project the number of new survivor pensioners in the two subsystems, the following 
equations are used:  
2 g = 
 
,
,, , (| ) (| )
CGA sob CGA CGA
ga ga ga s t coef b t ρ ρ =    (A.5.17) 
SS sob SS SS
 
,










ga coef  are estimated coefficients. 
 
.6 Compensations, contributions and pensions module equations 
A.6.1 Declared/stipulated compensations and contributions - SPSS  
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s over time are not considered (i.e. 
the struc e for genders, age or the level of schooling of the 
workers); 
ributors (at base year 
-  () t  is the annual average compensation (in euros) of CGA contributors 
of gender g and age a in year t; 
, ()
sal SS t γ  is the variation rate of the average comp  of the TCO in the 
private sector when composition effect
changes to  tur
,
CGA w
-  () h ⋅  gives the average compensation of TCO cont
prices) for a specific strata (g, a) as a function of the percentage of these 









ga t ε ). 
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In the first component of the equation (A.6.1), the difference  , (|
CGA
ga C , 0 ) (| )
CGA
ga t Ct ρ −  
 and w
ce is multiplied by   because it is assumed that the 
verage compensation of public employees registered in the SPSS does not differ from 
what they would have earned if they had been registered in the CGA.  
 
The average declared or stipulated earnings of the TI contributors wt  is projected 
by the following equation: 
provides an approximation to the number (in thousands and annual averages) of public 
employees, of gender g and age a, registered in the SPSS from 2006 ho in year t 
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a
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TI w
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   (A.6.2) 
TI
j α  is the percentage of the number of active TI contributors belonging to 
the j-th
-   is the vector of mid-points of the 
ry annual minimum wage for year t. 
Once the paths have been projected for the number of active TCO and TI contributors in 
the SPSS, and for their declared average earnings, the projection of the total amount of 
contributions revenue of the SPSS (in millions of euros), 
 earnings bracket in the base year; 
() 0.125;0.375;0.625;0.875;1.25;1.75;3 q =
7 earnings brackets, corresponding to 7 contributor earnings profiles; ( ) TI lt  is 
the legal minimum contribution bound for TI contributors in year t, defined 
in relation to the mandatory minimum wage; 
- 
min() wt  is the mandato
 
( | )
SS rt ρ , is carried out on the 
basis o
SS rt
f the following equation:  
 
(| )
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           (A.6.3) 
() ()
 st
registered public employees in the
m work); 
SS RG t ς  is the standard contribution rate of the SPSS (employer and 
employee) applicable in year t (currently, this rate is 34,75% of the declared 
or ipulated earnings); 
- 
() ()
SS FP t ς  is the "basic" rate of contribution (employer and employee) for 
 SPSS from 2006 (currently 23,08%, a rate 
that includes coverage for old age, disability, death and family allowances 
but excludes the coverage for the risks of unemployment and temporary 
absence fro
  85-  () t θ  is the “efficacy level” in collecting the contributions at the standard 
contribution rate; 
,, , (| ) (| ) (| )
TCO TCO TCO
ga ga ga Yt Ctwt ρ ρρ = -   is the su
- 
m of compensations (in 
thousands of euros) declared in year t by all TCO contributors of gender g 
and age a; 
,, , () () ()
TI TI TI
ga ga ga YtCt wt =  is the sum of earnings (also in thousand of euros) 
declared in year t by TI contributors of gender g and age a; 
-  ()
()
,, , ga ga ga ga
amount of compensations (in thousands o
, (| ) (| 0 ) (| ) ()
TCO FP CGA CGA CGA YtC t C t w t ρρ =−  is an approximation to the 
f euros) earned in year t by the 
 2006  public employees of gender g and age a registered in the SPSS from
(that, by construction, will be zero when  0 ρ = , i.e. when the model is used 
to generate the counterfactual situation where the CGA is not closed).  
A.6.2 Compensations and contributions - SPCGA  








,, () ( 1 )1 ()
sal CGA




 g and age a; 
-   is the update rate, in year t, of average compensation of SPCGA 
contributors of the strata (g, a).  
 
 terms of contributions to the SPCGA, the MISS model calculates first what the 
tors are responsible for: 
 
w
-  , ()
CGA
ga wt  is the average compensation  (in euros) in year t of SPCGA 
contributors of gender
, ()








(| ) ( 1 | )
(1 ) (1 | )
subs CGA CGA
















subs CGA rt ρ -   is the total sum of contributions paid to the CGA by 
contributors (in millions of euros, conditional on ρ ), excluding any 
contributions from employers and the "State subsidy to the CGA"; 
-   is the contribution rate levied on SPCGA contributors (currently 
, ()
subs CGA t ς
10%); 
-  ,, , (| ) (| )
CGA CGA
ga ga Yt wt ) (|
CGA
ga Ct ρ ρρ  is the amount of compensations (in 
thousands of euros) earned by SPCGA contributors of gender g and age
=
 a, 
conditional onρ .  
 
  86In relation to contributions to the CGA actually paid by employers, its amount (in 
millions of euros), 
, (| )
entid CGA rt ρ , is calculated on the assumption that the contributions 
correspond to a proportion of the amount paid by those registered in the subsystem:  
 
,, , (| ) () (| )




entid CGA t ς  is the ratio, in year t, of employers’ contributions effectively paid into 
the CGA and the sum of contributions by those contributors registered. Th
A.6.6) 
e path of 
entid C  is defined by the model user.  
 
The annual reference amount for employers’ contributions, rt
, ()
GA t ς
, equiv CGA(| ) ρ  (in millions 
f euros), that would be due to the CGA if all employers’ contributions were at a rate 
erage in the SPSS and the SPCGA, is given by:  
o
equivalent to the employers’ component of the standard rate in the SPSS, after taking 
into account the different cov
 
,, 1
(| ) () (| )
equiv CGA equiv CGA CGA rt t Y t , 1000
ρ ςρ =    (A.6.7)  ⊕⊕
where   is the "equivalent" rate of employers’ con ent 
for differences in coverage.  
 





equiv CGA t ς tribution, after adjustm
In
the CGA
,, , (| ) (| ) (| )
input CGA equiv CGA entid CGA rt rt rt ρ ρρ =−   (A.6.8) 
 
,,, (| ) (| ) (| )




, input CGA(| )  is the amount of employers’ contributions imputed to the State  ρ
(in millions of euros, conditional on ρ ), these being defined as the 
difference between the “equivalent” contributions and the employers’ 
contributions actually paid into the CGA; 
-  (| )
CGA rt ρ  is the total amount of actual and imputed employers’ 
s to the SPCGA (in millions of euros, conditional on  contribution ρ ).  
 
A.6.3 New old age and disability pensions - SPSS  
 
The model projects the length of the contributory career of TCO for the years along the 
horizon on the basis of the following equations:  
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   (A.6.11) 
 
with  { } { }
21, 15, 21, 21,
,, , , 1 ( ) min ( );max ( 1); ( 1)
TCO TCO TCO TCO
ga ga ga ga tt t
≥≥ ≥ ≥
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   (A.6.12) 
 
with  { } { }
31, 21, 31, 31,
,, , , 1 ( ) min ( );max ( 1); ( 1)
TCO TCO TCO TCO
ga ga ga ga tt t
≥≥ ≥ ≥
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   (A.6.13) 
, 40,
(9 ) ( )


























{ } { }
40, 31, 40, 40,
,, , , 1 ( ) min ( );max ( 1); ( 1)
TCO TCO TCO TCO
ga ga ga ga tt t
≥≥ ≥ ≥
− ∇= ∂ ∂ − ∂ − t , where    
is the percentage of TCO workers of gender g and age a who had completed dur or 
more years of contributory career in year t.  
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   (A.6.15) 
 
with  { } { }
21, 15, 21, 21,
,, , , 1 ( ) min ( );max ( 1); ( 1)
TI TI TI TI
ga ga ga ga tt t
≥≥ ≥ ≥
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   (A.6.16) 
 
ith  { } { }
31, 21, 31, 31,
,, , , 1 ( ) min ( );max ( 1); ( 1)
TI TI TI TI
ga ga ga ga tt t
≥≥ ≥ ≥
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⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
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{ } { }
40, 31, 40, 40,
,, , , 1 ( ) min ( );max ( 1); ( 1)
TI TI TI TI
ga ga ga ga tt t
≥≥ ≥ ≥
− ∇= ∂ ∂ − ∂ − t . 
he percentages given by the previous equations allow an approximation to the average 










( ) int min 7; 1 ( ) 17.5 ( )
2
TCO TCO TCO
ga ga ga ga
a
Dt t t
≥≥ ≥ ⎧− ⎧⎫ =− ∂ + ∂ − ∂ ⎨⎨ ⎬
⎩⎭ ⎩
( ) ( ) 35 ( ) ( ) 40 ( )
TCO TCO TCO TCO TCO
ga ga ga ga ga tt tt t
≥≥ ≥≥ ≥ ⎫
∂ −∂ + ∂ −∂ + ∂ ⎬
⎭
   (A.6.18) 
 
() 25.5 + ()




, , , int min 7; 1 ( ) 17.5 ( ) ( )
2
TI
ga ga ga D t t t
≥ =− ∂ + ∂ − ∂ + ⎨⎨ ⎬
⎩⎭ ⎩
 
15, 15, 15 TI TI TI a ≥≥ ⎧−
, ( ) ga t ⎧⎫
() ()
21, 31, 31, 40, 40,
,, ,, , 25.5 ( ) ( ) 35 ( ) ( ) 40 ( )
TI TI TI TI TI
ga ga ga ga ga tt tt t
≥≥ ≥≥ ≥ ⎫
where:  
- 





ga D t  and  , ()
TI
ga D t  are the average lengths of careers in y O and 
TI contributors, respectively, of gender g and age a; 
-   is the function whose result is the integer part of the argument.  
 
As for the reference compensations for the purposes of calc tory new 
ensions, the equations are:  
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=− ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦ ∑    (A.6.20) 
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ga j SS TI
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ga wt  are the reference compensations, as 
set down in Decree-Law 329/93, the firs being for TCO contributors 
(conditional on 
t 












ga wt ρ  are the reference compensations, as 
set down in Decree-Law 35/02, the first being for TCO contributors and the 
second for TI contributors (conditional on ρ ), of gender g and age a who 
retire in year t through old age or disability; 
-   is the consumer price index without housing
5 ) ()
IPC Lt ;( |
SS Lt ρ  is the 
luati n ind , calc lated  n accordance with Decree-Law 35/02 (see  reva o ex u i




(| ) ( () ()
) ( 1| )min 0.005;0.75 0.25
(1 ) (1 ) (1 | ) (1
IPC IPC
SS
IPC IPC TCO TI
Yt Y Lt Lt
Lt







− + + ⎢
















red in social security during and after 2002; 
ting of a weighted average of the amount 
of the new pension calculated according to the two previous regimes, to be 
                                                
                             (A.6.24) 
model contains equations for new pensions differentiating for the following 
Decree-Law 329/93, the most generous, which applies to active contributors 
who had already completed 15 years of contributions by the end of 2001; 
Decree-Law 35/02 ("pure"), the least favourable, applicable to contributors 
registe
-  "mixed" regime of Decree-Law 35/02, less favourable than the first but more 
favourable than the second, consis
applied to new pensioners registered in social security up to 2001 but 
without having yet completed 15 years of contributions by the end of that 
year; 
-  "mixed" regime agreed in 2006 between the government and social partners, 
to be in force from 2007 to 2016.  
 
The model tries to approximate to the complexity of the rules by considering different 
profiles of the reference compensation of new pensioners, following the same logic as 
for the calculation of the average earnings of TI contributors. More precisely, the model 
 
5 The path to horizon of the CPI without housing is one of the model required inputs, along with the path of 
the GDP deflator at market prices. 
  90considers seven earnings profiles, defined as percentages of the average of 
trata. The different percentages are the elements of 
the vector . Therefore, for each regime, the 
equations for the determination of the statutory pension as well as the actual new 
pension (after confronting the statutory pension with the applicable minimum pension) 
are the following: 
 
i. For Decree-Law 329/93 regime
compensations calculated for each s
  () 0.125;0.375;0.625;0.875;1.25;1.75;3 q =
:  
 
{ } { }
329/93, (329/93),
,, ( , | ) max min (1) ( );0.80 ;0.30 ( ) ( | )
TCO TCO ref TCO
ga ga ga yj t D t q j w t , ρ ορ =⋅  
{} max ( ) ;0 1,65 2,65
1,65 2,65
(2006) (2006)
( ) max 1 ( 2008) ;
(1 ) (1 )
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
   (A.6.25) 
 
{ } { }
329/93, (329/93),
,, ( , | ) max min (1) ( );0.80 ;0.30 ( ) ( | )
TI TI ref TI
ga ga ga yj t D t q j w t , ρ ορ =  
{} max ( ) ;0 1,65 2,65
1,65 2,65
(2006) (2006)
( ) max 1 ( 2008) ;
(1 ) (1 )
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
   (A.6.26) 
 
} ()
TCO TCO TCO TCO
ga j ga ga
j () {
7
329/93, 329/93, 15,min( )
,, ,
1
(| ) () 1 5m a x (,| ) ;
SS x tD t y j t t ρα ι x ρ
<
=




93, 15 20,min( )
,, 15 ( ) 21 max ( , | ); ( )
TCO TCO SS
ga g Dt y j t x t ιρ
− +≤ < +  
() { }
329/93, 21 30,min( )
,, 21 ( ) 31 max ( , | ); ( )
TCO TCO SS
ga ga Dt y j t x t ιρ
− +≤ <   +
() { }
329/93, 31 39,min( )
,, 31 ( ) 40 max ( , | ); ( )
TCO TCO SS
ga ga Dt y j t x t ιρ
− +≤ < +  
() { }
329/93, 40,min( )
,, () 4 0m a x (, | ) ; ()
TCO TCO SS
ga ga Dt y j t x t ιρ
≥ ⎤ +≥ ⎦   (A.6.27) 
 
} )
TI TI TI TI
ga j ga ga
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329/93, 329/93, 15,min( )
,, ,
1
(| ) () 1 5m a x (,| ) ; (
SS x <+ ⎣ ∑   =
() { }
329/93, 15 20,min( )
,, 15 ( ) 21 max ( , | ); ( )
TI TI SS
ga ga Dt y j t x t ιρ
− +≤ < +  
() { }
329/93, 21 30,min( )
,, 21 ( ) 31 max ( , | ); ( )
TI TI SS
ga ga Dt y j t x t ιρ
− +≤ < +  
() { }
329/93, 31 39,min( )
,, 31 ( ) 40 max ( , | ); ( )
TI TI SS
ga ga Dt y j t x t ιρ
− +≤ < +  
() { }
329/93, 40,min( )
,, () 4 0m a x (, | ) ; ()
TI TI SS
ga ga Dt y j t x t ιρ






, (| ) (| ) (| ) ()
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TCO TCO TI TI
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=    (A.6.29)  x
vt v t ρ +
 
329/93, 329/93,
,, , , (329/93),
,,
(| ) (| ) (| ) ()
(| )
(| ) ()
TCO TCO TI TI





















ga yj t ρ  is the appr ion to the amount (in euros, conditional  -  oximat
on  ρ ) of the old age or disability statutory pension, i.e. the earnings-related 
pe ns into ac
ration 
pension based on the worker’s contributory career (without taking minimum 
count) that a contributor TCO of gender g and age a would 
receive under the terms of Decree-Law 329/93 if he/she retired in year t with 




ga D t  and reference compensations of 
,
, () (| )
ref TCO
ga qjw tρ ; 
329/93, (,| )
TI yj t -  , ga ρ , idem for TI contributors (with duration of the contributory 
career  , ()
TI
ga D t  and reference earnings 
,
, () (| )
ref TI
ga qjw tρ ); (1) ο  is the first 
element of vector  ( ) 0.02;0.021;0.022;0.0225;0.023 ο =  which includes the 
various legal annual accrual rates of new pensions (set down in Decrees-Law 
32
- 




9/93 and 35/02); 
0( ) 1
velh t ≤Π ≤  is a factor that takes into account the additional annual 
penalty imposed on early retirements of old age in year t, using the situation 
in 2005 as the benchmark (by construction, in the case of disability pensions, 
(
velh t Π ) 1 = ); 
-  Φ is a binary variable that assumes the value 1 (value 0) when the effect of 
the "sustainability fact
in the model on the extreme assumption that the financial 
penalty on the pension value will not impact on decisions regarding 
retirement age; 





ga xt ρ -   is the approximation to  of the new the average amount   
pension (in euros, conditional on ρ ) for TCO contributors of the strata (g, 
a), after aggregating the 7 profiles and taking into account the minimum 




ga xt ρ -  , i
- 
















are the annual minimum pensions (in euros) in force in year t for SPSS 
pensioners with contributory careers of, respectively, less than 15 years, 15 





ga x ρ -   is the approximation to the average amount of old age 
pensions (in euros, conditional on ρ ) for the set of new pensioners of the 
 TCO contributors and from TI 
contributors, if the new pensions were all calculated in accordance with 
Decree-Law 329/93; 
- 




ga xt ρ , idem for new disability pensioners.  
 




,, , , ( , |) ( ( )2 0 ) m a x ( 1 ) ( ) ; 0 . 3 0( ) ( |)
TCO TCO TCO ref TCO
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{} max ( ) ;0 1,65 2,65
1,65 2,65
(2006) (2006)
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(| ) () 1 5m a x (,| ()
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35/02, 35/02, 15,min( ) ) ;
SS x tD t y j t t ρα ι x ρ
<
=
⎡ <+ ⎣ ∑   =
() { }
35/02, 15 20,min( )
,, 15 ( ) 21 max ( , | ); ( )
TCO TCO SS
ga ga Dt y j t x t ιρ
− +≤ <   +
() { }
35/02, 21 30,min( )
,, 21 ( ) 31 max ( , | ); ( )
TCO TCO SS
ga ga Dt y j t x t ιρ
− +≤ <   +
() { }
35/02, 31 39,min( )
,, 31 ( ) 40 max ( , | ); ( )
TCO TCO SS
ga ga Dt y j t x t ιρ
− +≤ < +  
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,, () 4 0m a x (, | ) ; ()
TCO TCO SS
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=    (A.6.35) 
vt v t ρ +
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ga ga ga ga inval SS
ga TCO TI
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(| ) (| ) (| ) ()
TCO TCO TI TI x tit x ti t ρρ ρ +
where the notations are exactly the same as for the regime of Decree-Law 329/93.  
 











This transitory regime is based on a weighted average of the values calculated in terms 
of the rules of each of the previous “pure” regimes, with end-2001 being the point of 
reference for the calculation of the weights.  
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here the notations are also the same as for Decree-Law 329/93.  
 












The difference between this mixed transitory regime and the previous one is related to 
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el weights these values according to the relative importance assumed for 
ach year t:  
 
 
In the MISS model the amounts of the new old age and disability pensions for the four 
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mx tt t =− ℘ − ℘ − ℘  are the proportion of contributors who 
retire in year t, under the terms of, respectively, the Decree-Law 329/93, the 
new regime defined for Decree-Law 35/02, the "mixed" regime of the same 
diploma and the "mixed" regi
partners in October 2006; 
- 
S








ga xt ρ  are the average amounts (in euros, conditional 
on  ρ ) projected respectively for new old age and disability pensions, after 
the relative importance of the various legal regimes has been taken into 




A.6.4 New old age and disability pensions - SPCGA  
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CGA Dt ρ  is the average length of service in yea   r t for active CGA  , ga
contributors of gender g and age a (conditional on ρ ); 
Ξ  is a parameter ( 1 ≥ ) defined as the ratio between the average length of 
service of new pensioners in strata (
- 
g, a) and the average length of service of 
all active contributors in that strata; 
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mx tt =− ℘ − ℘ − ℘  is the legally established 
ote that for ages under the legal age of retirement, the first part of the expression of 
equation (A.6.51) results simply from solving the approximate equality in order 
to
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This approximate relationship only mean at
b
out, then the average career length in the strata (g, a) in year t would increase by 1 
compared to the strata (, 1 ) ga −  in year  1 t − . 
Once the avera
 
ge career length of SPCGA contributors is determined for the strata (g, a) 
y equation (A.6.51), the average career length of new pensioners from the same strata,  b
, (| )
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ga Dt ρ   can be obtained for   (the values for 2005 being observed) through 
the equation:  
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-  For contributors registered in the CGA after 1994, the reference 
compensation is calculated by means of the same expression as given for the 
SPSS in the “pure” regime of Decree-Law 35/02:  
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   (A.6.52) 
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    (A.6.53)
7
 
-  istered in the CGA up to 1993, the reference 
compensation required for calculation of the new pension first component 
laid down in the Estatuto de Aposentação is given approximately by the 
following expression: 
                                                
For contributors reg
 
6 For simplification, the mortality of SPCGA active contributors is not considered, and it is assumed that 
there are no new registrations in SPCGA when other contributors of the same age are retiring. In any 
case, there is in practice negligible mortality for ages under the legal retirement age. Moreover, the second 
assumption is true when the CGA is closed to new registrations (i.e. when 0 ρ = ).   
7 Note that the index used to revalue past earnings ( (| )
SS Lt ρ ) is identical to the revaluation index defined 
for the SPSS. 
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-  ompleted 
up to 2005 the period of complete service, the reference compensation 
needed for calculation of the new pension second component laid down in 
the Estatuto de Aposentação is given by the following expression:  
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(A.6.55)
s for the duration of the contributory career of new 
able
8:  
  i.  Contributors registered after 1993
   
The latter formula simply restricts the equation (A.6.53) to the years of the contributory 
career after 2005.  
 
n the basis of the calculation O
pensioners and the reference compensations, the model determines the old age or 
disability pension for a new pensioner of the strata (g, a) according to the two main 
ules that might be applic r
 
 (Decree-Law 35/02, applied to the 
 SPCGA)   
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8 By simplification, the case is omitted when the contributor has completed the legal length of service for a 
complete pension in 2005, because it is assumed that in this case the contributor opted to retire in that 
year. 
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 are identical to those used for the SPSS. The only point worth 




SPSS grid.  
 
  ii. Contributors registered up to 1993 (Estatuto de Aposentação, modified in 
 2005)   
 
  For CGA contributors registered up to 1993, the amount of the new pension 
  is the result of a weighted average of two components: the first related to the 
  rule in force in 2005 for registered contributors up to 1993 and the second 
  related to the accrual rule set down in Decree-Law 35/02, but applied only to 
  the years of contributory career after 2005. 
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lating the new old age and disability pensions of the SPCGA for each strata 
(g, a) and each year along horizon (conditional on
+≤ < + ≥     (A.6.59) 
 
After calcu
ρ ) according to the two legal 
  100regimes, the MISS model proceeds to choose the regime to be applied as a function of 
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where the notation is again identical to that used for the SPSS.  
 
      (A.6.61) 
.6.5 Average pensions and expenditure on disability and old age pensions 
 
After the previous calculations, and with a view to calculating the annual expenditure on 
pensions in the two subsystems, the MISS model selects the value of the annua
at a pensioner of gender g and age a at the end of t would receive during thi
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9 To compute the average pension for the outstanding retirees at the end of year t, the relevant pension for 
a new retiree beginning in July (this is, a pensioner who first received a pension in July of year t) is the 
annual amount of the pension that he/she would have received if payment started in January. 
  101where  (| )
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inval SS zt ,  (| )
velh CGA zt  and  (| )
velh SS zt
, , , , ρ ρ ρ ρ , ga , ga , ga , ga  are, respectively, 
the amounts (in euros) of the average pensions defined above, conditional on ρ . The 
previous equations calculate the average pension as a weighted average, on the one hand 
of the annual average pension of the retirees carried over from the previous year and, on 
he other hand, of the annual average pension of t
re
 new retirees (taking these as if they had 
ceived a full pension during the whole year, even if that was not the case).  
 
After the average pensions is computed as described above, the model calculates the 
annual expenditure on pensions (in millions of euros, conditional onρ ), of each type 
and for each one of the subsystems, for the  ioners of each strata (g,a). The 
following equations are used for that purpose:  
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These equations are simple adaptations of the general approximation rule to the 
calculation of annual averages from year-end data (see equation A.1.2). This rule was 
defined for stock-variable
+
s, but its application in the current context is justified, bearing 
inval CGA in mind the definition of the variables,  , (| ) ga zt
, ρ ,  , (| ) ga zt
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ga dt ρ  , 
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inval SS dt ρ  , 
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velh CGA dt ρ  and 
, (| )
velh SS dt , ga , ga , ga ρ  in millions of 
uros, since average p e
expressed in thousands.  
ensions are calculated in euros and the numbers of pensioners are 
 
It should be noted that the annual average old age and disability pensions for the strata 
(g, a), in the standard concept of the average pension, can be obtained by dividing the 
total expenditure for the average stock of pensioners (and multiplying by 1000 to get the 
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A.6.6 Survivor pensions  
 
Since it was impossible to adequately model the additional facto ce the 
amount of new survivor pensions, the sim lest possible solution was adopted in the 
MISS model: to start from the values observed in 2005 for the average survivor pensions 
and update them by using the variation in the average old age pension of the subsystem 
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ga dt ρ wher  are the annual amounts (in euros) in year t for the 
ge pensions received by survivor pensioners of gender g and age a, respectively 
r the SPCGA and for the SPSS.  
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     (A.7.1) 
 
be the level of overall coverage of the SPSS for the strata (g,a). Also, let   be an 
"eligibility index" for unemployment benefit such that, in 2005, this index assumes the 
value 1 and an increase (reduction) of the index along the horizon m es in the 





  103active contributors of the SPSS. Given  , (| )
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ga t λ ρ  and ℵ e model calculates the 
number of beneficiaries with unemployment benefit (in thousands) for the strata (g,a) in
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   (A.7.2) 
 
In turn, the annual average amount (in euros)  , (| )
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where (  is an "index of generosity of the unemp enefits" set 
xogenously by the model user ( ).  
iven  Bt
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des ρ , the SPSS expenditure (in millions of euros) on 
unemployment benefits for beneficiaries of gender g and age a will be: 
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   (A.7.4) 
 
A.7.2 Sickness benefit  
 
 the MISS model, the number of SPSS contributors (in thousands) belonging to the  In
strata (g,a) with sickness benefit processed in year t,  , (| )
doe
ga Bt ρ , is up-dated through the 
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s a consequence, the following equation calculates the expenditure on sickness 
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A.7.3 Maternity, paternity and adoption benefits 
 
he rule for updating the number of beneficiaries of maternity, paternity and adoption  T
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∑    (A.7.8) 
 the one for the sickness benefits:  
 
while the rule for updating the average amount of the benefit for beneficiaries of the 
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xpenditure on maternity, paternity and adoption benefits for SPSS beneficiaries of 
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   (A.7.10) 
 
.7.4  A Subsidy for children assistance 
 
The model updates the number of contributors of the strata (g,a) who are beneficiaries 
of this allowance as follows:  
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he equations for updating the average amount and expenditure for the beneficiaries of 
the strata (g,a) are identical to those considered for the other typ s associated 
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   (A.7.13) 
o social security subsystems , () Tt ⊕⊕  from the following equation:  
 
 
A.7.5 Family allowance Abono de família - SPSS  
 
The model extrapolates the total number of beneficiaries of abono de família
10 for the 






























   (A.7.14) 
 
To reach the number of beneficiaries of abono de família in the SPSS, the model 
deducts from the total number of beneficiaries those for whom the CGA has payment 
sponsibility (beneficiaries with a family connection to CGA pensioners):   re
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   (A.7.16) 
 
10 The beneficiary of abono de família is the child or young person to whom the benefit is due. 
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SPSS expenditure per beneficiary of abono de família (in euros) is simply projected 
 the value observed in the base year in accordance with an updating rate for family 
e model user:  
from
allowances, defined exogenously by th
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,, AF SS AF SS PF
here  is the above-mentioned rate of annual update of family allowances. In 
turn, the total SPSS expenditure on abono de família is given by the equation:  
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he number of SPSS beneficiaries of gender g and age a who received some form of 
household benefits apart from abono de família in year t  by the equation:  
   (A.7.18) 
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          ( A . 7 . 1 9 )  
 
Just as for the abono de família, the average amount per bene ily 
enefits in the SPSS is simply up-dated bearing in mind the variation rate decided 
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 expenses to 
eneficiaries of gender g and age a is:  
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   (A.7.21) 
A.7.7 Family benefits - SPCGA  
 
Finally, owing to limitations of base information, the model considers a single equation 
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(A.7.22) 
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